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INTRODUCTION
A. WHAT IS FAIR EXCHANGE?
Fair Exchange ("FE"), in this article, means when communities in-
vest in businesses by giving them tax abatements, tax breaks, or assets at
below market rates, and the citizens get equity to be managed by a com-
munity trust.
The resounding response to this concept has been "Yes, of course!"
from business people, federal, state, and local legislators, union leaders,
community organizers, foundation staff, law professors, and journalists.
Treating government investors the same way one treats other business
investors is an idea that holds increasing sway today, as businesses be-
come more mobile while their attachment to any particular community
becomes more tenuous and subject to market influence.
The devil in the Fair Exchange concept is in the details. Even
though the overall concept of FE is simple and intuitive, its numerous
details require an in-depth study. This article explores legal and eco-
nomic precedents, proposes Fair Exchange models, discusses practical
and legal issues involved in designing the models, considers potential
applications across a wide range of issues, venues and jurisdictions; and
discusses strategies for implementing workable FE proposals. This arti-
cle aims to generate substantial and detailed discussion on how to actual-
ize FE at the local, state, federal, and global level.
At present there are no existing FE models, although there exists
substantial and successful precedents for many parts that constitute a
good FE model. The following is a hypothetical to clarify the concept of
a FE program; it is only one of many possible ways to organize an FE
model.
FAIR EXCHANGE
Suppose Multinational Manufacturing & Marketing, Inc. ("MMM")
seeks $18 million in tax abatements, low interest loans, and loan guaran-
tees to build corporate headquarters and a manufacturing facility in De-
troit. Suppose the City of Detroit, the State of Michigan, and the U.S.
federal government provide $18 million in abatements, loans and loan
guarantees to MMM, with $6 million from each. In return for the govern-
ment aid, MMM agrees to provide jobs and infrastructure improvements
to MMM's new facility in Detroit worth at least $18 million over the
next six years. This is an unfair exchange overall; although the com-
pany's investment may provide jobs for some citizens, all citizens, as
taxpayers, are paying for the aid to MMM. Thus, the entire citizenry
deserve a return on its investment. Therefore, a possible solution is to
include a provision in the loan and loan guarantee package where the
community investors each receive MMM shares worth 10% (in this case
$600,000 each) of their investment at the closing of the deal as compen-
sation for undertaking the risks involved.
Suppose further that MMM decides to close its facilities and move
its operation to Sri Lanka after three years, having provided only $3 mil-
lion in jobs and improvements. What can be done to enforce MMM's
agreement with the government investors and compensate the taxpayers
for their combined loss in jobs and tax dollars? Currently some commu-
nities have clawback laws' that allow the governments to seek compen-
sation from companies like MMM for withdrawing its investment after
receiving subsidies. Clawbacks are used as a disincentive to prevent type
of disinvestments MMM is making by moving away. FE allows the com-
pany the ability to move if it has to, but the community gets return on its
equity in the company if it prospers when it relocates. Unlike clawbacks,
which are generally enforced via litigation (if enforced at all), a develop-
ment agreement with FE equity provisions creates an automatic owner-
ship stake upon default because the stock warrants automatically mature,
as described below.
By contrast, under an FE law or FE Community Benefit Agreement
("CBA"), taxpayers' investments would receive treatment similar to
those afforded to business investors-securing their investments with
reasonable collateral or equity. MMM, the governments, and three com-
munity trusts2 would sign an agreement wherein MMM gives $6 million
I GREG LEROY, No MORE CANDY STORE: STATE AND CITIES MAKING JOB SUBSIDIES
ACCOUNTABLE 43-71 (Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy 1997); see generally Ken-
neth P. Thomas, The Sources and Processes of Tax and Subsidy Competition, (conference
paper presented at University of Minnesota during the "Reining in the Competition for Invest-
ment" conference (February 2004)), available at www.hhh.umn.edu/img/assets/6158/thomas_
paper.pdf.
2 For instance, the Detroit Community Trust, the Michigan Community Trust and the
U.S. Community Trust can undertake such duties.
2006]
238 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 15:231
in stock warrants (in addition to the initial $600,000 each received as a
closing requirement) for its publicly traded common stock as collateral
for the government benefits it receives. These warrants would have terms
that only mature if MMM does not fulfill its $18 million worth of
promises, using metrics agreed upon in the initial contract. In the current
example, MMM receives $18 million in benefits and returned $3 million
in value. A total of $15 million in MMM stock warrants would mature
immediately, providing $5 million of publicly traded common stock to
each of the three community trusts.
In such a hypothetical, a community trust can hold stock for divi-
dends, cash or other securities. The community trust can allocate assets
and income within the community trust to individual accounts for each
citizen of the jurisdiction who pays taxes to the government supporting
the business venture in question. These assets and income can then be
reinvested in local companies, used to augment public services, or em-
ployed in some combination of these options. Although in our hypotheti-
cal, each community would prefer that the jobs not leave for Sri Lanka,
MMM could at least compensate the local citizenry for its loss of em-
ployment by sharing in MMM's profit from cost savings gained in
relocation.
Local citizens make decisions about how to best use the community
trust income to protect the local economy; the community trusts (particu-
larly in conjunction with thousands of other community trusts, public
pension and social investors) vote their stock to make MMM a more
socially responsible company.
Federal legislation that required states and communities to create
and enforce FE laws in as a condition for receiving certain federal funds,
would enable all communities to enforce FE laws without losing compa-
nies to other U.S. communities. FE requirements could thereby level the
playing field for communities nationwide (worldwide if global bodies
enacted them); enacting FE laws that increase the power of governments
in their business dealings with companies. Broad use of FE programs
would enable community trusts to pool their stock assets so that each
holds a diversified portfolio of assets; yet create voting trusts so that each
community could vote the original block of stock it added to the pool.
The purpose of this article is to focus a policy discussion on the
concept that a government investment in any private business should be
handled as a business investment by a location-bound investor in a non-
location-bound business. Government investors need more sophisticated
tools to make these transactions a fair value exchange for the citizens
paying for them. This article opens the discussion by marshalling prece-
dents, examining models and drawing lessons from these models, all to
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provide a platform from which communities can begin to experiment
with the policy to develop best FE practices.
FE is both a general concept and a specific strategy aimed at solving
a major structural problem - the mobility of capital and the immobility
of communities and labor. The general concept of FE encompasses a
wide range of strategies and programs used by governments, labor, envi-
ronmental and community organizations, and those seeking to bring busi-
ness under civil society control. These programs aim to compensate
communities for the legal and financial benefits they provide to corpora-
tions within their borders.
The specific FE strategies discussed herein are not offered as alter-
natives to existing FE programs, but as concrete policy proposals aimed
to subject businesses to civil society control. For example, the former
World Bank economist, Noreena Hertz, proposed that the government
should: 1) create a World Social Organization to counterbalance the
World Trade Organization ("WTO"), with powers to protect human, la-
bor and environmental rights comparable to the WTO's powers to protect
trade; 2) create campaigns for national reform to disenfranchise corpora-
tions and re-enfranchise the citizenry; 3) increase anti-trust enforcement
and restrict cross-media ownership; 4) create global legal aid to ensure
greater corporate transparency; and 5) establish a global taxing authority
to tax pollution and energy consumption to protect the environment, to
tax alcohol and tobacco to provide a global health fund, and to tax mul-
tinational corporations to fund the development and enforcement of
global norms to protect human, labor and environmental rights.3 Joseph
Stiglitz, the Nobel prize winner and former World Bank Chief Econo-
mist, suggests that the World Bank should change its development assis-
tance methods that undermine democracy, forgive debts in developing
countries, and create lending mechanisms that address a society's overall
needs for development, instead of merely focusing on economic and fi-
nancial needs using, capital and natural resources. 4 David Korten sug-
gests decommissioning the Bretton Woods system of international
financial institutions and replacing them with equivalents run by and us-
ing United Nations ("U.N.") standards. 5 Current global governance is di-
vided between the U.N. and the Bretton Woods organizations. The latter
organizations, including the International Monetary Fund ("IMF"), the
World Bank and the WTO, dictate economic policies with callous disre-
3 NOREENA HERTZ, THE SILENT TAKEOVER: GLOBAL CAPITALIZATION AND THE DEATH
OF DEMOCRACY 209-212 (Free Press 2001).
4 STIGLIrZ, JOSEPH, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 241-247 (W. W. Norton
2003).
5 KORTEN, DAVID, WHEN CORPORATIONS RULE THE WORLD 267-80 (2nd ed., Kumerian
2001).
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gard for social and environmental consequences of its policies.6 Mean-
while, the U.N. finds itself forced to confront these social and
environmental consequences with little funding and no economic
authority. 7
The FE strategies discussed herein are not intended to undermine
the role of government. This article was researched and developed during
the years 2000 to 2005, when the legitimacy of "big government" came
under attack in the U.S. The author developed FE strategies using the
concept of ownership by community trust, with the goal of showing al-
ternatives to direct governmental ownership and avoiding charges of FE
being a "big government" proposal. The article presents successful ex-
amples of government ownership, including the Tennessee Valley Au-
thorities, the Chrysler Loan Guarantee and the Air Transportation Safety
and System Stabilization Act of 2001. Government ownership in FE pro-
grams does not involve long-term government management of busi-
nesses; instead, it encourages government or community trust bodies to
act as business investors for public benefit. In addition, the Tennessee
Valley Authority's program provides a successful example of a profit-
yielding long-term entity using a mixed public-private model.
In addition to numerous proposals for changes at the global govern-
ance level, there has been significant local activity by labor and commu-
nity organizations to get community benefit agreements from businesses
in exchange for their support in the government approval process of de-
velopment projects. 8 These examples show that FE can be accomplished
without stock or other equity changing hands, if promises are quantified
and enforceable.
There is a long history of government investment in private compa-
nies; examples include land grants, abatements, natural resource leases,
loans, loan guarantees and bailouts.9 The success of these ventures for
communities and citizens of has ranged from of these deals as business
proposition range from profitable business ventures to scandalous scams.
This article will examine these examples and incorporate the lessons they
provide for creating FE legislation. Following is a brief overview of
these examples.
During its first 100 years, with little else to invest, the U.S. govern-
ment used land grants to railroads, homesteaders and state governments
to develop the western frontier of the U.S. (the "West"), after removing
6 See id.
7 See id.
8 See infra section V (H) in this article.
9 See, e.g., 7 U.S.C.A. §301 (2004) (originally enacted as Morrill Land Grant Act of
July 2, 1862, ch. 130, §1, 12 Stat. 503.); 16 U.S.C. §831 (2001) (originally enacted as Tennes-
see Valley Authority Act of 1933).
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the Native Americans t1 . The government succeeded in its goal: the
homesteaders helped to populate the West, creating towns and states in
the process, and many poor European and American peasants became the
yeoman farmers Thomas Jefferson extolled as the bedrock of democ-
racy.I t Colleges that were set upon state-grant lands from that era now
represent some of our largest and most prestigious universities. 12 And
according to at least one congressional committee, the government re-
ceived in discounted transportation costs an amount equivalent with what
it gave the railroads (at least according to one congressional
document). 1 3
The Tennessee Valley Authority ("TVA") resulted in a very good
deal for the government. It has provided a wide range of much-needed
public services for over 70 years, including flood control and cheap
power. 14 Most importantly, the TVA brought businesses, jobs and elec-
tricity to a large and extremely poor large and impoverished portion of
the country.' 5 Beginning in the darkest hours of the Great Depression, it
continues to provide power and development benefits today. It has also
repaid the government's financial investment many times over.
In the 1979 Chrysler Loan Guarantee Act16 ("CLGA") and the 2001
federal airline bailout 17, the government required corporate loan recipi-
ents to provide stock warrants in addition to repaying their loans. In the
Chrysler case, Chrysler was saved, along with all the related jobs and
economic activity.' 8 Under the CLGA, Chrysler employees received ap-
proximately 15% of the company's stock, the loan was repaid in full to
the government ahead of schedule, and the U.S. government made over
$300 million when it sold its stock warrants. It is too early to tell whether
the government will turn a profit on the airline stock warrants from the
2001 airline bailout, but undoubtedly, the social benefits of preserving
jobs in the airline industry has amply justified government involvement.
However, when the government began to require 10 - 30% in stock war-
rants for airlines to qualify for loans and loan guarantees, Northwest Air-
10 Kansas Nebraska Act of 1854, U.S. Stats. At Large, Vol. 10, p. 27710 Stat. 277.
11 Thomas Jefferson, Notes on Virginia, 1782. "Those who labor in the earth are the
chosen people of god, if he ever had a chosen people, whose breasts he made the peculiar
deposits for substantial and genuine virtue. It is the focus in which he keeps alive that sacred
fire which otherwise might not escape from the earth."
12 For example, the Universities of Michigan and Wisconsin. Act of July 2, 1862 (Mor-
rill Land Grant Act), ch. 130, 12 Stat. 503 (current version at 7 U.S.C. §301 (2000)).
13 National Railroad Museum website at http://www.nationalrrmuseum.org/.
14 See infra section H (C).
15 See infra section II(C).
16 Chrysler Loan Guarantee Act of 1979, 15 U.S.C. §§1861-1875, P.L. 96-185 (repealed
1983).
17 Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, 49 U.S.C. §40101 (2001).
18 See infra section I(F).
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lines concluded that it did not need the funds enough to give up equity,
and decided not to submit its application. Both of these government ac-
tions were examples of businesslike deals where the government re-
ceived tangible benefits for risking its funds; they provide the basis for
the income end of the FE models proposed below in this article.
By contrast, the savings and loan bailout of the late 1980s was a
disastrous investment for the U.S. government and its taxpayers. The
$157 billion bailout was financed by floating 30-year bonds that, with
interest, may ultimately cost the taxpayers as much as $500 billion or
more. 19 Considerable evidence shows that the savings and loan industry
failed due in large part to misconduct by senior insiders or outsiders.
Well-connected insiders received remarkable benefits at the taxpayers'
expense. High-ranking government officials dismantled the federal strike
forces seeking criminal prosecution in these cases. Although the low-
income investors desperately needed protection from loss in the failed
savings and loans, most of the bailout benefit went to a wealthy few. The
savings and loan bailout stands as an example of what governments
should not do when investing in private businesses.
The Conrail deal shows the shortsightedness that comes from legis-
lators taking dogmatic positions about public-private partnerships or alle-
giance to special interests at the public's expense. The U.S. federal
government created Conrail out of seven bankrupt railroad companies,
and Congress ordered that Conrail was to become profitable and sold to
the private sector by a certain deadline. Congress did not provide that the
government might hold Conrail stock to reap long-term rewards from its
investment, so that even though the government invested over $10 billion
in Conrail, because it had to sell Conrail to the private sector at the arbi-
trary deadline, it sold its stock for $1.9 billion in 1987, having lost $8.3
billion on its investment. Ten years after the federal government sold
Conrail, a private company bought Conrail for $10 billion. Had the gov-
ernment held the stock for 10 years it would at least have broken even on
its investment, instead of losing $8.3 billion on the deal.
The Alaska Permanent Fund ("APF"), Alberta Heritage Savings and
Trust Fund (the "Heritage Fund") and the Canadian Labor Sponsored
Investment Funds ("LSIFs") provide very useful examples of structures
and the complex issues involved in developing the distribution end of
Fair Exchange legislation.
In the APF, a state uses royalties obtained from natural resource
exploration to provide dividends to all of its citizens and to serve as a
source of income for government services, while investing the fund prin-
cipal with no other social investment objectives. The fund grows nicely,
19 See infra section I(H).
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but the citizens become addicted to the dividend income in ways that
may undermine their capacity to act for the general good as citizens. The
APF provides the author's model for how a Fair Exchange trust might
provide individual citizens with dividends from government investments
in companies.
The Heritage Fund serves as an example of a province using royal-
ties obtained from natural resource exploration to lower taxes, make in-
vestments in economic development projects, support government owned
businesses, and provide loans to other Canadian provinces at below mar-
ket rates. Because the Heritage Fund has been controlled directly by the
government, unlike the APF (which is managed as a trust fund indepen-
dent of the government) the Heritage Fund's focus is muddled and its
direction has shifted with political winds. This fund, although initially
larger than the APF, has not grown at all
The Canadian Labor Sponsored Investment Funds (LSIFs) provide a
model of citizen investment directed by government chartered, labor con-
trolled investment funds. The LSIFs have produced a significant increase
in available venture capital in Canada, enabling substantial economic de-
velopment in provinces such as Quebec and Ontario that previously had
little access to venture capital. The LSIFs considered not only financial
factors, but also social and environmental audits to screen the companies
in which they invest. The LSIFs inspired the author's initial model for
workable FE community trusts.
An ideal FE legislation would contain a combination of the airline
bailout investment requirements, the APF's quasi-independent trust pro-
viding individual dividends, and the well-focused local investment strate-
gies of the LSIFs. The TVA also provides an excellent model. All the
precedents herein offer useful guides in realizing a new FE policy. It may
be quite difficult to accomplish all of this in one law that also addresses
the economic reality facing a community. The examples herein provide
excellent models of different aspects of FE. Each jurisdiction will need to
fashion its FE laws to meet its needs. Communities will need to balance
the various features of the examples with their economic reality to create
something that works for them.
This article does not intend to describe a definitive model for FE.
The examples herein are preliminary, and suggest that. Based on the ex-
perience in creating them, FE cannot be a one-size-fits-all piece of legis-
lation. Each local FE law will need to be crafted to fit the circumstances,
resources and competitive situation of the community.
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This article is the culmination of the Capital Ownership Group
("COG") 20 Fair Exchange Project's initial research phase. It was fol-
lowed by a policy conference 21 . The comments from that conference are
incorporated in this article. Based on positive reactions to FE at the con-
ference, COG is launching more research and a project implementation
phase. The implementation phase includes: finding more local and state
FE examples; interviewing their leaders; assisting communities to create
model FE policies; publicizing the outcome of these efforts, gathering
and disseminating best practices information, educating interested par-
ties, creating a technical assistance capacity, developing collaborative
networks of FE trusts, innovators and leaders; and developing a federal
or global trade policy to raise the floor on all government investments in
private companies. The author hopes this article is the first step of a
potentially large-scale public policy undertaking.
Recent events show the urgent necessity for action in the FE area.
As global competition heats up, and global businesses gain increasing
power in comparison to governments the economies of developed coun-
try economies suffer enormous pressure from growing energy costs and
lower wages in the developing world, and governments in both the devel-
oped and developing world need new economic strategies and tools to
protect the interests of their citizens from the pressure of global busi-
nesses that undermine civil society.
In the past few years, the U.S. federally guaranteed pension system
has been overrun with bankruptcies of steel companies, airlines and man-
ufacturing firms with under-funded defined benefit pension plans.
22
Since few new companies provide defined benefit pension plans, the
Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation ("PBGC") is sorely stressed
when these firms file for bankruptcy because PBGC only gets a fraction
of the pension funds it is obligated to pay retirees 23 . Because of its dire
situation, the PBGC has started seeking equity for the pension plan liabil-
ities it accepts. 24
20 See generally The Capital Ownership Group, at http:///www.capitalownership.org.
The Capital Ownership Group (COG) is a non-profit network of professionals, academics and
activists on six continents, using broad ownership to abate the negative effects of globaliza-
tion. COG operates an online conference center, think tank and library based at Kent State
University including 20 working groups and participants from six continents.
21 COG Fair Exchange Conference, October 5, 2005 at George Washington University
Law School. Presentations, materials and video of that conference available at http://www.
capitalownership.org/grphome.html.
22 Entrepreneurs Reap Benefits While PBGC Gets Saddled With The Costs, BusiNEss
WEEK, Feb. 14, 2005.
23 Id.
24 In re U.S. Airways, et al U.S. Bankruptcy Court E.D. Va., Alexandria Division, Case
No.94-13819, Consent Motion for an Order Approving Settlement of Claims of Pension Bene-
fit Guaranty Corporation Pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9019, In re U.S.
Airways, No. 04-13819 (Bankr. E.D. Va. filed Aug. 26, 2005).
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A FE settlement providing corporate equity in exchange for PBGC
taking on company pension liabilities was approved by the U.S. Bank-
ruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia in the Chapter 11 reor-
ganization of U.S. Airways, Inc. ("US Airways"). 25 U.S. Airways owed
PBGC nearly $2.5 billion dollars for terminating its pension plans and
over $200 million in minimum contribution liability. 26 Rather than en-
gage in costly litigation about the bankruptcy priority of these claims,
PBGC settled with the airline by accepting $13.5 million in cash, a
seven-year note for $10 million dollars and 70% of the Unsecured Credi-
tors' Stock in U.S. Airways. 27
Recently, the U.S. government allocated $51.8 billion as a down
payment to rebuild large portions of Mississippi and Louisiana destroyed
by Hurricane Katrina in September of 2005.28 The total government in-
vestment on this post-Katrina rebuilding project will likely exceed $200
billion;29 much of those funds will probably go to rebuild businesses.
The day after the government's plan became public, the Wall Street Jour-
nal reported that many U.S. corporations are using the current popular
support for large-scale government relief projects to push for a broad
range of business reforms that have little to do with hurricane relief.30
Among the reforms that lobbyists are seeking are: the removal of envi-
ronmental regulatory barriers to oil and gas drilling in the Arctic Na-
tional Wildlife Reserve, the removal of fuel taxes on airlines, and the aid
to rebuild chicken and oyster farms. 31
The government's Hurricane Katrina cash allocation begins in the
final year of the $15 billion federal airline bailout made necessary by the
events of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.32 Based on these
and numerous other examples, it becomes clear that governments are
called upon to invest in private businesses on a regular basis and are
therefore in need of ongoing government policies for engaging in private
business investments, rather than approaching each one ad hoc.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Brody Mullins, Lobbyists Seek Leverage from Storm: Congress Hears from Big Air-
lines and Energy Companies to Small Chicken Farmers, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Sept. 9,
2005, at A4.
29 See CNN Nightly News, (CNN television broadcast, Sept. 10, 2005).
30 Mullins, supra note 28.
31 Id.
32 H.R. 3645, "Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act to Meet Immediate Needs
Arising from the Consequences of Hurricane Katrina 2005", September 4, 2005. The final
report of the ATSSSA board was dated June 3, 2004 for loan applications with a deadline of
2002 that were due to be repaid between 2007 and 2009. The Financial Condition of the
Airline Industry: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Aviation, 108th Cong. (2004) (testimony
of Michael Kestenbaum, Executive Director of the Air Transportation Stabilization Board),
available at http://www.house.gov/transportation/aviation/06-03-04/06-03-04memo.html.
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The issue of states providing subsidies to businesses is the subject
of a current case on U.S. Supreme Court docket 33. In Cuno v. Daimler
Chrysler34 the Sixth Circuit ruled that the investment tax credit granted
to DaimlerChrysler against Ohio's corporate income tax violates the
Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. While Cuno is still pending a
Supreme Court judgment, bills have already been introduced in the Sen-
ate and House to short-circuit the appeals process, reverse Cuno, and
affirmatively give state and local governments the authority to grant wide
array of economic development-oriented tax incentives to businesses. 35
The legislation in question, the "Economic Development Act of 2005"
(S. 1066/H.R. 2471), is sponsored by Ohio Senator George Voinovich
and Ohio Representative Patrick Tiberi.36
B. COMMUNITIES SHOULD NOT BE SECOND-CLASS INVESTORS
Wal-Mart's story exemplifies the central contradiction in the current
relationships between corporations, governments and citizens. With an-
nual revenues of $256 billion, Wal-Mart is the world's largest retailer
and one of its largest companies. 37 Wal-Mart has used more than $1 bil-
lion worth of economic development subsidies to develop distribution
centers and stores in the U.S.; subsidies for individual distribution cen-
ters amounted to as much as $48 million (with an average of $7.4 mil-
lion), while the largest subsidy for retail stores was $12 million (with an
average of $2.8 million).38 Although Wal-Mart presents itself as an en-
trepreneurial success story, it has made extensive use of tax breaks, free
land, cash grants and other forms of public subsidies.39 In addition to tax
breaks it gets access to these local markets with the frequent conse-
quence of displacing local businesses and the jobs they provide. "It is
quite possible that a new Wal-Mart store will destroy as many (or more)
jobs than it creates - and the Wal-Mart jobs may pay less, meaning they
do less to stimulate the local economy."''4
33 DaimlerChrysler v. Cuno, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 5422, cert. granted 2006 U.S. LEXIS 1096
(U.S., 2006).
34 Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., 383 F.3d 379, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 18550 (6th Cir.)
(6th Cir. Ohio, 2004).
35 S. 1066/H.R. 2471, "Economic Development Act of 2005".
36 Michael Mazerov, Should Congress Authorize State to Continue Giving Tax Breaks to
Businesses, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, available at http://www.cbpp.org/2-18-05
sfp.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2005).
37 Phillip Mattera & Anna Purinton, Shopping for Subsidies: How Wal-Mart Uses Tax-
payer Money to Finance its Never-Ending Growth, Press Release and Executive Summary,
GOOD JOBS FIRST, at 7 (May 2004), available at http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/pdf/wmtstudy.
pdf.
38 Id. at 7.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 10.
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The web of human relationships that form a neighborhood or com-
munity is essential to human existence. People seek to live in places with
high quality of life, where they can be safe and secure. People want clean
water, air, food and medicine, and they prefer to live in places where
physical and social infrastructure such as libraries, schools, parks, com-
munity organizations and churches are long established. In addition to all
that, people need steady employment. Thus most people are invariably
tied to certain communities. We need stable employment near these com-
munities to enable stability in the neighborhood. These human needs
have not changed significantly over the centuries.
By contrast, business entities have none or few of those constraints
of place. Before technology made global markets possible, businesses
often had a closer connection to specific communities because they
needed to be close to natural resources, skilled labor, markets or trans-
portation hubs. In this age of computers and global electronic markets,
however, businesses have been freed from their local ties. Unfortunately,
our business laws and forms of government have not caught up with this
seismic social shift. Yet, to function successfully, businesses still need
government to enforce contracts, keep order, protect property, provide
infrastructure and allocate or protect claims to use of natural resources.
C. WHAT HAS BEEN THE ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT IN BALANCING
THE COMPETING NEEDS OF HUMAN COMMUNITIES AND BUSINESS,
AND HOW HAS GLOBALIZATION CHANGED THAT ROLE?
Humans have always adapted their means of living to the demands
of the economic engines, often at great human expense - such as sweat-
shops, child labor, overcrowded, diseased and crime-infested slums. In
democratic societies, when these conditions threaten general community
welfare, social movements such as unions, progressive political move-
ments rise to demand government intervention.
To provide jobs for communities, governments at all levels have
created programs to entice businesses to locate to protect the economic
well being of the community. Businesses quickly learn to use, manipu-
late or lobby to create these programs to meet their own competitive
ends.41 Now that election campaigns are so costly in the U.S., businesses
have achieved unprecedented control over legislative bodies. 42
41 See generally LERoY, supra note 1; see generally Thomas, supra note 1.
42 According to Common Cause, a U.S. public interest group that lobbies for accountable
government and clean elections: "The way congressional campaigns are currently financed is
corrupt. It is a system where individuals and groups can contribute significant sums of money
to elected officials who have the power to make decisions affecting the interests of those
donors. It is also a system where incumbents' financial advantage often results in noncompeti-
tive elections, making them less responsive to the voters and more responsive to special-inter-
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A key function of government has been to develop, allocate and
regulate the use and restoration of natural resources, but our current poli-
cies have resulted in enormous subsidies and nearly no net benefit for the
public. For example, Wal-Mart, a global corporation that causes compa-
nies in China to compete with each other to lower wages, 43 received $1
billion in subsidies intended to protect communities and jobs, even
though the opening of Wal-Mart stores in many communities leads to the
closing of local businesses run by local people.an
Clearly, governments need to alter their course of dealing with pri-
vate businesses; the balance between communities, business and govern-
ment has swung much too far in favor of businesses in recent years.
Since we do not have global government, it is increasingly difficult for
nations, states and local governments to regulate businesses. Now that an
increasing number of businesses have become multi-national, they are no
longer subject to the laws of a single jurisdiction. Upon granting benefits
such as tax breaks, tax abatements and subsidies of all types, local gov-
ernments have the legal power to require the same rights and benefits as
other investors in business. Yet, due to competitive economic pressure,
few communities exercise this power.
I. HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS OF GOVERNMENT
INVESTMENT IN PRIVATE BUSINESSES - FOR THE
REVENUE END OF FAIR EXCHANGE
A. QUESTIONS CONSIDERED
Any FE law would necessarily be a complex legal and economic
structure, but legal precedents exist for most of the proposed FE features,
although to date they have not combined in a single program. This article
is based on a literature survey seeking precedents and guidance on the
feasibility of FE; it is a conceptual and historical overview of prior gov-
ernment programs investing in business and an examination of the FE
element these programs contained.
B. HOMESTEAD ACT OF 1862
For each precedent, this article examines the following aspects: 1)
what the community investor's intended goals were; 2) whether the com-
munity investor's goals had been to broaden asset ownership; 3) how
well the community investor succeeded at its announced goals; 4)
est contributors." Common Cause: Holding Power Accountable, available at http://www.
commoncause.org/site/pp.asp?c=DKLNKIMQIwG&b=191979 (last visited April 14, 2005).
43 WILLIAM GREIDER, ONE WORLD READY OR NOT, THE MANIC LOGIC OF GLOBAL CAPI-
TALISM, 341-345 (Simon & Schuster 1997).
44 Mattera & Purinton, supra note 37, at 10.
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whether and how the community's investment structure or policies might
inform future FE policies; 5) whether the community got fair value for its
investment in financial terms; 6) other social or economic return on in-
vestment obtained by the government or quasi-government body from
the investment; and 7) available information on other impacts of the in-
vestment program. The article also investigates the problem of quanti-
fying non-monetary returns to communities and suggests a preliminary
basis for measuring community benefits.
U.S. government policy on the relationship between government,
business and citizens in the 18th, 19th and early 20th centuries serves as
a good starting point for comparison to and consideration of government
policy options toward businesses in the 21st century.
1. What was the purpose of the Homestead Act of 1862?
The central purposes of the Homestead Act of 1862 (the "Home-
stead Act") were to settle the western frontier of the U.S., to build com-
munities and to develop the U.S. economy. 45 Other laws passed at the
same time used government land to create agricultural colleges and in-
duce railroad companies to build railroads in the frontier, such as the
Morrill Land Grant Act 1862,46 which provided for college land grants;
and the Pacific Railroad Act of 1862, 7 which provided participating rail-
road companies with 5 square miles of public land for every mile of rail
laid, and which was later amended to include 10 square miles for every
mile of rail laid.48
The Kansas-Nebraska Act 1854 opened up more land to settlers as
the government "legally" acquired extensive land from the Native
Americans.
The Homestead Act provided that any citizen (or applicant for citi-
zenship) who was a head of household, veteran or person over age 21,
and who had not fought against the U.S. could claim 160 acres of public
land and obtain title by building a home on the land and farming it for 5
years. 49 The Homestead Act 50 , the Morrill Act 5 I and the Pacific Railroad
45 Act of May 20, 1862 (Homestead Act), Pub. L. No. 37-64, § 392 (repealed 1976).
46 Act of July 2, 1862 (Morrill Land Grant Act), ch. 130, 12 Stat. 503 (current version at
7 U.S.C. §301 (2000)).
47 Act of July 1, 1862 (Pacific Railway Act), ch. 120, 12 Stat. 489.
48 S. COMM. ON ENERGY & NATURAL RESOURCES, 108th Cong., BACKGROUND FOR THE
RAILROAD RIorr OF WAY CONVEYANCE VALIDATION Acr OF 2003, H.R. REP. No.1658
(describing the land grant features of the Pacific Railroad Act of 1862, 12 Stat. 489 and its
1864 amendment, 13 Stat. 356).
49 Act of May 20, 1862, Pub. L. No. 37-64, § 392 (repealed 1976).
50 Id.
51 7 U.S.C. §301.
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Act52 were passed in quick succession, soon after the South seceded from
the U.S.
2. What benefits does the Homestead Act of 1862 present?
Between 1862 and 1938, 3 million people applied and almost 1.5
million households were given title to 246 million acres of land.53 This
acreage is close to the combined area of Texas and California.5 4 The U.S.
Department of Interior (1998) lists that 287.5 million acres of the public
domain were granted or sold to homesteaders under the Homestead
Act. 55 This is approximately 20% of all existing public land in the U.S. 56
3. Did the Homestead Act have a lasting impact on the U.S.
economy?
How many people living today had ancestors who acquired property
through the Homestead Act? 57 As a means of gauging the Act's long-
term impact, the living descendants of each family that acquired property
under the Homestead Act were calculated 58 based on three different sets
of assumptions. The most aggressive showing that in the year 2000 there
were 93 million living descendants of the Homesteaders, which (based
on 2003 population of 293 million 59) would make those descendents ap-
proximately 32% of the current U.S. population. The medium estimate
was 46 million descendents, or 25% of the current adult population. The
most conservative estimate in which the homestead property passed to
only one descendent per generation was 20 million. "Taking the medium
estimate of 46 million... would mean that a quarter of the adult popula-
tion potentially has a legacy of property ownership and assets in their
background that can be directly linked to... the homestead policy". 60
Land ownership changed the lives of landless families in numerous
ways, providing upward mobility and a more secure future for the home-
steader and his descendents. 61
52 Ch. 120, 12 Stat. 489.
53 Trina Williams, The Homestead Act: A Major Asset-building Policy in American His-
tory - Working Paper 00-9 at 1, in INCLUSION IN ASSET BUILDING: RESEARCH AND POLICY
SYMPosIUM, St. Louis Washington University/Center for Social Development, at http://gwb
web.wustl.edu/csd/Publications/2000/wpOO-9.pdf, accessed on July 8, 2004.
54 Williams, supra note 53, at 5-6.
55 Williams, supra note 53, at 6.
56 Williams, supra note 53, at 6.
57 Williams, supra note 53, at 6.
58 Williams, supra note 53, at 7-8 and Chart I.
59 U.S. Census press release dated 12/22/2004 estimating the U.S. population as of July
1, 2004.
60 Williams, supra note 53, at 8.
61 Williams, supra note 53, at 3.
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Just as gaining an education is the surest way to rise in
society today, in colonial days the acquisition of prop-
erty was the key to moving upward from a low to a
higher stratum. The property holder could vote and hold
office, but the man with no property was practically on
the same level as the indentured servant or slave.62
"The Homestead Act is still responsible for the generation of $46.3
billion every year".63 Although some drawbacks have been identified re-
garding the Homestead Act (poor land, lack of implementation help, se-
lective administration regarding racial eligibility, etc.), it provided a
voice and an opportunity for many small landholders. The Act was pro-
gressive, insofar as it broadened the base of asset ownership beyond the
wealthy.64
4. Relationship between the Homestead Act and Fair Exchange
The Homestead Act demonstrates that building assets among com-
mon folks helps promote healthy growth. It provided a portion of the
asset basis for 25-32% of the adults currently living in the U.S. As one of
the country's first and most enduring economic policies, it embodied the
Jeffersonian concept that American democracy is best protected when
the majority of common people have a material stake in society; and that
it is in the best interest of the country as a whole to enable broad stake
holding. The relationship between stakeholdership and citizenship has
not changed in 250 years. However, in the 21st century equity in compa-
nies is a primary type of stake, as land was in the 18th and 19th century.
Therefore, an FE policy that broadens the country's or the world's own-
ership base should be a stabilizing factor during the tumult of the transi-
tion from the industrial to the knowledge economy.
C. THE TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - A VERY FAIR EXCHANGE
The TVA 65 is a striking example of a successful public/private part-
nership, in which the government distributed to the public a very fair
exchange for its investment.
62 See Williams, supra note 53, at 3 (discussing Dick Everett).
63 Todd Arrington, Historian at the Homestead National Monument of America, "Eco-
nomics and the Homestead Act" (2005 ) "bases his calculation as follows: "All the states that
had homesteading at some point in American history have a modem combined gross state
product of $4.63 trillion. If we assume that just one percent of that modem total can be related
to homesteading (via agriculture, manufacturing, retail sales, real estate, etc.), that means that
the Homestead Act is still responsible for the generation of $46.3 billion every year... Dollar
figures taken from the website of the United States Census Bureau. 1998 figures are the most
recent available."
64 Williams, supra note 53, at 10.
65 Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, 16 U.S.C.§ 831 (2004).
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Since its inception, the TVA has provided flood control, improved
river navigation, served as a regional economic development agency and
lender, developed and taught modem agricultural and environmental
stewardship methods, provided recreational spaces and opportunities,
created small business incubators, brought local communities into the
information age, and improved business and workforce productivity. 66
During its heavy dam construction phase in the 1940s, the TVA em-
ployed over 28,000 workers. 67 The 2004 TVA Annual Report stated that
over the past three years, TVA helped its development partners attract or
retain 145,000 jobs and provided $57.4 million in loan commitments,
which leveraged $832 million in additional investments. In 2004 alone,
the TVA leveraged investments of $2.1 billion, working with its business
partnerships.6 8
The federal government's initial investment of $50 mil-
lion69 in the TVA and its subsequent appropriations paid
off handsomely and fulfilled its objectives well. The
TVA began repaying the U.S. Government for its appro-
priation investment in 1948 on a sliding scale.
A return on the U.S. Government's initial appropriation
investment in TVA power facilities, plus a repayment of
the initial investment, is specified by law. The payment
for 2000 was $54 million, and total cumulative repay-
ments and return on investment by TVA to the U.S.
Treasury exceed $3 billion. 70
TVA is now entirely self-supporting on its power generation reve-
nue which, as of 2004, was over $7 billion per year, serving a 41,000
square mile watershed. 7 1 It annually pays local governments $338 mil-
lion in lieu of taxes.7 2 TVA provides wholesale electricity, serving 8.5
million people through 158 local power distributors, including munici-
66 What Contribution Does the TVA Make to the Valley Economy?, Tennessee Valley
Authority Official Website FAQ, available at www.tva.govabouttva/keyfacts.htm (last visited
Nov. 1, 2005).
67 A Short History of the TVA, Tennessee Valley Authority Official Website, available at
www.tva.govabouttva/history.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2005).
68 Tennessee Valley Authority 2004 Annual Report 12, Tennessee Valley Authority,
Knoxville, T.N., available at http://www.tva.gov/finance/reports/pdf/fy2004ar.pdf.
69 C. Herman Pritchett, The Tennessee Valley Authority as a Government Corporation,
16 SOcIAL FORCES, 120, 122 (October 1937).
70 Tennessee Valley Authority 2000 Annual Report, at Management's Discussion and
Analysis, Tennessee Valley Authority, Knoxville, T.N., available at http://www.tva.gov/fi-
nance/reports/pdf/fy2000ar.pdf.
71 How is TVA Funded? Tennessee Valley Authority Official Website FAQ, available at
www.tva.govabouttva/keyfacts.htm (last visited April 10, 2006).
72 Does TVA Pay Taxes? Tennessee Valley Authority Official Website FAQ, available
at www.tva.govabouttva/keyfacts.htm (last visited April 10, 2006).
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palities, cooperatives, industries and eight federal government agen-
cies.73 TVA electricity costs less than most electricity produced around
the nation. 74 Its waterways reduce transportation costs for Valley busi-
nesses by $400 million each year compared to other modes of shipping.75
TVA does all of the above while also providing flood control, im-
proving river navigation, serving as a regional economic development
agency and lender, developing and teaching modern agricultural and en-
vironmental stewardship methods, providing recreational spaces and op-
portunities, creating small business incubators, bringing local
communities into the information age, and improving business and
workforce productivity. 76
1. What was the stated objective of the Tennessee Valley
Authority?
The TVA was one of the most visionary of President Franklin
Roosevelt's New Deal innovations developed to lift the nation out of the
Great Depression. The Depression's devastating impact on the South and
the ongoing dispute (described below) about how to deal with the gov-
ernment-owned dam project and nitrate plants at Muscle Shoals, Ala-
bama, enabled Roosevelt to embark on a grand plan to create a regional
planning agency on a scale never before attempted. After his 1932 elec-
tion Roosevelt said "It is clear that the Muscle Shoals development is but
a small part of the potential public usefulness of the entire Tennessee
River... transcends mere power development... [and] leads logically to
national planning for a complete river watershed involving many States
and the future lives and welfare of millions. '77 He asked Congress to
create "a corporation clothed with the power of government but pos-
sessed of the flexibility and initiative of a private enterprise. '78 On May
18, 1933, Congress passed the Tennessee Valley Authority Act. Its stated
purpose was:
73 How Is TVA Electricity Distributed? Tennessee Valley Authority Official Website
FAQ, available at www.tva.govabouttva/keyfacts.htm (last visited April 10, 2006).
74 See How Do TVA Rates Compare With Those of Other Power Companies? Tennessee
Valley Authority Official Website FAQ, available at www.tva.govabouttva/keyfacts.htm (last
visited April 10, 2006).
75 See Navigation on the Tennessee River, Tennessee Valley Authority Official Website
FAQ, available at www.tva.govabouttva/keyfacts.htm (last visited April 10, 2006).
76 What Contribution Does the TVA Make to the Valley Economy, Tennessee Valley
Authority Official Website FAQ, available at www.tvw.govabouttva/keyfacts.htm (last ac-
cessed April 10, 2006).
77 Thayer Watkins, Regional Development Policies and Programs of the U.S., Econom-
ics Department, San Jose State University, available at www2.sjsu.edu/faculty/Watkins/usreg.
htm.
78 Id.
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An Act to improve the navigability and to provide for
the flood control of the Tennessee River; to provide re-
forestation and the proper use of marginal lands in the
Tennessee Valley; to provide for the agricultural and in-
dustrial development of said valley; to provide for the
national defense by the creation of a corporation for the
operation of Government properties at and near Muscle
Shoals in the State of Alabama, and for other purposes. 79
2. History of the Tennessee Valley Authority
In 1926 Senator George Norris (R. Nebraska) introduced a bill di-
recting the federal government to take over and expand the Wilson Dam
project at Muscle Shoals, Alabama and to build more federal dams along
the Tennessee River. 80 Norris's concern for farmers caused him to vehe-
mently oppose President Warren G. Harding's attempt to privatize the
federal project to build the Wilson Dam at Muscle Shoals. 81 In 1921,
Henry Ford offered to lease the dam and two nitrate plants for $5 million
through the next century. Norris believed this was not a good deal for the
government or for the local farmers and workers. Norris described Ford's
offer as the worst real estate deal "since Adam and Eve lost title to the
Garden of Eden". 82 Although the project made no progress in the Coo-
lidge administration and was later vetoed by Herbert Hoover, it was
ready and waiting for Roosevelt, who got it enacted in 1933.
During its early days, owners and managers of power companies
that served the Tennessee Valley criticized the TVA as being both un-
necessary and creating unfair subsidized competition. Its best-known
critic was Wendell Willkie. 83 Wilke helped create Commonwealth and
Southern utility company ("C&S"). Along with the Tennessee Electric
Power Company ("TEPCO") 84, Willkie and C&S waged a 5-year battle
against the TVA, challenging TVA's constitutionality. In January of
193985 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the TVA had the right to build
power plants in competition with private companies. Shortly thereafter,
TVA bought C & S's facilities.
79 16 U.S.C. § 831.
80 Jack Neely, Clash of the Titans, Tennessee Valley Authority Official Website, availa-
ble at www.tva.gov/heritage/titans/index.htm.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 The Indiana Farmer: TVA Heritage, Tennessee Valley Authority Official Website,
available at www.tva.gov/heritage/wilke/index.htm.
84 Timothy P. Ezzell, Jo Conn Guild, in Tm TENNESSEE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HISTORY
AND CULTURE, available at http://160.36.208.47/FMPro?-db=tnencyc&-format=tdeatil.htm&-
lay=web&entryid=G050.
85 See Tenn. Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118 (1939).
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In its early years when it was supported by Congressional appropri-
ations, the TVA was able to develop fertilizers for growing crops and
trees, teach farmers how to improve crop yields, help to replant forests,
control forest fires, and improve habitat for wildlife and fish. 86 The elec-
tricity generated by TVA dams powered electric lights and appliances,
making lives easier and farmers more productive; in addition, electricity
encouraged industrial development, creating jobs for the local communi-
ties.87 During the 1940s, the TVA engaged in one of the largest hydro-
power construction programs to produce aluminum for bombs and
planes.88
By the1950s, TVA had become the nation's largest supplier of elec-
tricity and had completed a 650-mile navigation channel the length of the
Tennessee River. Still demand exceeded supply but the TVA couldn't
get further federal appropriations to build coal-fired plants so it asked for
the authority to issue bonds.
President John F. Kennedy enjoyed playing off President Dwight
Eisenhower's remark that the TVA represented "creeping socialism". In
a 1963 speech at the TVA, Kennedy said "The tremendous economic
growth of this region, its private industry and its private income... make
it clear to all that the TVA is a fitting answer to socialism - and it cer-
tainly isn't creeping."
89
Legislation was enacted in 1959 for the TVA power system to be-
come self-financing.
The 1960s were years of unprecedented economic growth in the
Tennessee Valley. TVA began to build nuclear plants as a new source of
economical power.90 During the 1970s and 1980s the TVA had difficulty
keeping its power costs competitive because it had overbuilt nuclear
power facilities, and the oil embargo and increased fuel costs required it
to cancel several planned nuclear facilities. 91 In the 1990s, the TVA
halved its staff, reduced expenses and began to stabilize and then reduce
its power rates again.92 However, since the late 1990s, the TVA has de-
veloped a strong pollution control system and begun to invest in solar
and wind energy. 93
86 A Short History of the TVA, supra note 67.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 TVA on the New Frontier, Tennessee Valley Authority Official Website, available at
www.tvw.govabouttva/history.htm.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 A Short History of the TVA, supra note 67.
93 See (Tennessee Valley Authority 2004 Annual Report), supra note 68.
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3. Structure and Organization of the Tennessee Valley Authority
The TVA's Board of Directors (the "TVA Board") consists of three
members, all U.S. citizens, appointed by the President of the United
States with the advice and consent of the Senate. Each member is ap-
pointed for nine years. The U.S. President appoints the Chair. Being a
member of the TVA Board is a full-time job compensated by the TVA at
a rate comparable to a Level IV Executive Schedule civil servant (the
chair is Level III). Directors may live in homes provided by the Govern-
ment (may now be the TVA), and they must not have any financial or
business interests in the power industry or adverse to the TVA. 94 Board
members can be removed at any time by a concurrent resolution of the
House of Representatives and the Senate.95
The TVA Board directs the corporation, including hiring, firing,
contracting, buying and selling assets, etc. However, they are required to
pay "prevailing wages" and must give "due regard. . . to those rates
which have been secured through collective agreement by representatives
of employers and employees. 96
The TVA can sue and be sued in its own name, controls its corpo-
rate name, can adopt, amend or repeal its bylaws. However, it also has
the power to exercise the right of eminent domain in the name of the U.S.
Government. It has the power to acquire real estate for the construction
of dams, reservoirs, transmission lines, power houses, navigation projects
and other structures along the Tennessee River or its tributaries and may
use eminent domain to condemn property that private owners refuse to
sell it at a fair price. It may also convey or lease land in the name of the
U.S. to any corporation or person for use as summer residences, pleasure
resorts, or for any purposes to assist shipping or manufacturing, with
approval from Congress. Numerous specific dams, plants and other facil-
ities are named as either prohibited from being sold by the TVA or per-
mitted to be sold. 97 TVA has authority to help in adjustment of
population displaced by its projects, to provide rights of way and ease-
ments to local governments, and to create its own law enforcement
agents to maintain order on its properties.98 TVA has the authority not
only to produce fertilizer, but to create major programs to experiment
with new fertilizer projects and methods through agreements with farm-
ers, farm organizations, agricultural colleges, demonstration farms (ex-
cept when the nitrogen facilities are needed for military purposes) and to
create labs and plants to develop nitrogen products for the military.
94 16 U.S.C. § 831a(e)-(f) (1933).
95 16 U.S.C. § 831, Section 4(f).
96 16 U.S.C. § 831b.
97 16 U.S.C. § 831c(k)(b)-(d).
98 16 U.S.C. § 831c(I) (1993), 16 U.S.C. § 831c-3(a) (1933).
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TVA has the right to seek assistance from any other federal agency,
and the President shall direct that such assistance be rendered, if in his
opinion it suits the public interest. Yet the patents on inventions and dis-
coveries created, even by government employees working on TVA
projects, belong to the TVA.99
Competitive bidding is required for contracts over $25,000 except in
emergencies or repair situations. The Comptroller General of the U.S.
audits the TVA at least annually.' ° TVA has an independent Inspector
General's Office appointed by Congress that continuously examines the
programs, contracts, and financial reports of TVA to identify areas of
needed improvement to insure a more successful TVA, and to prevent
and correct fraud. 10 1
4. The Tennessee Valley Authority's public/private business
model
TVA is authorized to sell its power in excess of its own needs on the
open market; however, it must give preference to States, counties, mu-
nicipalities, cooperatives, and non-profit farmers or citizens organiza-
tions supplying their own members. It has the authority to build electrical
transmission lines to rural communities not served at reasonable rates,
make all necessary reasonable rules and regulations for equitable distri-
bution of electric power, and experiment to promote wider and better use
of electricity.10 2 TVA projects are considered to be primarily for the ben-
efit of the people of the area, and particularly for the domestic and rural
consumers. Industrial uses get secondary priority and are undertaken to
make the production of energy affordable for domestic and rural consum-
ers. Entities to which TVA sells wholesale power must distribute it on a
fair basis to retail customers not to exceed scheduled rates set by the
TVA board.103 TVA is authorized to make payments-in-lieu-of-taxes to
States and municipalities in which its facilities are located and is other-
wise exempt from local taxes. 1o4Half these payments are based on busi-
ness income in the state, county or municipality, while the other half is
based on TVA's property asset value. 105
From its inception until 1959, Congress provided the TVA authority
to issue bonds for specific projects fully backed by the U.S. Treasury.' 0 6
In 1959, Congress expanded TVA's bonding authority to permit it to
99 Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, 48 Stat.58-59, 16 U.S.C.§ 831, Section 5.
100 Id. at Section 8.
101 Website of the Office of the Inspector General of the TVA, http://oig.tva.gov/3/13/05.
102 Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, 48 Stat.58-59, 16 U.S.C.§ 831, Section 10.
103 Id. at Section 11-12.
104 16 U.S.C. § 831, Section 13.
105 Id.
106 16 U.S.C. § 831h(b).
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issue bonds on TVA's credit as needed to support itself as a business
independent of government subsidy.10 7 These new TVA bonds were not
guaranteed by the U.S. federal government, but are exempt from state or
local taxes other than inheritance, estate or gift taxes.108 However, TVA
still has to provide the Treasury Secretary notice of bond issuance seek-
ing approval as to timing and rate. If the Secretary does not approve
these bonds, the TVA may issue them as interim bonds to the Secretary,
which the Secretary is directed to purchase up to a limit of $150,000,000
outstanding at one time. If the TVA and Secretary do not reach agree-
ment on purchase of interim bonds within 8 months after their issue, the
TVA may proceed to sell them on the open market. 10 9
Beginning in 1961, the U.S. federal government required the TVA
to start repaying-from proceeds in excess of those needed to meet the
TVA's ongoing obligations-the investment the government made to
create and underwrite the TVA's development, at the rate of not less than
$10 million for each of the first 5 fiscal years, $15 million for each of the
next 5 years and $20 million for each year thereafter until a total of one
billion dollars of the appropriation investment shall have been repaid. 110
The repayment plan also provided for the TVA board to defer pay-
ments for up to 2 years due to inadequacy of funds occasioned by
drought, emergency, poor business conditions or other matters outside
the TVA's control.'11
During the first 25 years of TVA's existence, the U.S.
Government made appropriation investments in TVA
power facilities. In 1959 TVA received congressional
approval to issue bonds to finance its growing power
program. For the past four decades, TVA's power pro-
gram has been required to be self-supporting. As a re-
sult, TVA funds its capital requirements through internal
cash generation or through borrowings (subject to a con-
gressionally mandated $30 billion limit). 112
Theft of its property or fraud against TVA is treated as theft or fraud
from the U.S. Government 1 3 and the Government has the authority to
107 16 U.S.C. § 831n-4.
108 16 U.S.C. § 831n-4(b)-4(d).
109 Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933 Section 15d (c), 48 Stat.66-67 as amended by
73 Stat.280 (1959), 73 Stat.338 (1959), 80 Stat.364 (1966), 84 Stat. 915 (1970), 89 Stat.750
(1975), 90 Stat.376 (1976) and P.L. No 96-97 (Oct.31, 1979), 16 U.S.C. Sec. 831n-4.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 TVA 2000 Annual Report, supra note 70.
113 Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933 Section 21, 48 Stat.68-69, 16 U.S.C. Sec.
831t.
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take over any or all of TVA's facilities in case of war or national
emergency. 1 14
5. Is the Tennessee Valley Authority still relevant today?
By operating as a quasi-private company, with government invest-
ment and oversight, the TVA has provided a wide range of much-needed
public services for over 70 years, and has repaid the public investment
many times over. It is difficult to imagine using the TVA model in the
current political atmosphere, which focuses on privatization of much
more standard public services and New Deal programs, such as Social
Security. Yet, if there is a global economic crisis caused by the rising
economic hegemony of China' 15 or the decreasing access to petroleum, a
TVA type of solution in some fields, such as biomass fuel generation,
may be desirable. The devastation of large parts of Mississippi, Louisi-
ana and Texas by the 2005 hurricanes may make TVA-type solutions
necessary. Senator Edward M. Kennedy of Massachusetts has proposed
that Congress create a Gulf Coast Redevelopment Authority, modeled
after the TVA, to oversee the reconstruction of the areas devastated by
the hurricanes.' 16
It is crucial to understand and consider utilizing features of this
well-crafted public/private venture. The TVA was a bold idea born of
grave necessity. The Great Depression was a crisis in capitalism caused
by, among other things, major changes in methods and locations of pro-
duction and an insufficiently regulated Wall Street investment commu-
nity. The early 21st century is a similar period of global economic
change and dislocation. The U.S. continues to lose increasingly higher
skilled jobs to lower wage countries and is increasingly indebted to these
countries as well." 17 At some point in the near future, there may be a
sufficient crisis in the U.S. economy to change the political atmosphere
114 Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933 Section 20, 48 Stat.68 as amended by 96
Stat.49, 16 U.S.C. Sec. 831s
1 15 See ODED SHENKAR, THE CHINESE CENTURY, THE RISING CHINESE ECONOMY AND ITS
IMPACT ON THE WORLD ECONOMY, THE BALANCE OF POWER, AND YOUR JOB 170-76 (Wharton
School Publishing 2005).
116 WSVN.com, Rebuilding Gulf Coast After Katrina Most Expensive U.S. Reconstruc-
tion Project to Date (Sept. 23, 2005), available at http://www.wsvn.com/news/articles/na-
tional/mia7332 (last visited Oct. 30, 2005).
117 Niall Ferguson, Our Currency, Your Problem: Why Asian banks finance the U.S. way
of life, N. Y. TnviEs MAGAZINE March 13, 2005, at 19-22 ("[B]etween 70 and 80 percent of the
American economy's vast and continuing borrowing requirement is being met by foreign
[mainly Asian] central banks .... The Bush Administration's tax cuts for the Republican base
and a Global War on Terrorism is being financed with a multibillion-dollar overdraft facility at
the People's Bank of China... [and] according to a growing number of eminent economists,
this arrangement cannot last ... Sooner or later they [the Asian banks] have to get out - at
which point the dollar could plunge relative to Asian currencies by as much as 1/3 to 2/5ths
and U.S. interest rates would leap upward.")
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away from the current laissez faire government attitude toward the mar-
ketplace, providing openings for strategies that utilize government in-
vestment as pro-actively as the TVA does.
6. The Importance of Integrity in the New Deal Programs
Integrity in the use of public funds in the private sector was a key
feature of the New Deal programs, as Franklin D. Roosevelt demon-
strated in the 1930s. F.D.R. presided over a huge expansion of federal
spending, including a lot of discretionary spending by the Works Pro-
gress Administration. Yet the image of public relief, widely regarded as
corrupt before the New Deal, actually improved markedly. . . . [T]he
New Deal made almost a fetish out of policing its own programs against
potential corruption .... F.D.R. created a powerful "division of progress
investigation" to look into complaints of malfeasance in the WPA. The
division proved so effective that a later Congressional investigation
couldn't find a single serious irregularity it had missed."18
The political climate in the U.S. may be changing as the conse-
quences of privatization and tax cuts begin to take their toll on public
well-being. The combined social costs of tax cuts, the Iraq war and re-
construction of the massive hurricane damage may change the political
climate regarding government spending to make New Deal type pro-
grams more appealing. Particularly when their New Dealers judicious
use of public funds is compared with the corruption of the current propo-
nents of less government and privatization, such as the S&L bailout and
the Enron scandal, there may be a resurgence of interest in and relevance
of the New Deal programs such as the TVA and the Works Progress
Administration.
D. THE 1971 LOCKHEED LOAN GUARANTEE
The 1971 Federal Government loan assistance to Lockheed Corpo-
ration set an important precedent, showing the willingness of the govern-
ment to provide financial assistance to a failing non-government
corporation.1 9 Congress passed the Emergency Loan Guarantee Act of
1971 (the "Emergency Act"), which served to protect 60,000 jobs and a
potential GNP loss of $120 to 475 million, mostly in California, just as
the economy was recovering from the 1969-70 recession.' 20
The government protected its investment in Lockheed in many
ways. It appointed a board consisting of the Secretary of Treasury, Fed-
118 Paul Krugman, Not the New Deal, N.Y. TIMFS, September 16, 2005, at A27.
119 Comptroller General of the United States, Report to Congress: Guidelines for Rescu-
ing Large Failing Finns and Municipalities, GAO/GGD 84-34, March 29, 1984, at 10, availa-
ble at http://archive.gao.gov/d5tI/123950.pdf.
120 Id. at 11.
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eral Reserve System Chair and the Securities and Exchange Commission
Chair, and charged that board with obtaining sufficient collateral for the
government investment. 21 In addition, the board had power to change
management, approve asset sales, inspect the books and have an audit
from the U.S. General Accountings Office. 122 The government also re-
stricted the payment of dividends on Lockheed Corporation's common
stock and limited the payment of other loans to a lender receiving a loan
guarantee. 123 The government's loan guarantee of $250 million enabled
Lockheed to obtain a new aid package of $750 million. 24 Lockheed re-
tired the government loan guarantee early, as it was able to replace it
with a revolving credit agreement for $100 million. 125
The Act was worded to allow emergency loan guarantees to any
major business 126 enterprise, although it was clearly intended to provide
a $250 million loan guarantee to Lockheed. 127
Thus, at its birth, the Congress understood that any government in-
vestment policy should cover a broad range of possible investment trans-
actions between government and business. This article contends that such
a policy is increasingly necessary in a global economy. The govern-
ment's subsequent case-by-case actions (such as those naming Chrysler
or the airline industry) have mistakenly avoided implementation of a
clear general policy. A well-constructed federal policy on government
investment in private businesses would create a model and a platform for
similar policies at the state and local levels.
E. CONRAIL AND GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT IN RAILROADS
1. Railroads and the U.S. Government before 1970
The U.S. government has been deeply involved in the development,
protection, regulation and deregulation of the railroad industry since the
birth of the industry.128 Railroads were crucial to the development of the
American West, a necessity to connect a nation straddling a vast geo-
graphical expanse. The government's first large investment in the rail-
roads was under the Pacific Railroad Act of 1862, when the government
parceled out 131 million acres of land12 9 to private businesses in ex-
121 Id. at 12.
122 Comptroller General of the United States, supra, note 119.
123 See id.
124 See id.
125 See id.
126 Emergency Loan Guarantee Act, P.L. 92-70, § 2, 85 Stat. 178 (Aug. 9, 1971)
127 Comptroller General of the United States, supra, note 119 at 11.
128 As evidenced by the numerous acts cited in this paper from the Pacific Railroad Act of
1862 through the Conrail reorganization.
129 Nation Building 1860-1900, National Railroad Museum Website, available at www.
nationalrrmuseum.org/collections-018-historical-outline-.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2005).
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change for building railroads connecting the two coasts. 130 In exchange
for these land grants, the federal government required the railroads to
provide transport for government troops and property for half the normal
rate. 131 A Congressional Committee in 1945 estimated that the U.S. fed-
eral government received $900 million in railroad transportation costs in
exchange for parceling out $126 million worth of raw, undeveloped
lands that required railroads to give them value. 132
Railroads were the first national corporations and pioneered corpo-
rate business practices regarding treatment of customers, employees and
state, local and federal governments. The rise of the railroad companies
and their impact on America is a good analogy for the rise of multi-
national corporations and their impact on the global culture and econ-
omy. Railroad owners became fabulously rich. The size of railroad com-
panies and their resources dwarfed the resources of those, such as
farmers, workers and injured parties who dealt with them. Because of the
potential profits it could generate, the potential monopoly it could exert
over an area, and the wide variety of manipulation that could be em-
ployed, the railroads were at the center of most of the corruption of the
late 19th and early 20th centuries. Names like Jay Gould, James Fisk,
Cornelius 'Commodore' Vanderbilt, and Daniel Drew were synonymous
with corruption and scandal. 133 "As business grew rapidly during the last
half of the 19th century, government control fell hopelessly behind." 134
In 1887, Congress created the Interstate Commerce Commission
(ICC) to regulate the railroads, taking that responsibility from the states,
which were not well equipped to regulate these national companies. Yet
it took 30 years, numerous additional regulations and Supreme Court
cases before the ICC could exert enough control over the railroads to
curb their unfair rate practices that were most destructive of communities
and farmers, and their most brutal labor practices. 135 Congress also
passed various anti-trust laws to regulate the robber barons' corporate
and financial manipulation practices. 136
From 1900 to 1945, during the Golden Age of the Railroad, the U.S.
federal government developed a reasonable means to regulate the ex-
cesses of the growing railroad industry; but this balance did not last
long. 137 After World War II, other means of transportation and commu-
130 12 Stat. 489.
131 Nation Building 1860-1900, supra note 129.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 The Golden Age 1900-1945, National Railroad Museum Website, available at www.
nationalrnmuseum.org/collections-018-historical-outline-.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2005).
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nication provided increasingly stiffer competition with rail.1 38 The gov-
ernment invested in building the interstate highway system and many
airports. Auto, truck, barge and air transportation became major competi-
tion for rail. Still, the government retained an archaic regulatory scheme
treating railroads as the monopolistic enterprises they had been during
earlier years. 139 During the 1950s and 60s, although the railroad system
was losing passengers and freight to auto, truck and air transport, the
railroads were not permitted to drop routes or change their highly regu-
lated rate structure. By the end of the 1960s several of the nation's larg-
est railroads were facing bankruptcy, and many others followed during
the 1970s. 140 The railroad industry needed major restructuring, including
substantial government investment, regulation and deregulation, the gov-
ernment's creation of the National Railroad Passenger Corporation,
which created Amtrak, 14 1 and the formation of Conrail from the rem-
nants of seven bankrupt railroads in the Northeast and Midwest. 142
2. Why was Conrail created?
Penn Central was the largest transportation company in the U.S.
when it came into existence in 1968, out of the merger of the Penn-
sylvania and New York Central railroads. 143 Due to competition from the
trucking industry, increased labor costs, regulation of rates which lagged
cost increases, and inability to truly merge the two companies, Penn Cen-
tral lost $5.2 million in 1968 and $56.3 million in 1969; furthermore,
these losses continued to grow. 144 From 1969 to 1970, rail passenger
services sustained a loss of as much as $375,000 per day, forcing Penn
Central to seek emergency government assistance in May 1970.145 Una-
ble to get initial assistance, Penn Central filed for bankruptcy under Sec-
tion 77 of the Bankruptcy Act, under which railroads were not permitted
to go out of business. However, Penn Central's operating income could
not cover its operating costs, costing more money to operate it than to
shut it down. Thus in January 1974, Congress passed the Regional Rail
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Decline and Revitalization 1945 - 1995, National Railroad Museum Website, availa-
ble at www.nationalrrmuseum.org/collections-018-historical-outline-.html (last visited Octo-
ber 31, 2005).
141 Id.
142 Rudolph G. Penner, Congressional Budget Office, Economic Viability of Conrail xi
(1986) [hereinafter Penner] http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/50xx/doc50l6/doc22c-PartO2.pdf at 1
and http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/50xx/doc5016/doc22c-PartO4.pdf at 7.
143 Comptroller General of the United States, supra note 119 at 10.
144 Id.
145 See Comptroller General of the United States, supra note 119 at 10. (stating that two
assistance plans initially discussed included a $200 million loan guarantee from the Depart-
ment of Defense and a $750 million loan guarantee from the Department of Transportation).
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Reorganization Act (the "3R Act"). 146 The purpose of the 3R Act was to
"identify a rail system that would provide adequate and efficient rail ser-
vice in the Northeast and Midwest, and [to] reorganize the railroads in
the region into an economically viable system that could provide that
service."' 147 The act also established the Consolidated Rail Corporation
("Conrail") as a for-profit freight railroad and the United States Railroad
Association (USRA) as a government corporation to fund and oversee
Conrail's operations. 148
Additional legislation to nurse the railroad industry back to health
under government investment and supervision and then turn it back to
the private sector 149 followed, including the legislation described below.
USRA's final plan for the reorganization sought in the 3R Act 150
was created by Congress in Title VI of Railroad Revitalization and Regu-
latory Reform Act of 1976 (4R Act) (P. L. 94-210). It amended the 3R
Act to conform its provisions to the final structural, operational and fi-
nancial system designed for USRA by Conrail. The 4R Act initiated the
first significant reduction in federal regulation of railroads since the en-
actment of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887.151 Because regulatory
restrictions had contributed to the bankruptcy of Conrail's predecessors,
Congress began regulatory reform in the 4R Act to prevent additional
railroad bankruptcies and to improve the opportunities for all railroads,
including Conrail, to survive as private companies. 152
146 87 Stat. 985.
147 PENNER, supra note 142
148 See 87 Stat. 985; PENNER, supra note 142, at 4-5. The Regional Rail Reorganization
Act states that its intent is to address these problems:
" The rail service providers in the Midwest and Northeast region of the U.S. were insol-
vent and preparing to enter bankruptcy.
" Rail services were threatened with cessation or significant curtailment because trustees
were unable to formulate acceptable plans for reorganization. The rail service operates
across properties that were acquired for public use but have deteriorated and require
extensive rehabilitation and modernization.
" Public convenience and necessity require that adequate and efficient rail service in the
region and throughout the Nation meets the needs of commerce, national defense, envi-
ronment and passengers, U.S. mail, shippers, States and their political subdivisions and
consumers.
" Continuation and improvement of essential rail service in this region is also necessary
to preserve and maintain adequate national rail services and an efficient national rail
transportation system.
Rail service and rail transportation offer economic and environmental advantages with respect
to land use, air pollution, noise levels, energy efficiency and conservation, resource allocation,
safety, and cost per ton-mile of movement to such extent that the preservation and mainte-
nance of adequate and efficient rail service is in the national interest. The Federal Government
cannot meet these needs without substantial action.
149 PENNER, supra note 142, at 2-7.
150 87 Stat. 985.
151 PENNER, supra note 142, at 5.
152 Id. at 5.
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In April of 1976 Conrail began operations in 16 states with 99,000
employees and a 17,000-mile route system. 153 Because Conrail's rail-
roads needed substantial repairs from years of neglect, the U.S. govern-
ment financed these renovations by purchasing debentures and preferred
stock in Conrail, and subsidized its operating losses during this period of
rebuilding. 154
The regulatory reforms in the 4R Act proved insufficient, however.
The U.S. government continued to invest in Conrail and, by 1985, had
committed as much as $10.2 billion in 1985 dollars.' 55 Lower traffic and
higher operating cost than projected meant the financial health of the
railroad industry did not improve. 156 Conrail was doing worse than ex-
pected (as was the industry). Congress enacted two laws - the Staggers
Rail Act of 1980157 ("Staggers Act") and Northeast Rail Service Act of
1981158 ("NERSA") to address these problems.
The Staggers Act significantly reduced the government's regulation
of pricing and marketing activities for all railroads. 159 It enabled rail-
roads to restructure rates and services to improve profits and, if losses
could not be avoided, to abandon unprofitable routes and services.
160
Conrail's success in 1980 stemmed from this newfound ability to empha-
size profitable services and drop unprofitable ones. 161
The Northeast Rail Service Act of 1981 (NERSA) 162 required Con-
rail to demonstrate, by 1983, that it could be profitable. 163 In 1983,
USRA reported that Conrail met the NERSA profitability tests. 164 The
government was thus required to initiate the return of Conrail to the pri-
vate sector as a single entity by selling the government's Conrail com-
mon stock. 165
The government's sale of its Conrail stock had to follow certain
procedures under NERSA: 166 the sale had to ensure continued rail ser-
vice, promote competitive bidding for the stock, and maximize the return
to the federal government on its investment.' 67 The details of the sale
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 2, Table 1.
156 Id. at 4.
157 Staggers Rail Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-448, 94 Stat. 1895 (1980).
158 Northeast Rail Service Act of 1981, 45 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1116 (2000).
159 PENNER, supra note 142, at 5.
160 Id.
161 PENNER, supra note 142, at 7.
162 45 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1116.
163 PENNER, supra note 142, at 7.
164 Id.
165 PENNER, supra note 142, at 7.
166 45 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1116.
167 PENNER, supra note 142, at 8.
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were left to the discretion of the U.S. Department of Transportation (the
"DOT"), which began soliciting proposals for purchase in 1983.168 In
1985, the DOT announced its intention to privately sell the government's
Conrail stock to the Norfolk Southern Corporation, based on the belief
that Conrail's long-term viability would be more secure as a subsidiary
of a larger, more experienced railroad.1 69 However, the relevant Con-
gressional subcommittee raised concerns about this private deal and re-
quested a study from the Congressional Budget Office on the viability of
Conrail and the options for its sale.' 70 The study described the Norfolk
deal and alternate proposals by two groups of investment bankers that
would keep Conrail independent. The chief contention between the two
groups was the likelihood of Conrail's long-term viability as an indepen-
dent operator. 71
3. What benefit did the government and citizens get from the
Conrail deal?
By 1981 Conrail began a financial turnaround and no longer re-
quired government investment. It began to profit.
On March 26, 1987, the government sold its ownership interest in
Conrail through what, at the time, was the largest initial public stock
offering in nation's history. This transaction, with added cash payments
from Conrail to the U.S. Treasury, produced about $1.9 billion for the
taxpayers and returned the Northeast-Midwest rail freight system to the
private sector as a for-profit corporation, as Congress had envisioned
when it created Conrail. 172
In 1985, Conrail restored, retroactive to July 1984, industry-level
wages that were reduced for three years in wage negotiations mandated
by NERSA. DOT then selected Norfolk Southern Corporation as the pre-
ferred purchaser of the government's interest in Conrail.
4. The Conrail deal was not a Fair Exchange for the taxpayers
The U.S. government invested $10.2 billion in Conrail, and sold it
for $1.9 billion in 1987. Thus the government lost $8.3 billion on the
Conrail deal. In 1997, Norfolk Southern Corporation and CSX Corpora-
tion acquired Conrail for $10 billion. 173 Had the government retained its
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 Id. at Preface.
171 Id. at 9.
172 A Brief History of Conrail, Conrail Website, available at www.conrail.com/history.
htm.
173 CSX and Norfolk Southern press release, 3/19/98 (found at www.pmewswire.com/
cgi-bin/storiespl?ACCT=105&STORU=www/story/3-19-98) entitled "Conrail Acquisition to
Take Millions of Truck miles Off Pennsylvania Highways State to Save More than $18.5
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stock for the 10-year period, it would have been able to recoup its invest-
ment fully, selling at the price of $10 billion.' 74
Even though the government had a duty to save the rail system
when it was imploding in the 1970s, the fair exchange question remains:
why did the government require a complete sale of its stock as soon as
the DOT determined Conrail to be viable? Unlike the later Chrysler deal,
the government did not provide for any reward to the citizens or the
government for the risk it took with the taxpayers' money. Clearly, Con-
rail was a government success in that it revitalized the rail system at a
critical moment, but the government did not recoup its investment. One
reason for this failure to recoup is that the legislation creating Conrail
required the government to sell its interest into private hands at a very
early-set date. The law stopped the government from acting as a prudent
investor would, to obtain a reasonable return for its risk.
5. USRA/Conrail structure incorporates stakeholder governance
The 3R Act of 1973175 provided for two new entities: a non-profit
association known as the United States Railway Association (USRA) 17 6
and a for-profit corporation known as Conrail. 177 The governance struc-
ture of these entities provides useful insights for those seeking to create
Fair Exchange Commonweal Agencies or Community Trusts (described
later in this article) that include the interests of multiple stakeholders.
Their form and structure are outlined below.
a) United States Railway Association (USRA)
The USRA was a non-profit government corporation, directed by a
Board of Directors.1 78 The government members of the Board were the
Association's incorporators and served as acting Board of Directors for a
period of not more than 45 days after the date of its incorporation. Asso-
ciation employees were not government employees. The Association ex-
isted until dissolved by Act of Congress. The Board of Directors
consisted of 11 individuals, described in Section 201 of the 3R Act- as
follows:
Million in Road Maintenance Costs" states "CSX and Norfolk Southern submitted their appli-
cation to acquire Conrail to the U.S. Surface Transportation Board (STB) last June The board
is expected to issue its final decision on the $10 billion transaction in July."
174 This is a math equation, the supporting data for which is set out in the previous three
sentences.
175 Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-236, §§201-215, 87 Stat.
985 (1974) ("3R Act").
176 Id. at 87 Stat. 988-1004.
177 Id. at 87 Stat. 985, 1004-1009.
178 Id. at 87 Stat. 985, 988.
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The Chairman was appointed by the U.S. President with
advice and consent of the Senate; the Secretary, the
Chairman of the Interstate Commerce Commission and
the Secretary of the Treasury, or their duly authorized
representatives, were the three government members of
the board; seven non-government members were ap-
pointed by the U.S. President with advice and consent of
the Senate, from a list of qualified individuals, most of
whom must be independent from any connection with
railroad interests.' 79
The USRA Board's primary duties were to study the regional rail
transportation problem and solve that problem by establishing Conrail as
a self-sustaining, efficient rail system, providing service to as many cur-
rent locations as possible in a safe and environmentally friendly way, and
do so with financial assistance "at the lowest possible cost to the general
taxpayer" 180 and allocating routes between Conrail and other companies
to ensure efficiency, service and promote competition. 181 USRA had au-
thority to make loans to Conrail and other railroads to accomplish the
ends of its Final Plan. 182
All rail properties transferred to Conrail by other rail companies or
trustees were to be paid for in stock and securities of Conrail. Conrail
was to sell its rail properties for compensation. Much of its property
would come from the bankruptcy judges placing assets of railroads that
could not otherwise be reorganized into Conrail.
179 USRA Section 201(d) provided diverse board representation as follows:
One from list of qualified individuals recommended by National League of Cities and Confer-
ence of Mayors;
Two to be selected from lists of qualified individuals recommended by shippers and organiza-
tions representing significant shipping interests including small shippers; and,
One from list of qualified individuals recommended by financial institutions, the financial
community, and recognized financial leaders.
The lists of qualified individuals were required to include not less than three individuals. Also,
except for members appointed under paragraphs (1) and (3) (A), (B), (E) and (F), no board
member could have any employment or other direct financial relationship with any railroad.
Those appointed under (2), (C) and (D) could be employed or have direct financial relationship
with any railroad. The non-governmental members had staggered terms of office of 2, 4 or 6
years and the chair's term was 6 years. The President of the Association was to be chosen
(from amongst recommendations made by the Secretary of Transportation) and serve at the
pleasure of the Board.
180 Pub. L. No. 93-236, 101(b)(6), 202 and 206.
181 Pub. L. No. 93-236, 202 and 206.
182 Pub. L. No. 93-236, 210.
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b) Conrail Governance Structure
Conrail was a for-profit corporation designed under Title III of the
3R Act and established by the USRA Executive Committee. 183 These
USRA incorporators served as the corporate Board of Directors until
Conrail distributed its stock to the estates of the railroads from which it
would receive rail properties. 18 4 The Board of Directors consisted of 15
individuals selected in accordance with Conrail articles of incorporation
and bylaws provided that, so long as USRA or the Federal Government
held or guaranteed 50% or more of Conrail's outstanding indebtedness
(as determined by the Secretary of the Treasury), three members of the
Board shall be the Secretary of Transportation, the USRA Chairman and
the USRA President; in addition, five members of the board shall be
individuals appointed by the U.S. President with the advice and consent
of the Senate. 18 5
Conrail common stock was issued to the estates of bankrupt rail-
roads in exchange for railroad properties, which the bankruptcy judges
were instructed to transfer to Conrail, if they could not be used to suc-
cessfully reorganize relevant railroad companies. 186 Conrail was permit-
ted to repurchase said stock in order to establish an employee stock
ownership plan.187
6. Conrail was a fair exchange for employees
Section 102(5) of the 3R Act, passed in 1974, includes provisions
requiring the creation of an Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP).188
The final system plan required Conrail to explain how ESOP plans could
be practically used to meet the corporation's capitalization requirements
including potential cost savings, improved labor relations, and improved
service. 189 Section 301(e) also contemplated repurchasing some of the
stock sold to the public by the ESOP, or even total employee
ownership. 190
In 1982, Congress proposed an amendment to the 3R Act (section
1142, Title IV: Transfer of Freight Service) that required the Secretary of
Transportation (after July 1, 1982 and before December 31, 1983) to sell
the common stock of the Corporation held by the federal government, if
the Association determined that Conrail would be profitable. Because
183 Pub. L. No. 93-236, 301(a) and (c).
184 Pub. L. No. 93-236, 301(c)-(d).
185 Pub. L. 93-236, 301(d).
186 Pub. L. No. 93-236, 301(e).
187 Pub. L. 93-236, 301(e).
188 William Jones, Rail Act to Spur Worker Owners, WASH. POST, Jan. 2, 1974.
189 Under Section 206(e)(3) of the 3R Act.
190 See Pub. L. No. 93-236, 301(e).
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employee sacrifices were the key in making Conrail profitable, the Sec-
retary was required to first offer the stock to the employees in the amount
of wages, or wage increases, foregone by them. If the Secretary or his
agent first offered the stock at one price and then lowered the price to
attract additional purchasers, the Secretary was required first to offer the
reduced price stock to the employees.
In October of 1986, the Conrail employees agreed to a wage pack-
age at 12% below the industry standard and obtain an employee stock
ownership plan (ESOP) containing 15% (4.4 million shares) of the out-
standing Conrail stock. 191 When Conrail stock was first made available
for sale to the public, the employees received shares (based on a union
agreement) valued at $24 per share, equivalent to the wage sacrifice they
made over the previous three years.' 92 Some employees sold their shares
for cash on the market immediately. Those employees who held their
shares until the CSX purchase of Conrail received $100 per share for
their stock.193 For example, employee John Fink, who began his railroad
career in 1963 with the New York Central, received 237 shares of Con-
rail stock at $24 per share. 194 As of April 2005, the proceeds in his IRA
from the sale of those shares were worth over $100,000.00.195 There was
no organized use of the shareholder vote by employees. 196
7. Lessons from Conrail for New Fair Exchange Programs
The taxpayers unnecessarily lost at least $8.3 billion through the
federal government's handling of its Conrail investment; this loss could
have easily been avoided, had Congress not required a sale to the private
sector as soon as the company reached profitability. Employees who held
onto the stock they received got a fair return on the sweat equity com-
prised of their wage concessions.
The Conrail governance structure provides a model of a multi-stake-
holder governance process. Whether this structure would have served the
country well in the long run as, for example, the TVA has, is a question
open to debate; government's prematurely forced sale of its Conrail
stocks made it impossible to answer the question with any certainty.
191 Richard Gillespie, Conrail Sale Gives ESOP as Much as $300 Million, PENSIONS AND
INVESTMENT AGE, Oct. 13, 1986.
192 Author's telephone Interview with John Fink, Executive Assistant to the President,
United Transportation Union International (Apr. 6, 2005).
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 Id.
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F. THE 1979 CHRYSLER CORPORATION LOAN GUARANTEE ACT AND
ESOP
The summary version of the Chrysler Loan Guarantee of 1979
("Chrysler Guarantee") 197 is this:
The Arab oil embargo caught Chrysler Corporation sitting on a
mountain of debt as well as a huge inventory of gas-guzzlers. President
Jimmy Carter agreed in 1979, to provide Chrysler with up to $1.5 billion
in loan guarantees, as long as Chrysler won $2 billion in concessions
from banks, suppliers and unions. New CEO Lee Iacocca cut costs to the
bone, eliminating 53,000 jobs. The company also cornered the booming
minivan market. In 1983, the company paid off its loans seven years
early, at a profit of $350 million to the government.198 Chrysler invented
the minivan in 1983-84 and had no minivan competitors for several years
thereafter' 99.
1. Why did the government agree to bail out Chrysler?
Chrysler set sales records in 1972-73, but gasoline shortages, politi-
cal uncertainty, high interest rates, severe inflation and weakening con-
sumer confidence drove Chrysler into a financial crisis in the mid-70s.
American consumer demand soared for smaller, more fuel-efficient cars.
Japanese manufacturers were the first to respond, making great inroads
into the U.S. market. The combined domestic market share of the total
U.S. car market fell while the market share for imports rose to 23.4
percent.2oo
The major reasons advanced for passing the Chrysler Guarantee
were that Chrysler was the 17th largest company in the country (the 10th
in 1978) and the 3rd largest automaker in the U.S. There had never been
a bankruptcy of this size in the U.S. Chrysler employed 134,000 workers
concentrated in the Detroit area, which already had a high rate of unem-
ployment.20' There was concern about the effect of a Chrysler bank-
ruptcy on the manufacturing sector, and Chrysler was the sole producer
of the M-1 tank.202 The UAW estimate of lost jobs if Chrysler failed was
197 See Chrysler Corporation Loan Guarantee Act of 1979, Pub. L. 96-185, Stat. 1324
(1979).
198 America's Biggest Bailouts, BUSINESS WEEK ONLINE, available at http://www.busi-
nessweek.com/magazine/content/01_40b3751710.htm.
199 Email from Robert Jensen to author, dated 9/19/05, correcting earlier manuscript of
this article.
200 The Troubled Years, National Automobile Bankers Association/Vehicle Information
Services (2001), available at www.AutoWorld.com.
201 Comptroller General of the United States, supra note 119 at 15-16.
202 Id.
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500,000 including employees, dealers, and suppliers. The General Ac-
counting Office later estimated the potential job loss at 700,000.203
a) Terms of the Chrysler Loan Guarantee including Upside for
the U.S. Government in Exchange for Risk
The Chrysler Guarantee, 204 signed in January 1980, provided for up
to $1.5 billion in loan guarantees. 20 5 The five-person board administering
the loan guarantee program included: as voting members, the Secretary
of Treasury as Chair, the Federal Reserve Chair, and the U.S. Comptrol-
ler General as voting members; with the Secretaries of Labor and Trans-
portation as non-voting members.20 6
In the Chrysler Guarantee, most of the beneficiaries of the govern-
ment assistance were required to make significant concessions. The gov-
ernment's aid was to be matched by concessions from U.S. and foreign
banks, governments, creditors, stockholders, suppliers, dealers, and
union and non-union employees. 20 7 The Loan Guarantee Board had a
very active oversight role, adjusting the amounts of these concessions
between parties, approving any assets sales over $5 million, any contract
of over $10 million, and approving any financing and operating plans. 20 8
Chrysler was thus reorganized into a much more efficient firm without
going through bankruptcy. 20 9
Under the terms of the Chrysler Guarantee Agreement, Chrysler is-
sued to the government warrants for 14.4 million shares of Chrysler
stock at $13 per share. In 1983, after the guaranteed loan was fully re-
paid-seven years before the loan was originally due - the government
sold these warrants for $311 million.210
2. The Chrysler Program was a Success for the Government,
the Company and its Workers
Chrysler ultimately used $1.2 billion of the $1.5 billion guarantee
authority. There were very complex negotiations between the Loan Guar-
antee Board, U.S. senators, Chrysler management, and the International
Union United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement
203 Author's telephone interview with Robert Jensen, author of CHRYSLER CONTRACT
TALKS 1979-1983, a summary of the negotiators of negotiations between the UAW, Chrysler
and the government during the period of the loan guarantee negotiations and implementation,
and one-time Administrative Assistant to Marc Stepp, UAW Vice President and Director of the
UAW Chrysler Department, at the time of the Chrysler contract negotiations (Dec. 19, 2004)..
204 See Chrysler Loan Guarantee Act of 1979.
205 Chrysler Corporation Loan Guarantee Act of 1979 §4(b).
206 Comptroller General of the United States, supra note 119, at 16.
207 See id.; see also Chrysler Corporation Loan Guarantee Act of 1979.
208 Comptroller General of the United States, supra note 119, at 16.
209 See id. at 17.
210 See id. at 16.
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Workers of America ("UAW"). The UAW had made significant conces-
sions to Chrysler before it sought the loan guarantee. The union reopened
its contract three times in 13 months during the negotiations approving
additional requests for concessions. 2 11 The total concessions given by the
UAW during the period 1979-81 amounted to $1.1 billion.2 12 Manage-
ment also made significant concessions. 2 13 In exchange for these conces-
sions, the employees received "$100,000,000 of common stock of the
Corporation"2 14 (approximately 15% of Chrysler's common stock)21 5
through an employee stock ownership plan ("ESOP")2 16 to be allocated
equally among the plan's participants. 2 17
The Comptroller General of the United States, upon comparing the
government bailouts of Lockheed and Chrysler, the bankruptcy of Penn
Central and the creation of Conrail, concluded that the Chrysler Guaran-
tee was "the most sophisticated in terms of how commercial lending
principles were embodied in... [its]... structure. '2 1 8 He further con-
cluded that in each of these experiences the government had learned
from the previous one; had better results by using more commercial lend-
ing principles; and that similar future programs will benefit from that
experience and "will result in an even more financially rigorous program
if the circumstances warrant". 2 19
The value of the Chrysler stock warrants to the government and of
the stock given to the Chrysler ESOP in 1979 increased. The value of the
stock warrants when they were issued was $3.00 per share. These war-
rants issued to the government allowed it to purchase Chrysler stock at
$13.00 per share exercisable in 1990.220 Chrysler redeemed the warrants
in 1983 when their market price was $30.00 per share.2 2 1 When the com-
pany rebounded, the government profited financially, and the employees,
through the ESOP, then owned 15% of the publicly traded Chrysler
Corporation. 222
211 Author's telephone interview with Douglas Fraser, President of the International
United Auto Workers Union (Nov. 21, 2004).
212 See Jensen, supra note 203.
213 Public Law 96-185, 96th Congress, 93 Stat.1324, 15 U.S.C. 1861 et seq. 93 Stat 1329,
Sec. 6(a)(2) required at least $125,000,000 in concessions from Chrysler employees not repre-
sented by a union.
214 Public Law 96-185, 96th Congress, 93 Stat.1324, Sec. 4(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. 1861 et seq.
215 See interview with Douglas Fraser, supra note 211; see also interview with Robert
Jensen, supra note 203.
216 Chrysler Corporation Loan Guarantee Act of 1979 §7.
217 Chrysler Corporation Loan Guarantee Act of 1979 §7 (c)(3)(C).
218 Comptroller General of the United States, supra note 119, at 17.
219 Comptroller General of the United States, supra note 119, at 18.
220 Id. at 16.
221 See Interview with Douglas Fraser, supra note 211; see also Comptroller General of
the United States, supra note 119, at 16.
222 Id.
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3. What did the employees do with their Chrysler ESOP stock?
Ownership of 15% of a publicly traded company can be controlling
ownership.223 However, this was not a major focus of the UAW at the
time of the Chrysler Loan Guarantee or thereafter. Although Senators
Russell Long and Gaylord Nelson suggested stock and included it in the
loan guarantee legislation, 224 the UAW leaders were "in survival
mode. '2 25 The UAW was consumed with their members' concerns about
the huge concession package they took, and the unions had not requested
stock.226 The UAW was interested in how it might vote the stock; the
union leaders report that their lawyers, after researching the issue, found
that it would be extremely expensive (in terms of millions of dollars) to
organize the proxy votes of the union members. 227 Doug Fraser said,
"We had no ESOP expert .... We didn't focus on this .... We didn't
think the stock would be worth anything. We were looking at how we
could exercise control over the stock as an organization".2 28
The ESOP required in the Chrysler Loan Guarantee Act was a stan-
dard type of ESOP 229 that would have required, in a publicly traded com-
pany, pass-through voting on all issues for the participants to direct the
vote of the Trustee on allocated shares. 230 The UAW was not familiar
enough with ESOPs (which were only made tax deductible by Congress
in 1974231) to know that they might have been able to obtain more influ-
ence over the voting of this stock had they insisted on having a major
voice in choosing the ESOP trustee; neither Fraser nor Jensen knew who
the trustee was.232 Since their members were focused on the concession
package, it is unlikely that they would have used any bargaining leverage
to get a voice in selecting the trustee if it would have cost their members
any further concessions.
Corey Rosen, one of the Senate staff who drafted the Chrysler Loan
Guarantee Act, reported that no one from the Union ever discussed the
Act with him and that he had only one discussion with a Chrysler staff
223 The SEC requires individuals as they acquire large blocs or 5, 10 and 20% of publicly
traded stock to disclose it. See Securities Act of 1934, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 SS, 17
U.S.C. 78m, 7 8 p (2004).
224 See interview with Douglas Fraser, supra note 211; see also interview with Robert
Jensen, supra note 203.
225 Id.
226 Id.
227 Id.
228 Interview with Douglas Fraser, supra note 211.
229 See Chrysler Loan Guarantee Act of 1979; 15 U.S.C. 1861; 93 Stat. 1330; Internal
Revenue Code, 29 U.S.C. 4975(e)(7) (1980).
230 Internal Revenue Code, 29 U.S.C. 4975(e)(7) (1980).
231 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. 1001 (1974).
232 See interview with Douglas Fraser, supra note 211; see also interview with Robert
Jensen, supra note 203.
FAIR EXCHANGE
person. Neither labor nor management was very interested in the re-
quired ESOP when it was placed in the law. Rosen says he would have
told the Union to ask for more stock had they asked him at the time bill
was drafted. He believes they would have been able to negotiate for more
stock or voice in appointment of the trustee.233 However, the Union was
focused on huge concessions demanded from them and had little faith
that the stock would ever be valuable.
UAW President Douglas Fraser was given a seat on the Chrysler
Board of Directors, but the seat was given to him personally, and was not
made an institutional seat for the holder of the UAW presidency.234 He
used that position to raise issues of concern to the union members and as
a person knowledgeable about the industry, but not as one who con-
trolled a voting bloc.235 But in the 1982 negotiations, the union pushed
for and won a major workplace participation program to enable workers
to have a greater voice in quality matters. 236 This joint program contin-
ues up to the present.237
In 1984-85, each individual UAW member's Chrysler ESOP ac-
count was worth approximately $8,000.238 Marc Stepp, UAW Vice Presi-
dent in charge of Chrysler, wanted the members to keep their stock and
build their personal savings. 239 The UAW members expressed, through
their local presidents at their National Council meeting, a strong desire to
get money back on the concessions they had made.240 Chrysler happily
agreed with the UAW to buy back the shares of any UAW member who
wanted to cash out of the ESOP. 241 They were happy not to have such a
large bloc of their stock in the hands of the workers. 242 The agreement
was that the UAW members would automatically receive the cash unless
they made an affirmative decision to keep the stock.243 According to
Douglas Fraser, most of the union members took the cash and most of
the managers retained their stock. 244 The lowest value of the stock during
the issuance of the loan guarantee was approximately $3.00 per share.245
The stock value was $30 in 1983 when the government exercised its
233 Author's telephone interview of Corey Rosen by author on March 1, 2005.
234 See interview with Douglas Fraser, supra note 211.
235 Id.
236 See interview with Douglas Fraser, supra note 211; see also interview with Robert
Jensen, supra note 203.
237 Interview with Robert Jensen, supra note 203.
238 Id.
239 Id.
240 Id.
241 Id.
242 Id.
243 Id.
244 Id.
245 Id.
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warrants; the price later went up to $50 per share, split and rose to $50
again and split again.246
4. Daimler buyout of Chrysler - would the union members'
15% have mattered?
In 1995, Kirk Kerkorian, who owned 10% of the Chrysler Corpora-
tion stock, began an effort to purchase the majority of the stock and take
Chrysler private.2 47 He was working with former Chrysler President, Lee
Iacocca. 248 Mr. Kerkorian planned a leveraged buyout including em-
ployee ownership. 249 He had complained for months about a low stock
price ($40 per share) and feeble dividends, when Chrysler was "a money
machine throwing off $1 billion in excess cash per quarter".250 Manage-
ment at Chrysler were not happy about the takeover plan and began look-
ing for a white knight to keep Kerkorian from taking over Chrysler and
using its cash to pay off his acquisition debt.25' The white knight materi-
alized in the form of the German automaker, Daimler Benz.2 5 2 Shortly
thereafter, Daimler Benz and Chrysler merged to form the Daimler-
Chrysler Company. After a short time it became clear that Daimler had
taken over Chrysler, and that it was not a partnership of equals.253 In
September 1998, German management of DaimlerChrysler replaced a
large number of U.S. Chrysler managers, many more left, and Chrysler
was again in major financial trouble. 254 "When Kerkorian agreed to the
Daimler deal, Chrysler had close to $10 billion in cash. '255 Daimler-
Chrysler's profits in 2000 fell 40 percent from the year before; losing
$528 million in the last quarter compared to $1.2 billion profit the year
before.256
Had the employees kept their 15% ownership of Chrysler, would
Daimler have been able to take over Chrysler? Might the union, with
some sway over 15% of the company's stock, have been able to negoti-
ate a deal to keep Chrysler locally owned, maintaining jobs in the U.S.
and cash in Chrysler? Or could they have prevented the Kerkorian take-
over without a partner? We will never know the answer. At the time of
the Daimler takeover, UAW President Steven Yokich favored the
246 Id.
247 BILL VLASIC & BRADLEY A. STERTZ, TAKEN FOR A RIDE: HOW
DAIMLER-BENZ DROVE OFF WITH CHRYSLER 8 (Harper Business 2001).
248 Id.
249 Id.
250 Id. at 3.
251 Id. at 51.
252 Id. at 100-05.
253 Id. at 376.
254 Id.at 370-73.
255 Id. at 366.
256 Id. at 364-65.
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Daimler merger as a means to save Chrysler UAW jobs. He saw Daimler
as a much needed deep pocket with auto making experience. He saw that
as the best protection for the US Chrysler workers. The union leadership
was not fond of Kerkorian.2 57 At the time of the merger there was no
single shareholder with a 15% stake. Had the union members retained
their shares, they might have had a strong or even a determining voice in
defeating the Kerkorian takeover effort, or changing the direction the
merger/takeover took. We will never know.
In 2005 it is the Chrysler part of the business that is supporting the
ailing Daimler part. 258 How might that have strengthened the hand of the
Chrysler workers if they were still major stockholders at
DaimlerChrysler?
5. Relevance of the Chrysler Loan Guarantee and ESOP to the
Fair Exchange concept
The Chrysler Guarantee saved a large U.S. company from bank-
ruptcy; the company recovered and paid back the government early and
in full. In addition the government made a profit. The workers acquired a
large bloc of stock. Their sale of that stock helped to replace some of the
wages they had given up as concessions. Had the workers not sold their
stock, they might have played a major role in the decisions that led
Daimler Benz to takeover Chrysler. Chrysler, a major U.S. employer and
once an important pillar of the U.S. economy, is now only a division of a
German multi-national corporation, which can, at any time, decide to
dump the Chrysler workforce or assets. Although Chrysler was troubled
when taken over by Daimler in 1995, Kerkorian said that if Chrysler had
joined his leveraged buyout in 1995 instead of selling out to Daimler
three years later, "We would have owned it clean as a whistle, with no
debt.... The union guys and the management, they'd have twenty per-
cent. It would have been a real little jewel". 25 9
257 Mr. Yokich passed away before these interviews took place.
258 DaimlerChrysler 2004 Results Annual Press Conference & Conference Call by Bodo
Uebber, Chief Financial Officer (Stuttgart, Germany, Feb. 10, 2005), available at http://www.
daimlerchrysler.com/Projects/c2c/channel/documents/621909-uebber_.50210.pdf; but cf
DaimlerChrysler Q2 and First Half 2005 Results Conference Call by Bodo Uebber, Chief
Financial Officer (July 28, 2005), available at http://www.daimlerchrysler.com/Projects/c2c/
channel/documents/706732_dcx q2_2005_uebber.pdf (suggesting that the recent poor ac-
counting of the Daimler division may be largely a function of a one-time expense and tempo-
rary automotive industry economic conditions).
259 Vlasic, B. & Stertz, B., Taken for a Ride: How Daimler-Benz Drove Off with Chrysler,
Harper Business (2001) at 348.
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G. LESSONS THE GOVERNMENT LEARNED FROM ITS BAILOUT
EXPERIENCES IN THE 1970s AND 80s
The U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) Report to Congress
"Guidelines for Rescuing Large Failing Firms and Municipalities 260
(the "1984 GAO Study") recommended a set of guidelines for U.S. gov-
ernment loan and loan guarantee programs based on the bailout exper-
iences at Chrysler, Lockheed, Penn Central/ Conrail and New York
City. 26 1 The report concluded that there should be a general policy gov-
erning these intervention situations - that, when it is determined that gov-
ernment intervention is in the national interest, Congress should:
a) clearly describe the specific national interest served and congres-
sional intent for the program including specific goals and objec-
tives, and avoid conflicting intentions;
b) use commercial lending principles to structure the transaction to
protect the national interest;
c) get risk compensation in the form of loan fees or more likely
equity or warrants and loan priority over private lenders;
d) get concessions from suppliers, unions management, etc.; and
e) create a control board including the Secretary of Treasury, Secre-
tary of Office of Management & Budget and Chair of Federal
Reserve Board that would have some control over
management. 262
H. THE SAVINGS AND LOAN BAILOUT - THE PRICE OF FAILING TO
REQUIRE EITHER ACCOUNTABILITY OR THE USE OF FAIR
EXCHANGE PRINCIPALS
1. Corporate Welfare is the Opposite of Fair Exchange
The folks who created the S&L crisis, developed its bailout (and
many of whom benefited directly from it) the Reagan and Bush adminis-
trations, ran on platforms of keeping government from interfering with
business. They also sought to limit government expenditures on entitle-
ments for the poor. Their deregulation of the S&Ls, and the bailout re-
quired to clean up from the deregulation mess, was to transfer billions of
public dollars to a small number of wealthy S&L investors. Under their
leadership, government has given the most to businesses without proper
oversight or protection of the public interest whereas, the TVA, for ex-
ample, was created by the New Dealers, who believed in government
regulation of business. Yet, based on substantial planning and a concern
that the government must protect the public interest when it invests tax-
260 Comptroller General of the United States, supra note 119, at 17-18.
261 Id.
262 Id.
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payers' money, the TVA they created continues to serve multiple public
purposes of economic development for a region, cheap power, and job
creation. It made money for the region and the government, and became
self-sustaining. This S&L bailout section is included to provide those
interested in Fair Exchange with a fact source to use when confronted
with arguments of those who claim to want to keep government out of
business. Many who preach that position did not hesitate to bail out S&L
investors without providing protection for the public interests or purse.
2. What caused the Savings and Loan crisis?
The S&L industry began in the late 1800s for the sole purpose of
providing home mortgages. 263 Government regulation of the industry be-
came necessary when nearly two thousand of S&L institutions failed dur-
ing the Great Depression, forcing the federal government to provide
deposit insurance to quell fears of further S&L failures. 264
BETWEEN 1966-1979, S&Ls experienced difficulties with increas-
ingly rising market interest rates. 265 Interest rate ceilings prevented S&Ls
from paying competitive interest rates on deposits, so that consumers
replaced substantial amounts of S&L deposits with securities offering
higher rates of return. 266 Concurrently, money market funds began com-
peting with S&Ls for savings, which were additionally prohibited from
seeking higher-return investments other than accepting deposits and
granting home mortgage loans.267
By 1981, two-thirds of the nation's S&Ls were losing money and
many were broke.268 Instead of forcibly closing the insolvent S&Ls and
reducing potential losses for the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC), the government allowed these institutions to continue operating
at a loss. 269 During this delay, various S&Ls invested in questionable
business operations in an attempt to regain solvency, 270 using the more
expansive powers Congress bestowed upon them during the 1980-82 pe-
riod., powers granted in the hopes that the S&Ls would enter new areas of
263 Mark Zepezauer & Arthur Naiman, The S&L Bailout: $32 billion every year for 30
years, in TAKE THE RICH OFF WELFARE (1996), available at http://www.thirdworldtraveler.
com/CorporateWelfare/S&LBailout.html.
264 Id.
265 Id.
266 Id.
267 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), The S&L Crisis: A Chrono-Bibliogra-
phy, 1, FDIC Website, available at www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/s&l (last updated Dec. 20,
2002).
268 Id.
269 During the 1986-89 period, losses were compounded as insolvent institutions were
allowed to remain open and grow, allowing ever increasing losses to accumulate. See FDIC,
supra note 367, at 4.
270 See Zepezauer & Naiman, supra note 263.
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business and thus return to profitability. 271 "For the first time, the gov-
ernment approve[d] measures intended to increase S&L profits as op-
posed to promoting housing and home-ownership. 272
ACCORDING TO THE FDIC, FROM 1982-1985 there were reductions
in the Federal Home Loan Bank Board's regulatory and supervisory
staff. In 1983, a starting S&L examiner was paid $14,000 a year. The
average examiner had only two years on the job. S& L industry growth
increased by 56% between 1982 and 1985, during this period of supervi-
sory and examination retraction. Forty Texas S&Ls tripled in size be-
tween 1982 and 1986, many of them growing by 100% each year;
California S&Ls followed a similar pattern.273
The St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 ("GARN")
was enacted in December of 1982. This Reagan Administration initiative
completed the process of expanding federally chartered S&Ls' powers,
enabling them to diversify their activities to increase profits. 274 Major
provisions included: elimination of deposit interest rate ceilings; elimina-
tion of the previous statutory limit on loan to value ratio; expansion of
the asset powers of federal S&Ls by permitting up to 40% of assets in
commercial mortgages, up to 30% of assets in consumer loans, up to
10% of assets in commercial loans and up to 10% of assets in commer-
cial leases. '275
The de-regulation of the S&L industry did not stop many of the
S&L institutions from failing, however; from1989 to 1996, the Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation ("FSLIC") closed or otherwise
resolved 296 thrift institutions with total assets of $125 billion.276 Be-
tween the creation of the Resolution Trust Corporation ("RTC") in 1989
271 FDIC, supra note 267, at 2 ("MARCH, 1980 -Depository Institutions Deregulation
and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA) [was] enacted. Th[is] law is a Carter Administration
initiative aimed at eliminating many of the distinctions among different types of depository
institutions and ultimately removing interest rate ceiling on deposit accounts. Authority for
federal S&Ls to make ADC (acquisition, development, construction) loans is expanded. De-
posit insurance limit raised to $100,000 from $40,000. This last provision is added without
debate. NOVEMBER, 1980-Federal Home Loan Bank Board reduces net worth requirement for
insured S&Ls from 5 to 4 percent of total deposits. Bank Board also removes limits on the
amounts of brokered deposits an S&L can hold. AUGUST, 1981-Tax Reform Act of 1981
enacted. Provides powerful tax incentives for real-estate investment by individuals. This legis-
lation helps create a "boom" in real estate and contributes to over-building. SEPTEMBER,
1981-Federal Home Loan Bank Board permits troubled S&Ls to issue "income capital certif-
icates" that are purchased by FSLIC and included as capital. Rather than showing that an
institution is insolvent, the certificates make it appear solvent.").
272 Id.
273 FDIC, supra note 267, at 2.
274 Id.
275 Id.
276 Timothy Curry & Lynn Shibut, The Cost of the Savings and Loan Crisis: Truth and
Consequences, FDIC BANKING REVIEW (Dec. 2000), available at www.fdic.gov.bank/analyti-
callbanking/2000dec/brv 1 3n2_2.pdf.
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and that agency's resolution in 1995, an additional 747 thrifts with total
assets of $394 billion had to be rescued by last-minute efforts from gov-
ernment agencies. 277 The combined closings by both agencies of 1,043
institutions holding $519 billion in assets contributed to a massive re-
structuring of the S&L industry. 278
The government's decision in the early 1980s-to turn the S&Ls
loose in the marketplace to compete with banks-was the point at which
a well constructed policy including fair exchange could have changed the
course of S&L history to the advantage of the public. When interest rate
fluctuation began to make the S&Ls financially untenable, the govern-
ment had at least three options: 1) to close them down; 2) to use govern-
ment funds to recapitalize the industry in exchange for fair exchange
equity and lifting of S&L interest rate rules; or 3) to change the S&L
regulations to enable them to make up for the losses and become profita-
ble again. The government chose the third option, but also removed both
regulations and oversight. The outcome, as noted below, was an enor-
mously expensive fiasco paid for, not primarily by the private S&L in-
vestors, but by the taxpayers. So the taxpayers ended up with the risk of
option 3 without any potential upside for the risk.
3. Deregulation of the savings and loan industry enabled
substantial fraud that mainly benefited well-connected
people
These changes in the early 1980s ended the requirement that S&Ls
lend money only in their own communities, allowed them to offer 100%
financing (i.e., no down payments), and permitted S&L owners to lend
money to themselves. 279 These changes invited fraud; and sure enough,
the GAO reported that "fraud played a significant role" in the S&L fail-
ures and that the RTC "suspects that fraud or criminal activity on the part
of directors, officers, or senior managers contributed to the failure of 40
percent of the thrifts it has investigated". 280 Several of the biggest scan-
dals of the S&L fiasco involved high-level government officials using
277 Id.
278 Id.
279 FDIC, supra note 267, at 5.
280 Savings and Loan Crisis: Federal Response to Fraud in Financial Institutions, Hearing
Before the U.S. Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, GAO/T-GGD-90-61,
at 2 (1990) (statement of Richard L. Fogel, Assistant Comptroller General, U.S. General Ac-
counting Office), available at http://archive.gao.gov/d38tl2/141927.pdf; see also FDIC, supra,
note 367 (noting the following government measures that eased restrictions on thrifts: in Janu-
ary 1982, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board reduced the net worth requirement for insured
S&Ls and allowed net worth to be calculated by more liberal accounting standards; in April
1982, the Bank Board eliminated the minimum stock holder restriction on S&Ls, allowing for
single-owner S&Ls, and also eased the means of purchasing S&Ls by allowing buyers to use
real estate, rather than cash, as collateral).
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the S&L funds for their personal advantage. These are some examples.
"J. William Oidenburg bought State Savings of Salt Lake City for $10.5
million, then had it pay him $55 million for a piece of land he'd bought
for $874,000. With the help of... Herman K. Beebe, who served a year
for bank fraud, Don Dixon bought Vernon Savings and Loan (one of the
nation's healthiest) and then set up a series of corporations for it to loan
money to. Four years later, he left Vernon $1.3 billion in debt. Beebe
also had money in Silverado Savings, an S&L partly owned by President
George H. W. Bush's son Neil. Silverado told a prospective borrower he
couldn't have $10 million; instead, he should borrow $15 million and
buy $5 million in Silverado stock. Although federal examiners knew
Silverado was leaking cash as early as 1985, it wasn't closed down until
December 1988, a month after Bush was elected president. Because
Silverado kept leaking cash for those three years, it ended up costing
taxpayers more than a billion dollars."'28'
There are many stories about criminal activities connected with this
crisis.2 82 Numerous S&L bankruptcies followed.283
281 See Zepezauer & Naiman, supra note 263.
282 Additional S&L crime stories can be found in these sources: STEPHEN PIzzo, MARY
FRICKER AND PAUL MUOLO, INSIDE JOB: THE LOOTING OF AMERICA'S SAVINGS AND LOANS.
(McGraw- Hill 1989); David Scheim Trust of Hustle: The Bush Record found at www.cam-
paignwatch.org/morel/htm 3/14/05; LA Times, 7/31/1990, p. l;Wall Street Journal, 8/9/1988,
p. Al; Austin American- Statesman, 5/17/92, p. GI; Washington Post, 7/4/1992, p. Al; Wash-
ington Post, 12/28/1989, p. A21; San Diego Union-Tribune, 1/1/1990, p. B8; and Jonathan
Kwitny, "How Bush's Pals Broke the Banks," The Village Voice, 10/20/1992, p. 27. Black,
William, The Incidence and Cost of Fraud and Insider Abuse, Washington, DC: National
Commission on Financial Institution Reform, Recovery and Enforcement, Staff Report No. 13,
1993; CALAVITA, KITTY, PONTELL, HENRY N., AND TILLMAN, ROBERT H. Big Money Game:
Fraud and Politics in the Savings and Loan Crisis, (University of California Press 1997);
ET-rLESON, SHERRY AND THOMAS HILLIARD, Crime and Punishment in the S&L Industry: The
Bush Administration's Anemic War on S&L Fraud, (Public Citizen's Congress Watch 1990);
FAILED THmaFrs: INTERNAL CONTROL WEAKNESSES CREATE AN ENVIRONMENT CONDUCIVE TO
FRAUD, INSIDER ABUSE, AND RELATED UNSAFE PRACTICES, (U.S. General Accounting Office
1989 T-AFMD-90-4); GuP, BENTON, BANK FRAUD: EXPOSING THE HIDDEN THREAT TO FINAN-
CIAL INSTITUTIONS, (Bankers Publishing Co. 1990); MAYER, MARTIN, THE GREATEST-EVER
BANK ROBBERY: THE COLLAPSE OF THE SAVINGS AND LOAN INDUSTRY, (Charles Scribner's
Sons 1990); O'SHEA, JAMES, The Daisy Chain: How Borrowed Billions Sank a Texas S&L,
(Pocket Books 1991); PLZER, PAUL Z. AND ROBERT DErrz, Other People's Money: The Inside
Story of the S&L Mess, (Simon and Schuster 1989); The U.S Government's War Against
Fraud, Abuse, and Misconduct in Financial Institutions: Winning Some Battles but Losing the
War: Twenty-Ninth Report, Washington, DC: U.S. House of Representatives. Committee on
Government Operations, Committee Report 101-982, 1990;Whiteford, Taylor & Preston, Is-
sues Regarding the Role of Fraud and Other Criminal Misconduct in Causing Failures in the
Thrift Industry, Washington, DC: National Commission on Financial Institution Reform, Re-
covery and Enforcement, Staff Report No. 14, 1993;Why S&L Crooks Have Failed to Pay
Millions of Dollars in Court-Ordered Restitution: Nineteen Case Studies, Washington, DC:
U.S. House of Representatives. Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, Commit-
tee Print 102-11, 1992.; "William Black Tackles the Savings and Loan Debacle," in UNSUNG
HEROES: FEDERAL EXECUCRATS MAKING A DIFFERENCE, 22-63 Norma M. Riccucci, Washing-
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IN 1987, losses at Texas S&Ls comprised more than one-half of all
S&L losses nationwide, and of the 20 largest losses, 14 were in Texas. In
January 1987, GAO declared the FSLIC fund insolvent by at least $3.8
billion. 284
IN APRIL 1987, before Edwin Gray ended his term as Chairman of
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, he was summoned to the office of
Senator Dennis DeConcini, where four other Senators (John McCain,
Alan Cranston, John Glenn, and Donald Riegle) questioned Gray about
the appropriateness of Federal Home Loan Bank Board investigations
into Charles Keating's Lincoln Savings and Loan. 285 All five senators
who received campaign contributions from Keating would become
known as the "Keating Five.' '286 The subsequent failure of the Lincoln
Savings and Loan cost the taxpayers an estimated $2 billion. 287
IN NOVEMBER 1988, George Bush was elected President and the
S&L problem was not part of election debate. In February 1989, Presi-
dent Bush unveiled the S&L bailout plan. In August of that year, Finan-
cial Institutions Reform Recovery and Enforcement Act ("FIRREA") 288
abolished the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and FSLIC and turned
S&L regulation over to the newly created Office of Thrift Supervision
("OTS"). 289 The deposit insurance function shifted to the FDIC. 290 A
new entity, the RTC, was created to resolve the insolvent S&Ls.291
Other major provisions of FIRREA included: $50 billion of new
borrowing authority, with most financed from general revenues and the
industry; meaningful net worth requirements and regulation by the OTS
and FDIC; and allocation of funds to the Justice Department to help fi-
nance prosecution of S&L crimes. Additional bank crime legislation the
next year (i.e., the Crime Control Act of 1990) mandated a study by the
National Commission on Financial Institution Reform, Recovery and En-
forcement to uncover the causes of the S&L crisis, and come up with
recommendations to prevent future debacles. 292
ton, DC, Georgetown University Press, 1995. Wilmsen, SrEVEN K., Silverado: Neil Bush and
the Savings and Loan Scandal, (National Press Books 1991).
283 FDIC, supra note 267, at 3-4.
284 Id. at 4.
285 See id.
286 See id.
287 Id.
288 Financial Institutions Reform Recovery and Enforcement Act (FIRREA), 12 U.S.C.
1181, PL 101-73,108 Stat 183 (8/9/1989).
289 Id.
290 Id.
291 FDIC, supra note 267, at 5.
292 Id.
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4. Who benefited from the savings and loan crisis and what did
it cost American taxpayers?
In 1989, Congress appropriated $157 billion to bail out the S&Ls,
but even that was far from enough.2 93 In 1990, the GAO estimated "that
losses from thrift failures could be as much as $500 billion in the next 40
years. '294 To make up the difference, the RTC sold off the assets of
failed S&Ls, often in deals that seem much more beneficial to the buyers
than to the U.S. taxpayers. 295
"For example, Robert Bass, one of the richest men in
America, bought American Savings and Loan for $350
million, then received $2 billion in government subsidies
to help him resurrect it. During one week in 1988, the
government promised $8 billion in assistance to nine
S&L purchasers; one of them put $20 million down, and
the other eight paid nothing. 296
As of August 1990, the GAO estimated that the cost, including in-
terest, could be as much as $500 billion, stating, "the taxpayers will have
to pay for most of it. ' '297
Curry, writing in 2000 after they claimed the S&L cleanup was
complete, stated that due to the 1,043 thrift closures in the 1986-95 pe-
riod, the insurance resources of FSLIC were overwhelmed, causing tax-
payers to pay approximately $124 billion to cover the depositors
insurance and $29 billion from the thrift industry for a total of $153 bil-
lion298. However, these figures only count the interest payments on the
bonds floated for the bailout to the extent that their rate exceeds the nor-
mal U.S. Treasury rate; they do not include the amount of government
debt that would not have been incurred without the S&L bailout.299
Many sources reported that political connections helped protect
S&L misconduct, 300 particularly in Florida and Texas.301 But the bailout
funds came from taxpayers and went to the people who buy the bonds,
many of whom are the same ones who caused the problems. 302 So, ulti-
293 STEPHEN Pizzo, MARY FRICKER & PAUL MUOLO, INSIDE JOB, THE LOOTING OF
AMERICA'S SAVINGS AND LOANS 59 (McGraw-Hill 1989).
294 See savings and Loan Crisis, supra note 280.
295 Zepezauer & Naiman, supra note 263.
296 Id.
297 See savings and Loan Crisis, supra note 280.
298 Curry & Shibut, supra note 276.
299 Id. at 31.
30 Jonathan Kwitny, How Bush's Pals Broke the Banks, THE VILLAGE VOICE, Oct. 20,
1992, at 24.
301 David Scheim, Trust of Hustle: The Bush Record, available at www.campaignwatch.
org/hustle.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2005).
302 Zepezauer & Naiman, supra note 263.
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mately, the S&L bailout amounted to a massive transfer of wealth from
ordinary people to predominantly wealthy S&L investors.
30 3
In its August 1990 report "Savings and Loan Crisis: Federal Re-
sponse to Fraud in Financial Institutions," Richard Fogel of the GAO
stated that of the annual appropriation in the Financial Institutions Re-
form, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) 30 4 of $75 mil-
lion (for each of 1990 1991,1992) to enhance the Department of Justice's
efforts against financial fraud, $65 million went to fraud prosecutions
and $10 million to civil proceedings. 30 5 Fogel described the large number
of investigations, prosecutions, indictments and convictions obtained by
the FBI and US Attorneys, stressing the importance of the Dallas Bank
Fraud Task Force, 27 other special task forces and the Special Counsel
for Financial Institution Fraud. 30 6 Fogel sought more funds for the spe-
cial task forces and Special Counsel30 7 and access for the Special Coun-
sel to more timely and centralized data to effectively oversee the
government's effort to pursue financial institution fraud. 30 8 David
Scheim reported that
"In December 1989, the Bush Administration dismantled
all 14 of the regional strike forces and folded them into
the Justice Department.' Attorney General Richard
Thornburgh took this step despite widespread protests
from Congress and law enforcement officials that it
would cripple federal efforts against organized crime.2
Indeed, during their two decades of operation, the inde-
pendent strike forces had made enormous progress
against organized crime, and had played key roles in
convictions of Mafia bosses in major U.S. cities through-
out the country. 3 ... Such strike forces nationwide pros-
ecuted Mob figures involved in S&L fraud.6 Strike Force
efforts helped convict, among others, Mario Renda, who,
working with the Mob, brokered deposits into 130 S&Ls
nationwide, all of which failed. '30 9
303 Id.
304 Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), 12
U.S.C. 1181, PL 101-73,108 Stat 183 (8/9/1989)
305 See savings and Loan Crisis, supra note 280 at 11.
306 Id. at 1-8.
307 Id. at 1, 14.
308 Id. at 1, 11-13.
309 David Scheim Trust of Hustle: The Bush Record found at www.campaignwatch.org/
morel/htm 3/14/05; Scheim cites the following publications for these facts: Washington Post,
12/28/1989, p. A21; San Diego Union-Tribune, 1/1/1990, p. B8; San Diego Union-Tribune,
1/1/1990, p. B8; Wall Street Journal, 8/9/1988, p. Al; and Pizzo, Inside Job, p. 112, 120-23,
303, 337.
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5. If a business is too important for the government to allow it
to fail, then it is too big to be left free from organized
responsibility to that government
The S&L bailout provides a good example of a cyclical pattern in
the relationship between government and business in the U.S. The pen-
dulum seems to swing regularly from regulation to deregulation, from
protection from the rich and powerful to protection for the rich and pow-
erful. We saw that pattern with the railroads, from the land grants to the
robber barons to the anti-trust laws to the implosion from regulation as
rail ceased to be a monopoly, to the Conrail bailout and then sale to CSX.
With the S&Ls it was creation of S&Ls so the worker could get a home,
loan through a period of intense regulation after the markets imploded
during the depression. As the economy heated up and the Depression
sank further into memory, the S&L financiers were able to sell the vir-
tues of deregulation. Deregulation led to uncontrolled profit seeking,
thievery and then collapse. One would think that after so many of these
cycles, the pendulum should come to rest on the proposition that society
requires some amount of market regulation to curb the greed of human
nature and the ability of the rich to take unfair advantage of communities
and working people, but that regulation must keep current with market
trends, so as not to kill the regulated industry.
The Fair Exchange lesson of the S&Ls is that any business that
needs government investment must treat the taxpayers as investors with
the oversight, control and upside potential that any market investor
would demand. And, where an industry was created to serve a specific
public purpose, government oversight must also serve to protect that
public purpose.
II. THE AIR TRANSPORTATION SAFETY AND SYSTEM
STABILIZATION ACT OF 2001
1. Why was Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization
Act created?
Congress's primary concern in creating the Air Transportation
Safety and System Stabilization Act 3 10 ("ATSSSA 2001" or "2001 Air-
line Bailout") was to preserve the U.S. airline industry that was devas-
tated by the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington D.C. on
September 11, 2001 (hereinafter "9/11"). The country and Congress were
in shock and focused on these acts as the worst attack on civilians in U.S.
history. Congress was not focused on making industrial investment pol-
icy. Several airlines lost planes, all lost revenue when the airports were
310 49 U.S.C. §40101.
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closed for several days, and most suffered a loss of passengers for
months after the 9/11 attacks.31' Of the $15 billion appropriated for air-
line stabilization, $5 billion was granted to the airlines by the Department
of Transportation, with no strings attached, 312 for "losses incurred as a
direct result of the 4-day government shut-down of air traffic and incre-
mental losses stemming from the terrorist attacks. . . . DOT distributed
$4.6 billion in cash to 427 passenger and cargo air carriers." 313
2. Did Congress follow the U.S. General Accounting Office's
1984 study guidelines?
Apparently, the drafters of the ATSSA 2001 paid attention to the
guidelines outlined in the 1984 GAO Study of earlier bailouts, utilized
current business practices to protect the taxpayers' interests as investors,
and made efforts to prevent resort to government funds by those with
other options.314 The Air Transportation Stabilization Board ("ATSB") is
similar to the boards created for Conrail and Chrysler. Its voting mem-
bers are the designees of the Federal Reserve Chair, the Secretaries of
Treasury and Transportation, with a designee of the Comptroller General
of the United States serving as a non-voting member.315
The ATSB application 316 echoed many of the guidelines in the 1984
GAO Study. The application explicitly limited the salary and termination
benefits of executives of any applicant. It required that there be no other
available lending source financial information a commercial lender
would require and a detailed business plan including an analysis demon-
strating precisely how the airline intended to repay the debt. The applica-
tion states "the Board will give greater preference to those applications
that meet the greatest number of evaluation criteria" These included: "a
demonstration of concessions by the air carrier's security holders, other
creditors, or employees," 317 "a description of all security (if any) for the
loan" 318 including real estate and financial statements of guarantors 319;
and " a description of the Federal Government's ability to participate...
311 Philip Mattera, "The Big Bailout: Questions about Federal Aid for the Airline Industry
and the Takeover of Airport Security," Corporate Research E-Letter No. 16, September 2001,
available at http://www.corp-research.org/sep0 l.htm.
312 Press Release, Senators Fitzgerald and Corzine, Limit "Blank Check" Subsidy for Air-
lines (Sept. 21, 2001) (on file at http://corzine.senate.gov/press-office/record.cfm?id= 186653).
313 The Financial Condition of the Airline Industry: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on
Aviation, 108th Cong. (2004), available at http://www.house.gov/transportation/aviation/06-
03-04/06-03-04memo.html.
314 Pub. L. No. 107-42.
315 Pub. L. No. 107-42.
316 Air Transportation Stabilization Board Application for Air Carrier Loan Guarantee,
Form # 001, OMB No. 0348-0059.
317 Id. at 5.
318 Id. at. 6.
319 Id.
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in the gains of the Borrower. . through the use of such instruments as
warrants, stock options, common or preferred stock, or other appropriate
equity instruments. "The Board will give greater preference to... appli-
cations that demonstrate that the proposed instruments would ensure that
the Federal Government will... participate in the gains of the air carrier
and its security holders. 320
Despite the 9/11 crisis atmosphere, in the Senate debate321 on Sep-
tember 21, 2001, Senator Fitzgerald, a Republican from Illinois, and Sen-
ator Corzine, a Democrat from New Jersey: 1) insisted on equity
participation for all loan guarantees; 2) specifically referred to Chrysler
loan guarantee warrants; 3) asked that Treasury seek warrants as a condi-
tion of each loan guarantee; 4) mentioned that the U.S. government made
a $350 million profit on Chrysler warrants; and 5) mentioned that FDIC
wiped out the shareholders of Continental Bank in Chicago before they
provided government assistance and came out of it with the FDIC own-
ing 80% of Continental Bank.32 2
The criteria utilized in ATSSSA provide a precise and businesslike
model for some of the requirements that a Fair Exchange law should
contain. Its limitation to a single industry at a time when many of the
industry's employees and many other businesses were deeply injured by
the same event raises a logical question: why shouldn't this be a general
policy covering all similar government investment situations?
3. Outcome of Grants from the Air Transportation Safety and
System Stabilization Act, Loans and Loan Guarantees
In his report to the House Subcommittee on Aviation, ATSB Execu-
tive Director Michael Kestenbaum stated:
The ATSB received sixteen loan guarantee applications
prior to the June 28, 2002 application deadline estab-
lished under the Board's regulations drafted by OMB.
They included a range of large airlines, low-fare airlines,
smaller airlines, charter and cargo carriers. The ATSB
has approved seven applications, denied eight applica-
tions, and has one application pending. One of the ap-
proved applications was withdrawn prior to closing. The
ATSB has issued six loan guarantees totaling $1.56 bil-
lion supporting loans totaling $1.74 billion. The carriers
who have received ATSB guarantees are America West
Airlines ($380 million for a $429 million loan), Ameri-
320 Id.
321 147 CoNG. REc. S9590 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 2001).
322 Id.
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can Trans Air ($148.5 million for a $168 million loan),
Aloha Airlines ($41 million for a $45 million loan),
Frontier Airlines ($63 million for a $70 million loan),
US Airways ($900 million for a $1.0 billion loan), and
World Airways ($27 million for a $30 million loan). Ev-
ergreen Airlines received conditional approval for a loan
guarantee but withdrew its application after obtaining a
private loan. The loans range in maturity from five to
seven years with final maturity dates between 2007 and
2009. The guarantees generally have represented about
90 percent of the total loan amounts, with roughly 10
percent of the risk assumed by private sources. 323
4. The Air Transportation Stabilization Board only provided
loan guarantees to companies that agreed to compensate
the taxpayer risk-taking with an equity type of upside
benefits
The statute also indicates that, to the extent feasible and practicable,
the government should be compensated for the risk of extending loan
guarantees. 324 The ATSB has strived to ensure that the government be
compensated for the risk assumed in making the guarantees through fees
and stock warrants. 325 To date, the six ATSB borrowers have paid ap-
proximately $145 million in guarantee fees to the federal government. 326
The ATSB also obtained stock warrants in the six air carriers to allow the
government to participate in their financial success. 327 For those air carm-
ers, the warrants represent between 10 and 33 percent of each company's
equity. 328 Based on recent stock prices, the ATSB warrants currently
have a "paper value" in excess of $100 million.329 While they can be
exercised and sold at the ATSB's discretion (ATSB is exploring different
options for monetizing the warrants) the actual value realized will be a
function' of a number of factors such as the size of the position offered,
liquidity of the underlying stock and markets, investor interest, and the
323 The Financial Condition of the Airline Industry: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on
Aviation, 108th Cong. (2004) (testimony of Michael Kestenbaum, Executive Director of the
Air Transportation Stabilization Board), available at http://www.house.gov/transportation/avi-
ation/06-03-04/06-03-04memo.html.
324 Id. at 2.
325 Id.
326 Id.
327 Id. at 2.
328 Id.
329 Id.
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timing and manner in which the warrants are monetized. 330 The warrants
will have expired by 2012. 3 31
Currently, all five of the outstanding ATSB guaranteed loans are
performing. 332 Table 1 below demonstrates loan guarantee amounts,
while Appendix A lists equity provided to the government in exchange.
TABLE 1. ATSB LOAN GUARANTEES 333
Total Loan (including private
Carrier ATSB Loan $ (millions) loans) $ (millions)
America West 380 429
American Trans Air 148.5 168
Aloha Airlines 41 45
Frontier Airlines 63 70
US Airways 900 1,000
World Airways 27 30
5. Fair Exchange requirements saved the taxpayers $8.4 billion
of available credit
Airlines unwilling to provide stock warrants, such as Northwest Air-
lines, did not receive loan guarantees. 334 The Act provided ATSB $10
billion of loan guarantee authority during a specific time frame.335 At the
end of that period, the ATSB approved seven out of sixteen applications
330 Id.
331 Id.
332 Id. ("The current amount of outstanding guarantees is $1.19 billion. Frontier Airlines
repaid its loan in full ahead of schedule in December of last year. However, there is always a
risk of eventual defaults given the challenges the industry continues to face. The ATSB closely
monitors the financial performance of all of its borrowers. The borrowers submit monthly
financial reports to the ATSB, and the ATSB meets regularly with the borrowers to discuss the
state of the business.... On occasion, the Board has granted amendments and waivers to loan
terms for several of its borrowers. In these cases, the ATSB strives to ensure that taxpayer
interests are protected or enhanced. For example, the ATSB negotiated a prepayment of $250
million from US Airways as part of an agreement to provide the company with flexibility to
meet changing conditions in the airline industry.").
333 Statement by Brookly McLaughlin for Subcommittee on Aviation Hearing on the
Financial Condition of the Airline Industry (Embargoed until June 3, 2004).
334 Micheline Maynard, Airlines Shy Away from Loan Guarantees by U.S., N.Y. TMIEs,
Jan. 3, 2002, available at www.nytimes.com/2002/01/03/business/03AIR.html ("The nation's
airlines, which pleaded for a federal bailout package to help them survive the impact of the
Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, are shying away from applying for government loan guarantees after
seeing;" the 33% stock option requirements placed on America West as a condition of its loan
guarantee. Immediately after the announcement of the America West deal Northwest said it
would not submit an application that it had been preparing.).
335 The Financial Condition of the Airline Industry: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on
Aviation, 108th Cong., supra note 313, at 1.
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and issued $1.6 billion in loan guarantees. 336 Thus the airline industry
was preserved, but the taxpayers did not spend public funds needed for
other important public functions to subsidize any airline that did not have
true need.
III. CITIZEN SHAREHOLDERS: HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS OF
CITIZEN INCOME FROM GOVERNMENT/QUASI-
GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT IN PRIVATE
BUSINESSES -FOR THE CASH
DISTRIBUTION END OF FAIR EXCHANGE
Section II above (the cash infusion section) gave examples in which
private companies sought and received financial assistance or investment
from the public sector. In some of those instances, the government re-
ceived a return on equity. This section (the cash distribution section) pro-
vides examples in which the citizens receive income or equity return
from the public or quasi-public investment.
A. ALASKA PERMANENT FUND (APF) SHARING OIL AND GAS REVENUE
WITH ALL ALASKA CITIZENS
1. History of APF
The Alaskan economy had always been primarily based on natural
resource extraction, whether gold, furs, fish or timber. 337 In 1955, the
drafters of the Alaska state constitution understood the inherently preca-
rious position of an extraction-based economy; thus provided in Article
VIII, Sec.2 of the Alaska Constitution that the legislature would utilize,
develop and conserve "all the natural resources belonging to the State...
for the maximum benefit of its people. ' 338
In 1967, discovery of large oil reserves on state-owned land in the
Prudhoe Bay area of Alaska resulted in a windfall to the state. The Alas-
kan state government, which had a total budget of $124 million in 1969,
before the oil revenues began to flow into the state coffers, received $3.7
billion in petroleum revenues during the 1981 fiscal year. Recognizing
that its mineral reserves, although large, are finite, and that the resulting
income will not continue in perpetuity, the state government took steps to
assure that its current good fortune will bring long-range benefits. 339
In 1969, at its initial auction of leasing rights at Prudhoe Bay,
Alaska received a $900 million lease bonus from the oil companies. The
336 Id.
337 Joan Kasson, "The Early History of the Alaska Permanent Fund", Trustee Papers, 5,
13 Alaska Permanent Fund (1997). available at http://www.apfc.org/reportspublications/TP5-
2.cfm.
338 Id.
339 Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 56-57 (1982).
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State was only 10 years old and opted to spend those funds on basic
infrastructure needs, such as schools, water, sewers, roads, airports,
health, education and social services. But shortly after spending these
funds a consensus developed in the State that too much of the $900 mil-
lion had been spent too quickly and that the state needed to improve its
ability to preserve the one-time oil profits. 340 In the 1970s, therefore,
when development of the trans-Alaska oil pipeline began to turn North
Slope oil into cash, Alaskans sought a way to retain long-term benefit
from the oil revenue. Until the pipeline started eight years after the 1969
lease sale, there was no and Alaskans were concerned about when they
would see something more than the $900 million lease bonuses.341
The outcome was a constitutional amendment approved via a gen-
eral election in 1976:342
At least twenty-five percent of all mineral lease rentals,
royalties, royalty sale proceeds, federal mineral revenue
sharing payments and bonuses received by the State
shall be placed in a permanent fund, the principal of
which shall be used only for those income-producing in-
vestments specifically designated by law as eligible for
permanent fund investments. All income from the per-
manent fund shall be deposited in the general fund un-
less otherwise provided by law. 343
Subsequent legislation increased the minimum percentage from
25% to 50% for a small number of new leases, though the legislature
repealed the change in 2003 and returned to the 25% standard. 344
After the legislature established the APF, there was a major debate
about whether the Fund should be managed as a savings trust for the
future or as a development bank. As a development bank, it would have
made loans to companies to help create and expand businesses and jobs
in Alaska. The prevailing alternative was the creation of a public trust in
which the primary purpose was protection of the principal, with only the
interest available for appropriation by the legislature.
340 Email attachment of 8/1/05 to author, correcting facts on earlier article draft from
Larry Persily, City of Anchorage Finance and Budget Coordinator and former Deputy Com-
missioner of Alaska Department of Revenue [hereinafter Persily].
341 Id.
342 See Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation, An Alaskan's Guide to the Permanent Fund
6 (10th ed. 2001) [hereinafter Alaskan's Guide].
343 Id.
344 Email attachment of 8/1/05 to author, correcting facts on earlier article draft from
Larry Persily, City of Anchorage Finance and Budget Coordinator and former Deputy Com-
missioner of Alaska Department of Revenue. The Early History of the Alaska Permanent
Fund, The Trustee Papers 5, Alaska Permanent Fund 1997 at 37.
FAIR EXCHANGE
In 1980 the Alaska legislature decided that the APF should adhere
to the "prudent investor rule" and its trustees should invest in diversified
trust quality investments.345 The APF is managed separately from other
state investments.346
In 1980,the Alaska legislature created the first APF dividend pro-
gram. It provided that each Alaskan citizen over the age of 18 "would
receive a portion of the APF's earnings annually" based on a formula
providing one dividend unit for each year of residency since 1959. A
single unit was valued at $50. So that a resident since 1959 would have
received 21 units or $1,050, while a one-year resident would have re-
ceived $50. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled this system unconstitutional
as a violation of equal protection under the U.S. Constitution's 14th
Amendment. 347 (The current allocation formula is in the 'Dividend
Formula' section below.)
Separate from the legal battle over dividends, the legislature in 1981
made a special appropriation of $1.8 billion in surplus oil revenue to the
APF, an additional $1.26 billion in 1986, and several hundred million
dollars more in the following years.348
In 1982 the Legislature, at the request of the APF Trustees, enacted
an "inflation proofing" program to protect the APF's purchasing power
by moving some of each year's investment earnings into the protected
principal, to cover the "loss" to inflation.349 In 1983 the APF branched
out from CDs and bonds and first invested in the stock market and a year
later in real estate. 350 By 1987, the APF was larger than any other en-
dowment or private foundation in the country. In 1989 its assets reached
$10 billion. In 1990 it began to invest outside the U.S. 351 In 1998 the
APF's earnings first exceeded the State's general oil royalty and tax rev-
enue, as it earned revenue of $2.6 billion with assets of $25 billion.
APF's investment earnings had started exceeding its constitutionally
mandated 25% deposits years earlier, back in the early 1980s. 352
345 Kasson, supra note 337, at 10-11.
346 See id. at 10-11; Persily, supra note 340. Email correcting facts on earlier article draft
from Larry Persily, City of Anchorage Finance and Budget Coordinator and former Deputy
Commissioner of, Alaska Department of Revenue, to author, (July 31, 2005) (on file with
author).
347 Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
348 E-mail attachment of 8/1/05 to author, correcting facts on earlier article draft from
Larry Persily, City of Anchorage Finance and Budget Coordinator and former Deputy Com-
missioner of Alaska Department of Revenue.
349 ALASKAN'S GUIDE, supra note at 342; ALASKA STAT. 37.13.145 (2004); Persily, supra
note.
350 Persily, supra note 340.
351 See ALASKAN'S GUIDE, supra note 342 at 16.
352 See E-mail correcting initial draft of this article from Laura Achee, Alaska Permanent
Fund Public Relations staff to author, (May 4, 2005) (on file with author) [hereinafter Achee];
Persily, supra note 340.
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2. Legislative Mission of APF
The Permanent Fund legislation 353 transferred management of the
assets, investments and earnings from the Alaska Department of Revenue
to the Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation in April 1980. The Corpora-
tion's mission354is to:
1) ... provide a means of conserving a portion of the State's reve-
nues from mineral resources to benefit all generations of
Alaskans;
2) ... maintain safety of principal while maximizing total return;
and
3) ... be used as a saving device managed to allow the maximum
use of disposable income from the Corporation for purposes des-
ignated by law.
The 1980 law directed the Trustees to use the Prudent Investor Rule,
to diversify investments, to invest only in income producing assets, and
only to invest in specific classes of assets permitted under AS
37.13.120. 355 The legislature gradually expanded the list of allowable in-
vestments, and then in 2005 eliminated the list entirely, directing that the
Trustees only follow the Prudent Investor Rule. 356 The Rule means,
among other things, that investments must be diversified and that any
investment in Alaska must be held to the same investment criteria as any
other investment. Though there is no statutory provision mandating in-
vestments in Alaska, the APFC runs an internship program to train Alas-
kans in finance, and they invest through brokers with Alaska offices. 357
The Trustees' investment strategy seeks to obtain a 5% real rate of return
(over inflation). 358
3. Allocation of Funds
Annually, at least 25% of the State's mineral royalties and lease
bonuses must be placed in the APF. 359 The principal is invested but can-
not be spent without a vote of the citizens. 360 The income 36' can be spent
353 Alaska Stat. Sec. 37.13.010 (2004).
354 Alaska Stat. Sec. 37.13.020 (2004).
355 The Early History of the Alaska Permanent Fund, The Trustee Papers Vol. No. 5,
Alaska Permanent Fund (1997) p. 62
356 Persily, supra note 340.
357 See ALASKAN'S GUIDE, supra note 342 at 24.
358 Id. at 22; E-mail from Laura Achee to author, 06/04/05, Alaska Permanent Fund Pub-
lic Relations staff, correcting initial draft of this article; and Email attachment of 8/1/05 to
author, correcting facts on earlier article draft from Larry Persily, City of Anchorage Finance
and Budget Coordinator and former Deputy Commissioner of Alaska Department of Revenue.
359 Persily, supra note 340.
360 ALASKAN'S GUIDE, supra note at 342.
361 APF income is defined under ALASKA STAT. 37.13.140 (2004).
FAIR EXCHANGE
by the Legislature or reinvested. The required percentage of oil and gas
royalties goes into the "Reserved Fund Balance". The Reserved Fund
Balance holds all such required annual deposits plus additional appropri-
ations made by the Legislature. It also includes all unrealized APF gains
and losses.362
The "Unreserved Fund Balance", also known as the "Realized Earn-
ings Account" (REA), is the portion of the APF that may be spent by the
Legislature. The APF's Statutory Net Income is its Realized Earnings
(consisting primarily of interest, dividends, rents from real estate or capi-
tal gains (losses) realized upon any asset sales) less the cost of managing
the Fund assets.363 The Statutory Net Income is available for appropria-
tion by the Legislature, which, over the years, has chosen to spend the
money for dividends for Alaskans and little else. 364 AS 37.13.145 man-
dates (among other things) the formulae for allocating dividends365 to the
Alaskan people and for inflation proofing 366 of the principal, which is
merely moving the money from one column in the ledger (earnings) to
another (principal) and really isn't spending the money at all. 367 After the
Legislature provides these two mandatory items, the remainder stays in
the unreserved portion of the APF and is invested along with the
principal. 368
In most years the APF produces more income than that required for
dividends and inflation proofing. Any remaining income becomes part of
the Earnings Reserve Account (ERA). The Legislature may appropriate
funds in the ERA for any lawful purpose,36 9 but has never chosen to
appropriate any significant amount.370 Some years the Legislature makes
additional appropriations to the principal of the Reserved Fund after
making the statutorily required appropriations. 371
362 ALASKA STAT. 37.13.140 (2004); see Fund Financial History & Projections as of
February 25, 2005, ALASKA PERMANENT FUND CORPORATION, FUND FINANCIAL HISTORY &
PROJECTIONS AS OF FEBRUARY 28, 2005 4-5 (2005), http://www.apfc.org/iceimages/financials/
2005 2 Fin.pdf.
363 Alaska Statutes 37.13.145; Alaska Permanent Fund 2005 Financial Statement pp.4-5
Fund Financial History & Projections as of February 25, 2005 (found at www.apfc.org/ice
images/financials/2005 (3/23/05)
364 Persily, supra note 340.
365 ALASKA STAT. 43.23.025 (2004). The dividend is computed by adding the fund's net
income for the previous five years. That number is multiplied by 21% and then divided by
twice the number of eligible applicants.
366 ALASKA STAT. 37.13.145(c) (2004).
367 Persily, supra note 340.
368 Achee, supra note 352.
369 ALASKAN'S GUIDE, supra note at 342.
370 Persily, supra note 340.
371 See Fund Financial History, supra note 363; Achee, supra note 352.
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4. Inflation-Proofing to Make the APF Permanent
The purpose of inflation proofing is to preserve the corpus of the
APF against inflation and the inevitable exhaustion of oil resources and
revenue.
In 1982 the Legislature enacted the inflation proofing formula cur-
rently in use, which is determined by multiplying the annual percentage
change in the U.S. Consumer Price Index by the principal balance at the
end of the fiscal year. 372 For example, if the CPI went up 3%, and the
APF balance stood at $20 billion, the formula dictates that the legislature
move $600 million from earnings to the APF's principal to cover the loss
to inflation. Depending on the rate of inflation, and the APF's earnings,
that transfer could represent a lot or a little of any year's earnings. 373 For
1991, 53% of the APF's income was needed for inflation proofing, while
in 1987 high earnings and low inflation meant only 14% was needed for
inflation proofing.
In 2001, at the request of the Board of Trustees, a proposed consti-
tutional amendment offered complete and permanent inflation proofing
for the entire APF rather than just the principal. 374 (The Legislature has
consistently declined since then to place the constitutional amendment on
the ballot for political rather than fiscal reasons. 375) As of March 21,
2005 it was being reintroduced. 376
The trustees' constitutional amendment proposal would cap annual
payouts from the APF for any purpose at 5% of the APF's total market
value, in order to make it a permanent resource. The trustees' long-term
target is an 8% annual return, with an assumed annual inflation rate of
3% on average, leaving a real rate of return at 5%. Therefore, in the long
term, to allow enough retained earnings to protect the entire APF against
inflation and to protect the APF principal from any incursion, the trustees
believe the annual payout should be limited to no more than 5% of a
rolling five-year average of total market value.377
5. Dividend Formula
In 1982 the first $1,000 dividend check was distributed to Alaska
residents. Every Alaskan who applies, resides in the State during the
qualifying year and on the dividend application date, and was present in
372 ALASKA STAT. 37.13.145(c) (2004); Persily, supra note 340.
373 Persily, supra note 340.
374 ALASKAN'S GUIDE, supra note 342 at 17; Persily, supra note.
375 Email attachment of 8/1/05 to author, correcting facts on earlier article draft from
Larry Persily, City of Anchorage Finance and Budget Coordinator and former Deputy Com-
missioner of Alaska Department of Revenue.
376 Telephone interview with Laura Achee, Communications and Research Liaison,
Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation (3/22/05).
377 Persily, supra note 340.
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the State for at least 72 consecutive hours during the prior two years (or
is a child born of or adopted by such a person) receives equal
payments. 378
After the $1,000 payment in 1982, payments were based on the
earnings of the APF and divided equally for every eligible resident. 379
The current dividend formula adds the APF's net income for the previous
five years, multiplies it by 21% and divides by two. The effect is that
about half of the APF's realized earnings for the average of the previous
five years are paid out in annual dividends each year.380 Based on that
formula, the annual dividend has ranged from a low of $331.29 in 1984
to a high of $1,963.86 in 2000.381 Investment earnings, not oil prices,
drive the dividend, and the poor stock market returns of 2001 and 2002
cut into payments.382 Regardless, the dividends have had an impact on
the Alaskan economy and have been an especially important source of
income in rural Alaskan communities. 383
6. APF Structure
The APF is managed independently from the state treasury to sepa-
rate the saving and spending functions.384 The initial APF legislation cre-
ated a quasi-independent Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation (APFC) to
be insulated from day to day politics and yet accountable to the Alaskan
people. 385 This critical balance is accomplished by having: a) a board
made up of independent trustees, b) a requirement that the APFC report
annually to the Legislative Budget and Audit Committee and c) a re-
quirement that the APFC's annual budget be approved by the
legislature. 386
There are six trustees. 387 The four public members, all appointed by
the governor, serve four-year terms, and the two members of the gover-
nor's cabinet serve until they leave their posts or the governor removes
them. The public trustees should be experienced in the fields of business
378 ALASKA STAT. 43.23.005 (2004). Some residents, such as incarcerated criminals, are
ineligible to receive dividends. See ALASKA STAT. 43.23.028 (a) (2004), There are various
other exceptions to the residency requirements, including students and those on active military
service. See ALASKA STAT. 43.23.008 (2004).
379 See Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation, The Early History of the Alaska Permanent
Fund: Perspectives on the Origins of Alaska's Oil Savings Account, The Trustee Papers Vol.
No. 5 67 (1997).
380 Persily, supra note 340.
381 ALASKAN'S GUIDE, supra note 342 at 28 - 29.
382 Persily, supra note 340.
383 ALASKAN'S GUIDE, supra note 342 at 29.
384 Id. at 11.
385 ALASKA STAT. 37.13.010 (2004).
386 ALASKAN'S GUIDE, supra note 342 at 33; ALASKA STAT. 37.13.050.
387 ALASKAN'S GUIDE, supra note 342 at 34, Achee, supra note 352; Persily, supra note
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and finance. The two cabinet members are the Commissioner of Revenue
and another trustee of the governor's choice.
Investment decisions are based on a strategy adopted by the Board
of Trustees. Ideally, the strategy protects the principal and produces an
average annual real rate of return of five percent over the long term.388
To achieve a five percent real rate of return, the Trustees established
and continuously review an asset allocation target. Asset allocation deter-
mines the types and percentages of investments (e.g., the 2001 asset allo-
cation was 35% in domestic bonds, 2% in non-dollar bonds, 37% in
domestic stocks, 16% in international stocks and 10% in real estate). 389
Trustees employ an executive director who hires staff to conduct the
day-to-day operations of the corporation. By design, the APFC out-
sources with investment professionals as needed to manage, analyze and
monitor investments and returns. In-house staff works in the executive,
investments, finance, information technology, administration, and com-
munications areas. 390
7. Economic Impact of APF
For over 20 years, every eligible Alaska citizen has received an an-
nual dividend distribution from the APF, capitalized by a portion of the
revenues from oil and gas production on publicly owned lands. As the
APF has grown in value, the size of the annual dividend has increased so
that in 2005 about $600 million will be distributed to 600,000 citizens. 39'
In 2002, almost $1 billion 392 was distributed to 600,000 citizens, ac-
counting for six percent of total household income in Alaska. 393
The dividend program has disproportionately increased the incomes
of the poor and rural Alaskans relative to income increases for high-
income families over the same period.394 As a result, there is a great deal
of interest in the effect of the Permanent Fund Dividend (PFD) on
macroeconomic indicators like job creation, wages, income, and spend-
ing and saving habits. However, Professor of Economics and Director of
the University of Alaska's Institute of Social and Economic Research
Scott Goldsmith notes that there is not much information available on
388 ALASKAN'S GUIDE, supra note 324 at 21-22; See also Persily, supra note 340.
389 ALASKAN'S GUIDE, supra note 342 at 22.
390 Id. at 35.
391 See STATE OF ALASKA DEPT. OF REVENUE, ALASKA PERMANENT FUND DIVIDEND Divi-
SION 2004 ANNUAL REPORT 5, available at http://www.pfd.state.ak.us/forms/Annual Reports/
2004 Annual Report. PDF.
392 Id.
393 See Scott Goldsmith, Basic Income Eur. Network 9th Int'l Cong., The Alaska Perma-
nent fund Dividend: An Experiment in Wealth Distribution 1 (2002) available at http://www.
ilo.org/public/english/protection/ses/download/docs/gold.pdf.
394 The Early History of the Alaska Permanent Fund, supra note 355 at 38, 74.
FAIR EXCHANGE
these matters because "there has never been an audit to determine how
the funds have been used -including what parents are doing with their
children's PFDs." 395 Goldsmith attributes two reasons to the reluctance
to study these matters: 1) Alaskans feel that they personally own a por-
tion of the oil and thus what they do with their oil dividends is private
and 2) Politicians are loath to study the subject because they do not want
to give the impression they are considering changing this extraordinarily
popular program. 396 Thus, "there is no evidence that the dividend has led
to significant investment in new business activity, although it has un-
doubtedly resulted in significant investment in human capital. 39
7
Anecdotal evidence of beneficiary spending habits indicates that
Alaskans see the October APF dividend distribution as a year-end bonus
and spend much of the money on consumer durables.398 As a result, ap-
pliance and furniture stores, auto merchants, and travel agents do a lot of
business immediately after the dividends are distributed. Retailers also
advertise and compete for dividend business through the use of "Divi-
dend Days." For example, airlines will offer bonus tickets for customers
who are willing to trade in an entire check.399
The PFD's impact on the labor market appears small. There is some
evidence that the dividend may have a negative impact on wages, offset
by the dividend or may induce larger poor families to migrate to the
state. However, this temptation is moderated by the one-year residency
requirement4°°and the difficult climate. "Under the residency rules, a
family that moved to Alaska in May 2005 would not receive their first
Permanent Fund dividend until October 2007, a long time to wait for
'free' money if they are poor. '40 1
The dividend has had a dramatic effect on the distribution of income
in Alaska, which ranks among the most equitable in the country. 402 Data
from the Economic Policy Institute shows that in the last ten years the
income of the poorest fifth of Alaska families increased 28 percent com-
pared to a 7 percent increase for the richest fifth. In contrast, for the
395 Goldsmith, supra note 393 at 9.
396 Id.
397 E-mail correcting facts from earlier draft of article from Scott Goldsmith, Professor of
Economics and Director of the University of Alaska's Institute of Social and Economic Re-
search, to author (May 25, 2005) (on file with author).
398 Goldsmith, supra note 393 at 9.
399 Tony Lewis, Devoted to the Dividend: Budget Crisis or Not, Alaskans Love Getting
Their Share of Oil Wealth, ALASKA MAGAZINE, Sept. 2004, available at www.alaskamagazine.
com/stories/0904/featurepdf.shtml; Persily, supra note.
400 Goldsmith, supra note 393 at 9.
401 Persily, supra note 340.
402 Goldsmith, supra note 393 at 9.
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entire United States over the same period, the increase for the poorest
fifth was 0.8 percent compared to 14.9 percent for the richest fifth. 40 3
Moreover, the dividend should help to empower low income Alas-
kans in various ways. . .(including) "increase in volunteer work ..
increase in wage rates in unattractive work situations or reduction in in-
stances of spousal abuse."'4° 4 The PFD stabilizes the cash flow to rural
areas where per capita money incomes are among the lowest in the U.S.,
and non-governmental sources of income are variable and uncertain. "In
some areas the PFD. . .accounts for more than 10 percent of cash in-
come. '40 5 This is particularly significant for communities that depend on
fish or other natural resources, which can be prone to large fluctuations
in both harvest and price. 40 6 It has also had a general stabilizing effect on
the state economy for similar reasons.
8. Social Impact
Alaska has not had a personal income tax since 1979 and has never
had a broad-based sales tax.40 7 Instead, the State sends each resident an
annual check. How has this affected social discourse on matters of public
policy or public spending? No one has formally studied this, 40 8 but some
feel this has created a generation of Alaskans whose only relationship to
the State comes when they cash their dividend checks. Goldsmith con-
tends that it has created an "environment preoccupied with consumption
that may be detrimental to investment and the longer-term needs of soci-
ety." Moreover, politicians have a vested interest in protecting this popu-
lar program, and therefore they evaluate every issue based on its
potential impact on the dividend. "This is a problem because now oil
revenues have fallen to the point where earnings from the Permanent
Fund might logically be used as a replacement source of revenue. '40 9 Yet
the communal mindset of taxpayers who are used to paying for such
things has never existed for young Alaskans.
With the decrease in oil revenue, Alaska will inevitably have to re-
duce the dividend to pay for state services or implement an income tax.
There are numerous arguments on about whether to decrease the divi-
dend or implement a state income or sales tax or drastically cut services
403 Goldsmith, supra note 393 at 9; JARED BERNSTEIN, ET AL., CTR ON BUDGET & POLICY
PRIORITIES, PULLING APART: A STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS OF INCOME TRENDS (2000), http://
www.cbpp.org/1-1 8-00sfp.pdf.
404 Goldsmith, supra note 393 at 11-12.
405 Id. at 12.
406 Id.
407 Persily, supra note 340.
408 Goldsmith, supra note 393 at 12.
409 Id. at 13.
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- or a combination of the above.4 10 One argument in favor of continuing
the dividend while simultaneously instituting an income tax is that the
government would have to ask the citizens for tax funds, rather than the
government simply taking what it wanted from the APF.4 11 Income tax
proponents also argue that an income or sales tax would reduce the over-
all cost to Alaskans of government funding because it would be partially
paid for by non-state residents and visitors. Finally, there is an argument
that reducing the dividend would disproportionately burden poor Alas-
kans who are least able to pay.
The delay in finding a solution to Alaska's fiscal problem is due to a
variety of factors. While the APF was originally envisioned as a means
to help pay for government in the future, "a significant minority of the
population feels that under no circumstances should the earnings of the
fund be used to help pay for state government. '41 2 Separating manage-
ment of the APF from the government has exacerbated this problem. For
most of 1992-2002 the state government operated at a deficit, while the
APF generated surpluses. This sends a confusing message to the
public.4 1
3
The PFD has fostered "a feeling that the government exists to dis-
tribute cash to its citizens, but that individuals do not need to contribute
to public life. These young people have not been schooled in the respon-
sibilities that come with living in a representative democracy. '414 How-
ever, the effect of these cash transfers becomes less significant as income
increases because the dividend represents a smaller percentage of total
income and much of it may be dissipated in federal taxes. As a result, the
dividend has the greatest immediate impact on the poorest Alaskan com-
munities, but this use of public funds is not well focused on serving their
long-term needs.
9. APF Lesson for Creating Fair Exchange Programs
The APF provides an excellent model for the front or income-cap-
turing end of a Fair Exchange program. Article VIII, Section 2 of The
Alaska Constitution, provides an excellent example of the concept that
the State's natural resources belong to the people and should provide
benefit to all the people whenever they are exploited.
Its administration provides many examples of balancing between
public and private interests. The creation of the APFC as a corporation
separate from, yet accountable to, the government is a valuable model.
410 Persily, supra note 340.
411 Goldsmith, supra note 393 at 13 - 14.
412 Id. at 14.
413 Id.
414 Id. at 17.
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APFC must have its budget approved by the state legislature, and the
governor appoints most of its trustees. Yet most of the trustees are ex-
pected to possess significant financial skills and knowledge. Initially the
trustees' investment authority, including the classes of investments in
which they were permitted to invest assets, was legislatively mandated
and limited, although these limits have been removed and replace solely
by the Prudent Investor Rule. 41 5 The trustees can propose new methods
for inflation-proofing or allocating dividends, but these must be approved
by the legislature. The principal can only be used for purposes approved
by the citizens through a constitutional amendment. One benefit of main-
taining the APF separate from the rest of government is that it promotes
transparency. 416
Providing a non-wage income stream to all is another feature that
could be incorporated into a Fair Exchange program. However, this may
be more difficult in states where the value per capita is smaller than in
Alaska. Alaska's high value per capita is attributable to its huge reserve
of one of the most sought after and dwindling natural resources, which
produces a huge amount of income for its small population. Thus, the per
capita allocation of the mineral resource income is more significant than
it would be if Alaska had a population comparable to California's.
It is important for any Fair Exchange program to consider Alaska's
inflation-proof system, but the APF's social impact is much less impres-
sive. The PFD has not created a stronger sense of community in Alaska.
Since Alaska's natural resource wealth is a limited resource, the con-
sumer-oriented, individualistic mentality created by the current structure
of fund distributions will harm the state when faced with a natural re-
source scarcity or global corporate pressure.
If a Fair Exchange program is to provide long-term strength to a
community, it must instill community values in its citizens. It must help
them work together for joint benefit, while simultaneously accruing indi-
vidual benefits.
The APF principal is invested without any social investment crite-
ria. Its sole investment focus is to achieve a target return. The highly
commendable aspect of this policy is that it has consistently expanded
the APF and provided dividends to citizens. The downside of this strat-
egy is that the APF does not help broaden the active shareholder base of
415 E-mail attachment of 8/1/05 to author, correcting facts on earlier article draft from
Larry Persily, City of Anchorage Finance and Budget Coordinator and former Deputy Com-
missioner of Alaska Department of Revenue.
416 Persily, supra note 340. (Email correcting facts from earlier draft of article from Scott
Goldsmith, Professor of Economics and Director of the University of Alaska's Institute of
Social and Economic Research, to author (May 25, 2005) (on file with author)).
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global corporations. Fair Exchange should broaden that base and exert
increasing citizen control over corporate governance and decisions.
Some combination of the APF mechanism for collecting revenue for
citizens from private companies that exploit public assets, and the LSIF
method of reinvestment in entities that commit to serve as exemplary
corporate citizens (described in Section III (D) below), would be an ideal
Fair Exchange program.
B. ALBERTA HERITAGE FUND
The statutory mission of the Alberta Heritage Savings and Trust
Fund ("Heritage Fund") is: "To provide prudent stewardship of the sav-
ings from Alberta's non-renewable resources by providing the greatest
financial returns on those savings for current and future generations of
Albertans." 417
In 1936, Alberta was the only province in Canadian history to go
bankrupt. Alberta was then obligated to pay off all of its debt to the
government and to banks. It could not borrow any additional money until
six years after its debt was repaid. Alberta floated a debt bond that al-
lowed it to function. It then developed budgets that both paid down the
debt and operated the province, even managing to introduce progressive
legislation and social programs. The foreign debt was paid in full by
1945 and the domestic debt was paid off in 1949. In 1950, the Heritage
Fund was established with the intention that in 1975 it would start paying
each citizen a monthly dividend check. Money formerly used to pay debt
was put into a fund that became the Heritage Fund, which was structured
similarly to the APF. Ted Hinman, Alberta Treasurer, went to Alaska to
help Alaska get the APF started in 1960.
It was anticipated that the Heritage Fund would start paying divi-
dends in 1975, but the government changed its structure and plan.418 The
Heritage Fund reached an amount approximately equal to the amount of
government debt of $C40 million. The province operated debt free until
1971, and the province did away with provincial income tax. The gov-
ernment reintroduced the income tax in 1982. 4 19
In March of 2005 the entire debt had been paid off again and the
government announced that there would be a prosperity dividend paid to
every Albertan. It would be a one-time payment, however, and not an
417 Alberta Heritage Fund Web Site Frequently Asked Questions,http://www.finance.gov.
ab.ca/business/ahstf/faqs.html.
418 E-mail from Chick Hurst, Alberta Social Credit Party Historian to author, (Sept. 13,
2005); See also Alberta Social Credit Party, The Heritage Fund & Dividends, http://www.
socialcredit.com/subpages-history/heritage-fund.htm.
419 Id.
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annual event.420 The government expected the payment to be approxi-
mately $400 per person.421
Between 1957 and 1958, the Alberta government experimented with
paying direct dividends to citizens. 422 The dividends were around twenty
dollars. The government terminated the program "when popular opinion
indicated people would prefer the money be spent on schools, roads, hos-
pitals and municipalities. '423 The government also had numerous
problems of administration and fraud involving people collecting as
many as fifty payments. 424 Discussion has reopened in Alberta over the
proposed 2005 dividend to be distributed directly to Alberta citizens.425
1. Alberta Heritage Fund Structure
A percentage of Alberta's non-renewable resource revenue is trans-
ferred from its General Revenue Fund to the Heritage Fund in any year
when the Legislature has passed a Special Act authorizing it.426 The Pro-
vincial Treasurer administers the Heritage Fund427Originally there were
two separate portfolios, the Endowment Fund and the Transition Fund,
but the transition portfolio was phased out by the end of 2005428 The
funds in the endowment portfolio have an investment objective of "maxi-
mizing long-term financial returns. '429 There is a Standing Committee
on the Heritage Fund, which oversees the Treasurer, reviews and ap-
proves the Fund's annual business plan and financial statements. It con-
sists of nine members of the Alberta Legislature, of which at least three
must be from the opposition party. 430
Annually, the income of the Heritage Fund is transferred to the pro-
vincial General Revenue Fund, less funds appropriated or allocated by
the Legislature to the Heritage Fund.431 Beginning with the 1999-2000
fiscal year and thereafter, the Heritage Fund has been allowed to retain a
portion of its income for inflation proofing. The Treasurer takes from the
420 Id.
421 Darcy Henton, Cheques to Go to All Albertans Except Residents of our Prisons, Pre-
mier Says, EDMONTON SUN, Sept. 22, 2005.
422 Patricia Beuerlein, Socred Oil Dividends, EDMONTON JOURNAL, at A2, Sept. 22, 2005.
423 Id.
424 Id.
425 Id.; Editorial, Alberta Deserves More Than Rebates, EDMONTON JOURNAL, at A18,
Sept. 22, 2005; Graham Thompson, 'Prosperity Bonus' Blamed on Media: Alberta Govern-
ment Backed Into a Corner by Reports of $300 Per Person Payouts, EDMONTON SUN, Sept. 22,
2005.
426 Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund Act (RSA 2000 cH-A-23), Revised 1/1/2002,
§ I(e) available at http://www.qp.gov.ab.ca.
427 See id. §3(1).
428 See id. §12(l)-(2).
429 See id. §3(2).
430 See id. §6(l)-(4).
431 Id.
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Fund income an amount equal to the percentage increase in the Canadian
gross domestic product price index times the total equity of the Heritage
Fund, and deposits it in the Fund endowment portfolio. 432 However, until
the Province's accumulated debt is eliminated, the Treasurer is not re-
quired to make the full amount of these inflation-proofing contributions
to the endowment. Instead the Treasurer may only contribute an amount
he "considers advisable". 433
2. Alberta Heritage Fund History
The Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund 434 was created in
1976with three objectives: 1) to save the proceeds of the non-renewable
resource wealth of Alberta for the benefit of future generations, 2) to
strengthen or diversify the economy, and 3) to improve the quality of life
of Albertans.
The Fund received 30% of the Alberta government's non-renewable
resource revenue from April 1, 1976 to March 31, 1977. This amounted
to $620 million. In addition, a special contribution of $1.5 billion of cash
and other financial assets was transferred from Alberta's General Reve-
nue Fund to the Heritage Fund on August 30, 1976. Between 1977 and
1982, six Canadian provinces borrowed a total of $1.9 billion from the
Heritage Fund at below market rates.
In the late 1980s some money from the Heritage Fund was used to
diversify the economy and to fund capital projects, such as developing
parks, enhancing libraries, and maintaining forests and to diversify the
economy. These projects included the Alberta Heritage Foundation for
Medical Research, the Alberta Heritage Scholarship Fund, the Alberta
Children's Provincial General Hospital (Calgary), the Walter C. Macken-
zie Health Services Centre (Edmonton), the University of Alberta
Clinical Research Building, the Pine Ridge Reforestation Nursery En-
hancement, and the Alberta Family Life and Substance Abuse Founda-
tion. In 1987 the government ceased the transfer of natural resource
royalty revenues to the Fund.
In 1995 the government surveyed Albertans about the Heritage
Fund and Albertans decided to keep the Fund for future generations and
focus on generating better returns on long-term investments. As a result
of the 1995 survey, the Heritage Fund was restructured such that the
government could no longer use it for direct economic development or
social investment purposes. A new business plan was implemented to
increase long-term investments. A new Legislative Standing Committee
432 Id.
433 Id.
434 See Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund Act, supra note 426 at Chapter A-23
Preamble.
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operating at arms-length from the government was created to review and
approve the business plan and to ensure that the objectives of the Fund
were met.
In 1998 the government surveyed Albertans about their fiscal priori-
ties. Albertans rated elimination of debt, tax reduction and increased
spending in certain vital areas ahead of increasing savings in the Heritage
Fund. In the fall of 2000, the government surveyed Albertans about their
priorities after the debt is eliminated. Their highest priority was one-time
tax rebates, followed by saving for the future. A much lower percentage
of respondents favored one-time government spending.
In December of 2000, all the loans made to other provinces from
1977 to 1982 had been repaid in full. In a March 2003 survey of over
77,000 Albertan households, 61% agreed that the Fund should continue
to operate primarily as an endowment fund. The Fund 2003 annual report
showed that the Fund closed out the year with a fair market value of
$11.1 billion, a decrease of $1.3 billion from the previous year, losing
equity due to the poor stock market results, which were offset by other
investments, such as real estate. In the first quarter of 2003 the Heritage
Fund transferred $199 million in earnings to the General Revenue Fund
to support program spending in health care, education and infrastructure.
During the first nine months of the 2004-05 fiscal year, the Alberta Heri-
tage Savings Trust Fund contributed nearly $850 million to Alberta's
General Revenue Fund (GRF).
As of February 2005, the Heritage Fund's fair value stood at $12.2
billion.435 Note that although the Alberta Heritage Fund and the Alaska
Permanent Fund began at roughly the same time with the Alberta Heri-
tage Fund initially having more funds appropriated, the total fund bal-
ance of the Alaska Permanent Fund as of February 2005 was $47.8
billion.436
3. Heritage Fund Results
Over the past 28 years, more than $26 billion in investment income
from the Heritage Fund has been transferred to the Province's General
Revenue Fund to support program spending in areas such as health care,
education, infrastructure, debt reduction and social programs. 437 About
435 The information in this historical section is summarized from the Alberta Heritage
Fund Web Site Heritage Fund Historical Timeline, http://www.finance.gov.ab.ca/business/
ahstf/history.html.
436 See Fund Financial History & Projections as of February 25, 2005, ALASKA PERMA-
NENT FUND CORPORATION, FUND FINANCIAL HISTORY & PROJECTIONS AS OF FEBRUARY 28,
2005 4-5 (2005), http://www.apfc.org/iceimages/financials/2005-2_Fin.pdf.
437 Alberta Heritage Fund, FAQ available at http://www.finance.gov.ab.cabusiness/ahstf/
history.html (March 24, 2005).
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$3.4 billion 438 has been invested in capital projects, at least some of
which provide ongoing economic and social benefits for Albertans.
Alberta has managed the Heritage Fund as an income fund rather
than as an endowment. It has provided its residents with lower taxes and
utility rates than they would have otherwise had, and has created jobs by
funding projects that were otherwise unaffordable. 439 From an invest-
ment standpoint, it probably misallocated funds by subsidizing its own
Crown corporations such as telephone service and natural gas. There was
no explicit policy or formula created to describe or measure a proper
social rate of return440
However, the Albertans were aware of the Alaska Permanent Fund.
As time went on, the Alaska Fund grew and the Alberta Fund remained
stagnant. In response to a 1995 survey of Albertans, steps were taken in
January 1997 to restructure the Heritage Fund. Two new portfolios were
created, Endowment and Transition. Transition was created to hold the
old fund assets in the five divisions. Over 10 years $1.2 billion per year
was to be transferred to the Endowment Portfolio. The asset mix in the
Endowment Portfolio was now 35-65% fixed income securities and 35-
65% equities, similar to a traditional endowment portfolio. By compari-
son, at the end of 1996, the Heritage Fund was only 8% invested in
equities.441 In addition, the post 1997 fund has an inflation-proofing
mechanism. 44 2 Yet, all these funds are still operated directly within the
government. Unlike Alaska's APF, there is no separate trust with inde-
pendent trustees.
C. COMPARISON OF ALASKA AND ALBERTA FUND INTENTIONS AND
OUTCOMES
Alberta and Alaska have many similarities. They are relatively
young as human settlements, are sparsely populated, and have substantial
mineral resources that form a large portion of their economic bases. Both
share a northern climate. Both also inaugurated resource funds in 1976
based on their substantial mineral wealth and a desire to reduce the vola-
tility of their economies.443
438 The information in this historical section is summarized from Alberta Heritage Fund,
FAQ available at http://www.finance.gov.ab.ca/business/ahstf/history.html (March 24, 2005).
439 Allan Warrack & Russel Keddie, Natural Resource Trust Funds: A Comparison of
Alberta and Alaska Resource Funds, 72 W. CENTRE FOR ECON. REs. INFO. BULL. 7, (Sept.
2002), available at http://www.bus.ualberta.ca/wcer/pdf/72.pdf.
440 See id. ("To determine a social rate of return on the funds used by Heritage Fund, the
private rate of return would need to be taken and adjusted with both positive and negative
externalities. No attempt has been made here to measure externalities.").
441 Id. at.7.
442 Id. at 9.
443 Id. at 3.
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However, Alberta made very different choices than Alaska. The Al-
berta system is more focused on community needs, while the Alaska sys-
tem focuses on benefit to individual Alaskans. Alberta has used more of
its Fund to pay for economic development projects and regular govern-
ment expenses. Alberta also administered its Heritage Fund from within
the government.
Alaska's Fund arose in a much more deliberate and rigorously de-
bated fashion than the Heritage Fund. Creation of the APF required a
Constitutional amendment passed through a statewide referendum. A
three-year process determined its objectives. 444 Conversely, the Heritage
Fund was created by the legislature and functions as a part of the provin-
cial government. Consequently, it has been subject to politics' constantly
shifting winds.
The difference between Canadian and U.S. political culture also
plays a significant role. Alaska exemplifies individualistic American cul-
ture. Alberta started with more typically Canadian community-focused
investment strategy. Canadians (as will be demonstrated in the section on
Labor Sponsored Investment Funds below) have an historic concern
about growing indigenous Canadian economic institutions, so as not to
become a financial colony of the U.S. In recent years, however, Alberta
has begun to realign its investment strategy for the Heritage Fund to ob-
tain more market level returns.
It is difficult to properly compare the results of the Heritage Fund
and APF because so many of the non-financial impacts ("externalities" is
the economists term) have not been measured. Below are a chart and
several bar graphs created by Allen Warrack comparing the two pro-
grams based on available data.
444 id. at 14.
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TABLE 2. COMPARISONS:
ALBERTA HERITAGE FUND VS. ALASKA
PERMANENT FUND 445
Heritage Fund APF
Time Era Mid- 1970s Mid-1970s
Resources Base Hydrocarbons Hydrocarbons
Philosophy Nationalization Privatization
Establishment Legislation Referendum
Governance Bureaucracy Trustees
Economic Development Yes No
Social Dividends Yes No
Financial Management Income Endowment
Stocks Holdings No/Changing (1997) Yes
Inflation Proofing No/Changing (1997) Yes
Investment Profile Inward/Changing (1997) Outward
Fund Size Smaller Larger
Fund Growth No Yes
FIGURE 3. COMPARISON CHART4460
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Clearly, the APF is much richer financially than Alberta's Heritage
Fund as of 2005. (See comparison chart, Figure 3 above.) The conse-
quences for the social fabric are much harder to compare. The Albertans
continue to use their Fund income (beyond inflation proofing) to provide
445 Allan A. Warrack & Russell R. Keddie, Western Centre for Economic Research
School of Business, University of Alberta Edmonton, Canada T6G 2R6 www.bus.ualberta.ca/
CIBS-WCER, NUMBER 72, SEPTEMBER 2002 p.2 3 , NATURAL RESOURCE TRUST
FUNDS: A COMPARISON OF ALBERTA AND ALASKA RESOURCE FUNDS, Figure 5.
446 Source of Figure 3: Allan Warrack & Russell Keddie, Natural Resource Trust Funds:
A Comparison of Alberta and Alaska Resource Funds, 72 W. CENTRE FOR ECON. RES. INFO.
BULL. 5, at 21 (Sept. 2002), available at http://www.bus.ualberta.ca/wcer/pdf/72.pdf.
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community services traditionally provided by government out of taxes,
with allocation decisions being made by the government. According to
First Ontario Fund Director, Ken Delaney, Alberta is the only debt-free
province and has lower taxes than the others. 447 In Alaska, a large por-
tion of the APF income goes directly to individuals. Such distributions
have helped decrease the gap between rich and poor. It is hard to make a
comparison to Alberta on that front because the Canadian social econ-
omy is much larger than that in the U.S. Canadians have other programs,
such as national health insurance, which help reduce the differences be-
tween rich and poor.
Alberta has income taxes and government is a respected institution
in Canada. The concern Goldsmith raises, about the detrimental effect
the PFD has on the ability of young Alaskans' to function as contributing
citizens, is an important concern. As the oil resources are depleted, and
the Alaskan population grows, only time will tell whether dependence on
the dividend has undermined social cohesion.
The Alaska Permanent Fund trustees invest as traditional endow-
ment trustees. They use no social criteria at all for their investments.
They are not pro-active on governance issues as is the California pension
fund (CalPERS). They do not screen for social criteria, as does a social
index fund like the Domini Social Investment Fund, or the Canadian La-
bor Sponsored Investment Funds. Thus, for example, they have no mech-
anism by which the APF Trustees could be instructed not to invest in one
or more companies seen as particularly destructive to Alaskan environ-
mental, economic or social interests.
D. LESSONS FROM APF AND HERITAGE FUND FOR FAIR EXCHANGE
There are few regions in the world containing both huge natural
resource wealth and a small population. Therefore, neither the Alaska nor
Alberta situations are easily replicable. (There are, however, suggestions
that the oil wealth of Iraq should be owned and managed for the Iraqi
people in a manner similar to the APF.44 8) These models do, however,
provide examples that can be used on a smaller scale. They enable us to
compare the pros and cons of using a trust to hold and invest citizen
funds compared to a government. They demonstrate the importance of
inflation proofing for fund longevity.
447 Telephone interview of Ken Delaney, Executive Director, First Ontario Fund (Aug. 5,
2005).
448 In Congressional testimony, U.S. Secretary of State Cohn Powell specifically men-
tioned the Alaska dividend model for Iraq in response to question from Senator Allen. "AN
ENLARGED NATO: MENDING FENCES AND MOVING FORWARD ON IRAQ" HEARING BEFORE THE
COMMITT'EE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED STATES SENATE 108TH CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION,
April 29, 2003 at 38, http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate/ U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, 2003.
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In Alaska, the fund income is divided to provide for inflation-proof-
ing and citizen dividends, while leaving some of the fund available for
the legislature to allocate to government functions. Even if the portion
available for government is not sufficient long term, the structure is in
place when the political will is.
Alaska's sophistication in caring for the Fund's survival, income to
citizens and government provides a good platform from which to develop
a Fair Exchange model.
A Fair Exchange model would add a mechanism to use the govern-
ment investment in private and public companies to impact their corpo-
rate governance and investment or disinvestments policies. The Alberta's
Heritage Fund focused on developing the Albertan economy, decreasing
the cost of utilities, creating jobs, and making low interest loans to other
Canadian provinces. Undoubtedly, it has served a real, if difficult to mea-
sure, social/economic function in Canada. Another example is the Cana-
dian Labor Sponsored Investment Funds (LSIFs).
E. CANADIAN LABOR SPONSORED INVESTMENT FUNDS (LSIFs)
Considering LSIFs in the Fair Exchange context, we must view
them in at least two ways: 1) as private companies receiving government
subsidies for which a fair exchange is expected; and 2) as a model for the
distribution mechanism of the fair exchange proposals described in this
article.
"Canadian innovations in labor-friendly asset management offer
rich lessons for those seeking new ways to organize and control capi-
tal .... The best of the LSIFs mobilize workers' savings to invest in good
jobs within local communities. The investment strategies of these LSIFs
are rooted in a broader social agenda that promotes worker participation,
training, and respect for stakeholders."'449
1. What are LSIFs?
Labor Sponsored Investment Funds (LSIFs) are union-sponsored,
tax incentivized investment funds that supply venture capital (VC) fi-
nancing to small and medium-sized enterprises in Canada. They were
first created in the mid-1980s, and have grown in number, size, and im-
portance over the past 20 years. The funds are established to fulfill spe-
cific federal and/or provincial goals, with each level of government
enacting statutory restrictions to help guide investments to achieve their
public policy objectives.
449 Archon Fung, Tessa Hebb & Joel Rogers, WORKING CAPITAL: THE POWER OF LABOR'S
PENSIONS 128 (Cornell University Press 2001).
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Since 1991, they have raised the largest amount of capi-
tal ($10.6 billion or 44 percent of the VC market) and
invested the largest amount of total VC ($5.3 billion or
24% of the VC market). They currently have the largest
share of VC under management in Canada ($9.2 billion
or 41% of the Canadian market as of 2003). These fun-
draising and investing activities, however, have not been
without costs - the federal government alone has fore-
gone $1.8 billion in tax revenue to cover tax credits
since 1991.450
Since 1991, 90% of LSIF capital has been raised in Ontario and
Quebec, and 85% has been invested in those two provinces. 451 The vast
majority of the funds' billions in assets come from small investments
made by average working people. 452
2. How and Why LSIFs Were Created
The specific trigger for the creation of the initial funds was the
1981-83 recession and persistent levels of high Canadian unemployment.
The labor sponsored venture capital corporation model was initiated by
the Quebec Federation of Labor (FTQ) in the Province of Quebec in
1984 to meet identified equity capital gaps for small and medium sized
businesses in a manner which would address additional social policy
concerns. The idea of a labor sponsored fund was the most recent devel-
opment in a long tradition of capital retention strategies in Quebec,
which include the pooling of pension funds to assist local economic ac-
tivity and the development of a comprehensive network of credit unions
which re-lend deposits locally. 45 3 Four additional funds have been cre-
ated which follow the Quebec model,454 the Working Opportunity Fund
in B.C.,455 the Worker Investment Fund in New Brunswick,4 56 the Cro-
cus Fund in Manitoba 457 and the First Ontario Fund in Ontario. 458
450 Thompson Financial Venture Capital Reporter Database 2005 (This is a proprietary
database accessed by Industry Canada under a license agreement with Thompson Financial,
for a study that has not been and will not be released by Industry Canada. Interested parties can
find the data by entering into a licensing agreement with Thompson Financial).
451 Thompson Financial Venture Capital Reporter Database 2005.
452 Sherman Kreiner, Labor-Sponsored Investment Funds in Canada, http://www.uswa.
org/uswa/program/content/437.php).
453 See id.
454 E-mail from Don Allen, Regional Data Corp., to author (Aug. 2, 2005).
455 Employee Investment Act, R.S.B.C. ch. 112 (1996).
456 Registered Labour-sponsored Venture Capital Corporations Regulation-Income Tax
Act, N.B. Reg. 2001-11 (2001); New Brunswick Income Tax Act, S.N.B. ch. N-6.001 (2000).
457 Crocus Investment Fund Act, S.M. ch. 48 (1991-1992) (Can.).
458 Community Small Business Investment Funds Act, S.O. ch. 18 (1992) (Can.).
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These funds are committed to earning competitive re-
turns. At the same time, the funds set out to provide cap-
ital to needed sectors, and, in addition, to meet social
goals the unions have established, including job creation
and retention, and regional economic development. As
part of their social mandate, each fund undertakes some
form of "social audit" of each firm it finances, which
includes examining labor relations, health and safety,
ethical employment and environmental practices. The
funds also take a proactive approach to the workforce -
encouraging improvements such as financial education
for workers, encouraging a high performance workplace,
participatory management, and worker ownership. 4
59
The Crocus Fund was the only fund with a formal social audit was.
However, First Ontario Fund uses a seven-page "Economic Impact As-
sessment" questionnaire filled out by prospective investee companies
that covers all the same subjects.4 60
The target market is small and medium sized businesses.
Typically, an equity interest is sought in companies em-
ploying less than 500 workers that have total assets of
less than $50 million. Most investments range from
$C500,000 to $C2 million. In raising capital these funds
are committed to participation by a broad base of aver-
age working people, through marketing by the sponsor-
ing unions or labor federations. The maximum annual
individual investment which qualifies for tax credits is
legislatively mandated and has ranged from $C3,500 to
$C5 ,000.461
3. Quebec Solidarity Fund (Solidarity FTQ) - the first LSIF
model
The Fonds de Solidaritd des Travailleurs du Quebec (Solidarity
FTQ)4 6 2 was the first fund to be created. The initial plan called for a 35%
provincial tax credit only for individual investors. The plan was then
presented to the Federal government, which agreed to match the provin-
cial government seed equity commitment of ($C10 million each) and to
459 See Kreiner, supra note 452.
460 Analysis of Fiscal Costs and Fiscal and Economic Impact of Ontario Labour-Spon-
sored Investment Funds (Regional Data Corporation, Don Allen) Sept. 2004 [hereinafter Anal-
ysis of Fiscal Costs].
461 See Kreiner, supra note 452.
462 R.S.Q., chapter F-3.2.1.
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provide matching tax credits, provided that the total tax credits did not
exceed 40% (20% provincial and 20% federal). 463
However, in the 1996 federal and Quebec budgets each tax credit
was reduced from 20% to 15%. 464
The Fund undertook negotiations with the provincial se-
curities commission to permit sales to be made by volun-
teer members of the Solidarity FTQ. The Fund raised
approximately $C500,000 during its first sales season.
The Fund... [had, as of 1995,] $C1.5 billion dollars in
assets. The bulk of sales are made through lump sum
investments into from their Registered Retirement Sav-
ings Plans (RRSP), which is the Canadian equivalent of
an Individual Retirement Account (IRA) in the U.S.
These revenues are supplemented by investment via pay-
roll deduction. In addition to mandating employers to
implement payroll plans, Solidarity FTQ affiliated un-
ions have undertaken a major initiative to establish col-
lective bargaining agreement language which compels
employers to match employee contributions made via
payroll deduction on a dollar for dollar basis. Statistics
as at December 31, 1995 indicate that about 65% of the
Solidarity Fund's 238,000 shareholders are affiliated
with the labor movement, the highest percentage among
all Canadian labor sponsored venture capital
corporations. 465
The Solidarity FTQ has several features that made its LSIF model a
unique innovation. Quebec legislation provides that the Quebec Federa-
tion of Labor (FTQ) is the sole sponsor of the Solidarity FTQ. FTQ ap-
points 10 of the 16 Fund board members and has input on the
appointment of the other six, including the chief executive officer.466 The
Fund goals as stated in the legislation indicate the importance of collat-
eral benefits beyond the purely financial. The stated purposes of the
Fund467 are to:
"Invest in firms within Quebec whose total assets are
less than $50 million, or whose net assets are not greater
than $20 million, to create, maintain and protect jobs;
promote the training of workers in economic matters and
463 See Kreiner, supra note 452.
464 See Allen, supra note 454.
465 See Kreiner, supra note 452.
466 WORKING CAPITAL: THE POWER OF LABOR'S PENSIONS 138 (Archon Fung et al. eds.,
2001) [hereinafter WORKING CAPITAL].
467 Id.
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enable them to increase their influence on Quebec's eco-
nomic development; stimulate the Quebec economy; and
invite workers to subscribe to the Fund. 468
Individual workers invest in LSIFs by contributions from their
RRSP. The LSIF tax credit allows a maximum of $C5,000 to be invested
by a person each year, for which he receives a 15% federal tax credit and
a 15% provincial tax credit, for a maximum rebate of $C1,500. Because
the contribution can be made with tax deferred RRSP funds, the deferral
is generally worth an additional approximate 30% of the contribution for
the average wage earner.469
LSIF investments are intended to be long-term patient capital. Thus,
the Quebec Fund requires contributions to remain in the fund until retire-
ment, or the contributor will incur tax penalties. The other LSIFs allow
for a withdrawal after eight years without a penalty.470
The provinces of Quebec, Manitoba and British Colum-
bia have each added a second LSIF, under pressure to
end the monopoly of their first fund. A number of other
LSIFs have been created in the provinces of Ontario and
Saskatchewan, which may be considered more private
sector oriented and less social goals oriented, although
they are also mandated to invest in small/medium busi-
ness and create employment. Therefore, Canada now has
27 labour-sponsored investment funds.471
Although there is now another LSIF in Quebec, the Solidarity FTQ
Fund is unique. It is the oldest and largest LSIF. The strong link between
the labor movement and the Quebec government enabled it to establish
itself as a substantial economic force in Quebec with a uniquely close
involvement with the economic development functions of the Quebec
government. Its economic strength and size have been enhanced by its
low cost structure, a consequence of having functioned for many years
with no LSIF competition. It has economies of scale that none of the
other LSIFs have, and it has had many years to grow as the sole Quebec
LSIF, without needing to market in competition with others in Quebec. It
garnered the support and participation of most of the unions in Quebec.
Whereas there are 18 LSIF funds in Ontario competing with each other
for investors from their various sponsor unions or organizations, and by
paying big commissions to brokers and financial planners to sell to the
468 Id.
469 Id.
470 Id.
471 See Allen, supra note 454.
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public. In Quebec, union members can sell LSIF stock directly, whereas
in Ontario a licensed broker must supervise such sales. 472
4. Impact of LSIFs
a) Filling the Capital Gap
Canada historically has not had adequate access to venture capi-
tal.473 LSIFs made a huge contribution to filling the venture capital gap
for small and medium-sized companies in Canada. In 1990 when LSIF
vehicles were not fully developed, the Canadian venture capital industry
stood at $3 billion with investments of $200-300 million annually. By
1998 the total sector stood at $8.4 billion. In 2000, the LSIFs accounted
for 50% of the venture capital in Canada and were the fastest growing
segment of the market. 474
In 1997, the entire Canadian venture capital industry invested $1.8
billion in 794 companies and the LSIFs invested $671 million of that
amount. In fiscal year 1997-98, the Solidarity FTQ Fund alone invested
$614 million. Due to the work of the Solidarity FTQ Fund, Quebec went
from being a province with limited venture capital sources to one gather-
ing the largest share of overall venture capital in the country. 475
On August 29, 2005 the Ontario government announced its inten-
tion to end its 15% tax credit no earlier than the end of the 2005 tax year
for LSIFs in Ontario. The reason they gave was that Ontario no longer
needed a subsidy to make venture capital available. 476 The Ontario LSIFs
contest this reasoning. 477 In 2005, the Association of Labour Sponsored
Investment Funds (ALSIF) 478 indicated that lack of capital access put
emerging Canadian technology companies at a competitive disadvantage
with American counterparts. 479 The ALSIF concluded that the problem
of venture capital supply was worsening, 480 and that in the years since
472 Interview with Ken Delaney, President and CEO, First Ontario Fund (8/2/05).
473 See Canadian Venture Capital and Private Equity Association, 2004 Review of Ven-
ture Capital Investment Activity in Canada 2, 3, 5, 8 (Feb. 16, 2004), http://www.altassets.
com/pdfs/CVCAYearEnd2004.pdf.
474 See WORKING CAPITAL, supra note at 466.
475 Id. at 139-140.
476 Press release, from Manuel Alas-Sevillano, Ontario Minister of Labour, 8/29/05 "On-
tario Plans to End Tax Credit for LSIFs: Incentive to investor no longer needed in healthy
venture capital market". (Aug. 29, 2005) (17.1.3) http://ogov.newswire.ca/ontario/GPOE/2005/
08/29/c3815.htm.?lmatch=&Iang=_.html (found 952005).
477 David Levi, President and CEO of GrowthWorks (an Ontario LSIF) in its press release
August 29, 2005 ("There is already a shortage of venture capital in Canada and this decision
will make the situation even worse for emerging Ontario companies.") (17.1.3) http://www.
press.arrivenet.com/pol/article.php/686556.html.
478 Regional Data Corporation, Jay Heller & Don Allen, Review of Financing Issues
Raised by the Institute for Competitiveness and Prosperity, May 2005.
479 Id.
480 Id.at 14.
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LSIFs were created the LSIFs had not crowded out other types of venture
capital firms48' and there had been an increase in foreign (primarily U.S.)
venture capital funds in Canada. The ALSIF study states that LSIFs had
performed at least as well as other Canadian venture capital funds during
the previous 5 years (2000-05) and better than the Canadian technology
funds. 4
82
The two largest sources of venture capital (VC) in Ontario are
LSIFs and foreign companies. 48 3 From 2002-04, foreign VC companies
directed only 9.6% of their Ontario investments to first round invest-
ments, while Canadian VC firms (LSIFs holding the majority of these
assets) invested 35% of their assets to companies not previously receiv-
ing VC.484 This study concluded: "Ontario companies generally only
succeed in attracting foreign venture capital if they already have domes-
tic investors in place," 485 whereas "LSIFs are guaranteed to invest
domestically." 486
b) Job Creation
A 1997 study showed that, on average, venture backed investee
firms increased their employment base by 26% per year as compared to
1.2% for the Canadian economy as a whole. A 2004 study of economic
impact of Ontario LSIFs found that a sample of 187 investees of the
funds had a total work force of 9,000 at the time that the funds first
invested in these firms. By 2002, their work forces had grown to 32,000.
If the firms had grown at a pace consistent with all Ontario firms of the
same size, they would have reached only 11,000 employees by 2002.487
The estimated direct, indirect, and induced impact of the Ontario LSIFs
through 2001 on employment was 27,000 jobs in Ontario and 29,400
jobs for all Canada. 488
c) Return to Government on LSIF Tax Credit Investment
The above-mentioned 2004 study of fiscal and economic impact of
Ontario LSIFs estimated that the cumulative fiscal cost to taxpayers of
Ontario funds from inception during the 1990s to tax year 2000 was
$C494 million for the Ontario government and $C489 million for the
federal government. Most of the funds raised are placed in company in-
vestments, although a portion is placed in marketable securities to reduce
481 Id. at 11.
482 Id. at 9.
483 Id. at 14.
484 Id.
485 Id.
486 Id.
487 See Analysis of Fiscal Cost, supra note 460.
488 Id. at 2.
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risk. The funds placed in companies led to an economic impact in terms
of the start-up, growth and maintenance of firms. In the year 2002, this
economic impact was estimated to have led to incremental government
revenues of $357 million for Ontario and $449 million for the federal
government. This implies a payback period of costs since inception of
1.4 years for Ontario and 1.1 years for the federal government. There-
fore, by mid-2003, all of the cost invested up to 2000 would have been
recovered and incremental government revenues would have carried on
subsequently, since the vast majority of investees were still operating and
growing. 489 LSIFs are a relatively new experiment. Although this is not
conclusive evidence that LSIFs provide a fair exchange financially, it is
evidence that they are moving in that direction.
d) Broader Social Return on LSIF Investment
In addition to the benefits noted above, in Ontario LSIF investees
invested in research and development at quadruple the rate (from $137
million to over 700 million) of comparable Canadian firms that did not
receive LSIF investments. 490 Through 2001, beyond what would have
otherwise been expected without them, Ontario LSIFs created a large
export income gain of $1.5 billion,491 contributed $C2.3 billion to the
Ontario GDP and $C2.6 billion to the Canadian GDP.49 2 All have been
created to provide venture capital for local Canadian firms using capital
from a source formerly largely untapped - individual investors, and par-
ticularly union members. The LSIF funds enable many working people
to save more for their retirement than they would have otherwise. 493 The
union connection appears to make LSIF investments more accessible and
worthwhile to workers with incomes under $100,000 per year.494 Some
LSIFs perform social audits and have high labor and environmental stan-
dards as well (see following sections.).
The LSIFs have been a good investment and a fair exchange for the
communities.
e) Creation of Regional Financial Networks
In the early days of the Solidarity FTQ Fund, its officials realized
that there were many investment opportunities outside the Montreal area
that never came to the attention of the Fund. Often firms from such rural
areas did not approach the Solidarity FTQ Fund because it seemed too
489 id.
490 Id.at 3.
491 Id. at 8.
492 Id. at 2.
493 Id. at 2, 5.
494 Id. at 5.
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removed from their community or because it required travel to Montreal.
The Solidarity FTQ Fund overcame this barrier by developing a regional
partnership with Quebec's government. The network now operates sev-
enteen regional funds, each with offices and managers assigned to local
areas, which invested $C41.7 million in 155 firms with investments in
the $C50,000 to $C500,000 range. Proximity to the investments in-
creases knowledge of opportunities and enables closer monitoring of the
loans. It also builds the involvement of local people who, in turn, are
more likely to invest in the trust and to obtain the financial education
offered by the Solidarity FTQ Fund.495 This led to an even more local-
ized development of SOLIDE funds to provide pre-start-up financing in
the $C5,000 to $C50,000 range. As of 2001 there were 86 SOLIDEs in
Quebec that had invested in 490 enterprises.496
f) LSIFs Throughout Canada
In 1988, Canada passed national legislation followed by provincial
legislation in British Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario and New Brunswick.
In four of these provinces, a sole labor sponsor, the provincial labor fed-
eration, was named in the legislation. However, in Ontario, which in-
cludes Canada's financial center, Toronto, the financial community
fought creation of a labor-controlled fund. There was strong disagree-
ment within the Ontario labor movement about the appropriateness of
LSIFs. Thus, when LSIF legislation passed in Ontario, the labor federa-
tion could not be named as the sole sponsor. Rather, any labor organiza-
tion or trade association could sponsor an LSIF.497 As of July 2005, 18 of
27 LSIFs exist under Ontario legislation. 498
Five of the six funds with a sole labor federation sponsor formed an
alliance 499 and created a Statement of Principles to set a standard for
themselves, and to distinguish themselves from what they perceived as a
lack of concern, in many of the Ontario LSIFs, for the social benefits,
beyond rate of return, which they believe are fundamental to LSIFs. The
Statement of Principles of the Labour Sponsored Investment Fund Alli-
ance is:
1) organization and direction by a labor body (meaning a board of
directors controlled by a labor organization with at least 100,000
members);
2) commitment to meeting social goals (including job retention, re-
gional economic development, social audit, and requiring inves-
495 See WORKING CAPITAL, supra note 466, at 150-52.
496 Id. at 150.
497 See Fung, Hebb & Rogers, supra note 449, at 131.
498 See Allen, supra note 454.
499 See Fung, Hebb & Rogers, supra note 449, at 131.
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tee companies' commitment to improvement of labor-
management relations);
3) commitment to provide an equitable rate of return to sharehold-
ers, risk capital in a diversified portfolio, and participation by a
broad base of average working people; and,
4) facilitation of cooperation between labor and business.500
Because the Alliance has not met since 1998, the distinction be-
tween Alliance and non-Alliance funds is no longer very helpful. 50' A
number of funds have merged or been restructured so that only two now
meet the original criteria, Solidarity FTQ and First Ontario Fund.50 2
g) Social Audit and Worker Education
The Alliance LSIFs require their investees to be fair, safety con-
scious employers and good environmental stewards. They do not require
them to be unionized firms. Solidarity FTQ, the largest of the Alliance
funds provide worker education to train their sales force made up of
union members. They provide financial literacy classes for their investors
to learn to manage their retirement accounts. The Solidarity FTQ Fund
requires management in its investee firms to open their ledgers to their
employees and assists those firms in training their employees to under-
stand these ledgers. As the year 2000, sixteen thousand workers in Que-
bec had participated in these two-day financial courses. A 1999 study
found that all surveyed investee companies reported varying degrees of
improvement in labor management trust and communication after these
training programs. 50 3
5. Financial Performance of LSIFs compared to Comparable
Commercial Funds for Individual Investors
LSIFs have provided clear benefits to Canadian communities. As
outlined above in the section entitled "Broader Social Return on LSIF
Investments, the LSIFs now have $C5.955 billion in assets in Quebec
and $C3.386 billion in the rest of Canada for a total of $C9.3 billion
invested in funds aimed at building local economies. 5°4 LSIFs repay the
500 Id. at 133-34.
501 Interview with Ken Delaney, President and CEO, First Ontario Fund, interview with
author 8/2/05.
502 Id.
503 WORKING CAPITAL, supra note 466 at 152 (citing a 1999 study by Paul Laliberte at the
University of Massachusetts.
504 Thomson Financial Venture Capital Reporter 2005, a copyrighted proprietary
database, is the main source of data on the Canadian venture capital market. The information
cited herein was accessed by Industry Canada under a license with Thompson Financial, for an
Industry Canada study that has not been and will not be released. The author obtained the data
from the unpublished study. The Thompson Financial Venture Capital Reporter is found at
http://www.canadavc.com/.
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government for its investment, so they provide a fair exchange. How-
ever, the issue of return on individual investment is not really a Fair
Exchange issue.
a) Impact on Individual Investors
There should be concern about how the average citizen investor is
treated. So we will explore briefly these three questions. 1) Should unso-
phisticated investors be putting their discretionary savings in venture
capital funds? 2) If unsophisticated, working-class investors are using
LSIFs to save for retirement, are they getting an appropriate return on
investment for the risk they take? 3) Do LSIF worker-investors have dif-
ferent LSIF investment objectives than commercial venture capitalists?
FIGURE 4
Globe Labour-Sponsored Peer Index as of 15-Sep-05
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Most investment advisors would not advise unsophisticated inves-
tors to put a large portion of their discretionary savings in traditional
venture capital funds. Figure 4 provides a comparison of the Toronto
Globe & Mail's LSIF Index compared with the S&P 500 Composite in
Canadian dollars 5o5 to give a general idea of the alternate equity invest-
ment returns available to a Registered Retirement Savings Plan (RRSP)
investor. The LSIFs have not performed as well as the S&P 500. The
section below "Financial Return Comparison Data" shows that the LSIFs
have not performed as well as small cap funds since 1999, although they
outperformed them up to 1998. However, many Ontario modest income
investors, who have not otherwise made RRSP contributions, have in-
vested in LSIFs.50 6 The proportion of union members who invest in
505 See http://globefunddb.theglobeandmail.com/gishome/plsqllgis.showchart?comp-id
=O&fidl =5117&period= 120&indxlid=3140&fid2=&pi-movype=SMA&pi_mov-avgl =
&pi-mov-avg2=&pi-mov-avg3=&iaction=Go&pi-universe=PUBLC_FUND 9/12/05
506 See Analysis of Fiscal Costs, supra note 460.
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LSIFs is larger than their proportion amongst Ontario taxpayers. 507 Ca-
nada has a national pension system to which everyone contributes and
from which everyone receives benefits. The RRSP is an inducement to
personal savings via income tax incentives and is strictly voluntary. 50 8
The LSIF investors are likely making small LSIF investments for reasons
not completely based on financial return, but perhaps based on concern
for maintaining the local economy and jobs: "One theory is that individ-
ual investors are less sensitive to rates of return given the up-front tax
credit and the small amount of each investment. By comparison, those
that invest in private funds tend to be sensitive to rates of return and have
large amounts of capital at stake. This theory suggests that LSVCC
(LSIF) managers are less driven to produce high returns than their pri-
vate sector counterparts. Theoretically, this may manifest itself in invest-
ments that private funds would have rejected or negotiated for a better
position, a more passive approach to investment monitoring and offering
little value added to the investee firm.50 9
If unsophisticated, working-class investors are using LSIFs to save
for retirement, are they getting an appropriate return on investment for
the risk they take? LSIFs, particularly the Solidarity FTQ, make a con-
certed effort to provide financial literacy training to their worker-inves-
tors510 so that they do not remain unsophisticated investors and can
properly judge the risk of investing in the LSIFs compared to alternative
RRSP investments. Additionally, it is hard to use the existing fund indi-
ces to compare return on investment with other similar stock or venture
capital funds because the LSIFs report their return on investment after
costs and not including tax benefit, whereas the other Canadian venture
capital funds report their return on investment before expenses.51'
507 Regional Data Corporation, "Analysis of Fiscal Costs and Fiscal and Economic Im-
pact of Ontario Labour-Sponsored Investment Funds", May 2004 at 5.
508 Keith Wilde, senior model analyst, DYNACAN, Micro-simulation, Canadian Social
Security, email to author 9/22/05.
509 D. SANDLER & J. MACINTOSH. Mutual Funds that Invest in Private Equity? An Analy-
sis of Labour-Sponsored Investment Funds 33, (Working paper, University of Alberta and
University of Toronto, 2003b).
510 The second of four key objectives of the Solidarity Fund FTQ is "To promote eco-
nomic training of workers in order to enhance their contribution to Quebec's economic devel-
opment." See Fonds de Solidarity FTQ, About the Fund, at http:/www.fondsftq.com/intemet
fonds.nsffVwebTimpAN/AprAcc?opendocument.
511 See Delaney, supra note 501.
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b) Methodology Problems Comparing LSIF Returns to
Commercial Returns
It is not proper to compare the Toronto Globe & Mail globeinves-
tor.com LSIF index 5t 2 with other non-venture capital stock indices, as
they really represent other asset classes. There are additional problems
with comparing other stock fund data. It is hard to use the existing fund
indices to compare, return on investment with other similar stock or ven-
ture capital funds because the LSIFs report their return on investment
after costs and not including tax benefit, whereas the other Canadian ven-
ture capital funds report their return on investment before expenses. 51 3
The tax benefit of an LSIF may not legally be included in the return on
investment calculations shown in any offering publication for LSIF
participants. 514
An example will demonstrate why this matters. The author com-
pared various small cap and venture indices against the LSIF index. The
10-year cumulative return for BMO Nesbitt Bums Small Cap Index had
a return on investment over 10 years of 10.33%. The LSIF Index had a
return on investment of 0 .53%. If a worker invested $100 in an LSIF
with provincial and federal tax credits, his $100 investment at the end of
10 years would be $105.30, but his actual investment would have been
$70, not $100, whereas the person who invested $100 in BMO Nesbitt
would have $110.30 on his $100 investment. So the LSIF investor made
$105.30-70 = $35.30 on his investment, and the BMO Nesbitt investor
made $110.30 - 100.00 = $10.30 on his investment. In this case, the
LSIF investor made over 3 times the return of the small cap investor. The
LSIFs are explicitly prohibited by law from showing prospective custom-
ers return on net (after tax credits) costs. 515
The LSIF index, although it lists the Solidarity FTQ, does not have
cumulative data for return on investment or many other categories on
that fund, as Solidarity FTQ does not provide that information to the
index makers. So the absence of the Solidarity FTQ data skews the LSIF
index considerably.
Any proper comparison between the other indices and the LSIFs
would need to include the Solidarity data, as it comprises almost half the
LSIF funds invested in Canada. Solidarity FTQ has $5.9 billion in assets,
whereas the rest of the LSIFs combined have $3.38 billion in assets. Soli-
darity FTQ, in its own reports shows much better performance than the
other LSIFs, which is likely due to its economies of scale, historic mo-
512 A fund index of 130 Canadian LSIF funds and sub-funds http://globefunddb.theglobe
andmail.com/gishome/plsql/gis.gen-fr?in-rep-type+ADM&in.
513 See Delaney, supra note 501.
514 Id.
515 Id.
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nopoly on LSIF business in Quebec from the early 1980s until after
2000; and its size in relationship to the entire Quebec economy. 5 16 This
author found only annual, and not cumulative rates of return in the En-
glish language data available on the Solidarity FTQ website5 1 7 . It did
show an average annual rate of return since inception of 4 .9 %,5t8 which
is substantially better than that of the rest of the LSIFs, and would clearly
change the overall LSIF figures if included in the index. Table 5D (be-
low) shows this comparison.
c) Financial Return Comparison Data
Table 6.4519 (see Table 5A below) in Fung, Hebb and Rogers
showed one, three and five year returns as of December 1998 from the
February 1999 Globe and Mail Fund Report. It shows the Alliance LSIF
Funds outperforming the non-Alliance LSIF funds substantially on one,
three and five year average rates of return. Fung, Hebb and Rogers attrib-
uted some of this Alliance LSIF success to the strengths their social au-
dits gave to their investment decision-making process.
By using social audits, investors screen out attributes
that can be associated with bad management, including
poor labour relations, dangerous environmental prac-
tices, and disregard for consumers and communities. Ec-
onomically Targeted Investments (ETI) opponents see
these screens as distractions from securing the best pos-
sible return. The Alliance funds contend that social per-
formance improvements require the sacrifice of
profitability is simply inaccurate. At the close of 1998,
Alliance-controlled funds, operating with a broad social
and economic agenda, solidly outperformed mixed-
board LSIFs, small-cap funds, and the Toronto Stock
Exchange total return for that year. 520
Below is a summary of the information on Fung, Hebb and Rogers,
table 6.4 (Table 5A below) and more recent data from the Canadian So-
cial Investment Organization. (SIO). The SIO data does not compare Al-
liance with non-Alliance funds. In 1999 (Table 5B) it compares Alliance
funds against the average for small and mid -cap funds and in 2004
(Table 5C) it compares a group of LSIFs including Alliance and non-
Alliance funds to a small cap index.
516 Id.
517 Fonds du Solidarit' FTQ Website http://www.fondsftq.com/intemetfonds.nsfNweb
TimpAN/AprAcc?open document.
518 Id.
519 See Fung, Hebb & Rogers, supra note 449 at 143.
520 See id. at 142.
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TABLE 5A
As of 12/31/98 % return 1-year 3-year 5-year
Alliance Fund Average 6.27 6.94 7.01
Non-Alliance Fund Average -5.33 0.16 2.11
From p. 143 of Working Capital: The Power of Labor's Pensions
The assertion about outperforming other funds may have been true
in the late 1990S.521 However, since the technology bubble burst in 2000,
LSIF performance compared to listed small cap stock funds has not been
good due to weak private equity markets and decreases in the tax incen-
tives provided to LSIF investors.5 22
TABLE 5B
As of 12/31/99 % return 1 mo. 3 mo. 1-year 3-year 5-year 10-year
Alliance Fund Average 5.6 11.3 17.9 5.4 5.6 NA
All Canadian Small to 8.5 9.3 17.6 2.8 9.9 8.3
Mid Cap Equity Funds
Average
From Socially Responsible Investment Organization Newsletter Feb.2000 p.8 - Fund
Performance
TABLE 5C
12/31/2004 % return 1 mo. 3 mo. 1-year 3-year 5-year 10-year
Labour Sponsored Venture - 0.6 -1.3 -7.3 -6.0 0.9
Capital Funds
BMO Nesbitt Bums Canadian - 9.9 14.1 17.3 12.4 10.7
Small Cap Index I L
From Socially Responsible Investment Organization Newsletter Website - Fund
Performance 2004 (www.socialinvestment.ca/MutualFunds/Dec322004) This list
includes Alliance and some of the non-Alliance LSIFs.
First Ontario's Ken Delaney opined that it was inappropriate to
compare the LSIFs, which are required to invest in small and medium
sized local businesses, to small cap stock indices comprised of publicly
traded companies such as those in Tables 5B and 5C.523 He said that the
better comparison is to the rest of the venture capital industry. Indeed, a
number of the LSIF funds are included in the Canadian Venture Capital
and Private Equity Association data on venture capital companies. 524
521 See Delaney, supra note 501.
522 Id.
523 Id.
524 Canadian Venture Capital & Private Equity Association, May 20, 2005 press release
"Canadian venture Capital & Private Equity Performance Data" - the list of firms included
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When compared to the whole Canadian venture capital industry525 the
LSIF returns seem comparable. Since 1996, LSIFs tend to invest a ma-
jority of their funds in later stage venture capital rounds. So it seems
reasonable to compare their return on investment to those of other later
stage venture capital investors in Canada. (See Table 5D) By that mea-
sure, they are behind their cohort in one and 5-year rate of return, but
ahead of them in 3- and 10-year rates of return. So they are on a par with
their cohort.
TABLE 5D. COMPARING RATE OF RETURN FOR OF LSIF
INDEX526 WITH CANADIAN VENTURE CAPITAL INDEX527
Total From
Investment % Returns Assets 1-year 3-year 5-year 10-year 15-year Inception
Later Stage Venture NA 5.6 -4.3 -4.3 0.0 NA
Capital in Canada as of
12/31/04
Toronto Globe Labour $3.4 bil- -1.3 -3.23 -6.21 0.53 1.54
Sponsor Peer Index 5 2 8  lion
5 2 9
8/31/05
Solidarity FTQ5 3 0 as $5.9 bil- 5.0 NA - but NA but NA but Average
of 5/31/04 lion5 3 1  annual annual annual annual
return in return in return in return since
2002 2000 1995 inception
-11.4% 8.6 11.6% 4.9%
d) Do LSIF Rules Negatively Affect Returns on Investment
Do the LSIF rules regarding reinvestment within the province and
the pacing rules put too many restraints on LSIF management, decreas-
traditional venture capital companies and some LSIFs - found 9/12/05 at http://www.cvac.ca/
files/CVCAPressReleasePerformanceStudyDec_2004_finalMay_202005_R.pdf.
525 Many of the LSIFs, like the First Ontario Fund, and GrowthWorks Working Opportu-
nity Fund, are included in the Canadian Venture Capital and Private Equity Association, Press
Release "Canadian Venture Capital & Private Equity Industry Performance Data" May 20,
2005 at 4.
526 Toronto Globe and Mail financial web site globeinvestor.com, found on 9/9/02 at
http://globefunddb.theglobeandmail.conm/gishome/plsq/gis.gen-fr?in-rep-type+LT&in-sor
527 Canadian Venture Capital & Private Equity Association, May 20, 2005 press release
"Canadian venture Capital & Private Equity Performance Data" - the list of firms included
traditional venture capital companies and some LSIFs - found 9/12/05 at http://www.cvac.ca/
files/CVCAPressReleasePerformanceStudyDec_2004_finalMay-20 -2005_R.pdf'.
528 This index does not include 3,5,10 and 15-year cumulative figures for Solidarity FTQ,
so it covers only 43% of the LSIFs.
529 Author added all the assets listed for the 130 funds on the globeinvestor.com Labour
Sponsored Venture Funds. Some of them did not list assets, including Solidarity FTQ. http://
globefunddb.theglobeandmail.com/gishome/psql/gis.gen-fr?in-rep-type+ADM&in.
530 The remaining 57% of the LSIF results are these from Solidarity FTQ, "Financial
Highlights, Fund Returns" http/:www.fondsftq.com/interntefonds.nsf/VwebTimpAN/AprSta?
opendocument.
531 Id.
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ing the available eligible deal flow and forcing them to make some risk-
ier investments than they would otherwise make if they had more
latitude? Unlike private venture capital funds, LSIFs are required to rein-
vest in their home province and have "pacing rules" which require them
to invest 50% of capital raised in January-February by December 31of
that year and another 20% in the next year.532 The geography may limit
the available deals, especially when some qualified investments must be
made within a time period in which the deal flow is not good. This au-
thor could not find sufficient data to address this question. But it is a
question that should be considered by anyone seeking to replicate the
LSIF model. Mismanagement seems to have been the primary problem
leading to the Manitoba Crocus Fund going into receivership in 2005. 533
However, there is also speculation that Manitoba was too small a market
to be able to successfully manage a fund with the requisite geographic
and pacing restrictions. As a province with only one million people and
35,000 businesses, there may not have been adequate deal flow for Cro-
cus to choose better investments and still follow the rules. 534
Do the LSIFs have adequate business oversight to pro-
tect them from making investments based on political
pressure? A labor-sponsored fund is inherently subject to
pressure from the labor unions that sponsor it to make
investments to protect jobs in companies where its mem-
bers work. However, a fund cannot survive if it gives in
to such pressures. If labor is to have a major ownership
position in such a fund, it must provide fund managers
enough protection to allow them to do what is finan-
cially necessary, regardless of politics. The First Ontario
Fund (FOF) has such a mechanism, which was sorely
tested in a recent case of a USWA organized firm that
was an FOF investee was losing substantial market share
to Chinese competition. The FOF board of directors had
11 members, 6 from labor and 5 from business. How-
ever, the investment committee is comprised of the 5
business members. So when a decision had to be made
whether to reinvest in the company in question, the in-
vestment committee determined that reinvestment was
532 Office of the Canadian Auditor General, Jon W. Singleton, Examination of the Crocus
Investment Fund May 2005, Appendix G - Sections of the Income Tax Act Related to the
Pacing Requirements of a Labour-Sponsored Fund.
533 Id. at 1.
534 Interview with Robert Warren, Executive Director, Asper School of Business Centre
for Entrepreneurship, University of Manitoba (April 21, 2005).
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unwise, and FOF let the company close instead of
reinvesting. 535
6. Devaluation of the Crocus Fund and its Implications
The Manitoba Crocus Investment Fund was one of the small LSIFs,
with total assets of approximately $100 million or less in 2004.536
On April 4, 2005, the Manitoba Securities Commission issued alle-
gations against the Crocus Fund for mismanagement leading to a sharp
drop in share value from $10.45 per share to less than $7 per share,
which it did not determine or report in a timely manner to investors.
In the investigation, the Auditor General found many instances of
mismanagement at Crocus but did not generalize these to the LSIF indus-
try.5 3 7 In fact, the Auditor General's report described the socially respon-
sible investment process, as one that should have been a good Crocus
safeguard. However, it was not always followed:
Socially Responsible Investing (SRI) reviews have had a
positive impact on the investment decision-making pro-
cess. However, there have been instances where the for-
mer CEO and former CIO have curtailed the review
process. Had these SRI reviews been completed, the re-
sults may have influenced the Board's decision to
invest.538
The Crocus board of directors was comprised primarily of union
leaders. The board members had little experience sitting on fund boards
or dealing with venture capital decisions. It is likely that they relied
heavily on their staff. Their staff was small and had not only the normal
venture capital staff duties of seeking, analyzing, structuring and financ-
ing deals, but also had to perform social audits, train union leaders to sell
securities and sold securities to inexperienced investors including their
Board members union constituents. Unlike the First Ontario Fund, whose
investment committee is made up of its board members from the busi-
ness community (who have the final say on investment decisions), Cro-
cus left this work to its staff.539 Staff can have trouble staying detached
535 See Delaney, supra note 501.
536 JOHN W. SINGLETON, OFFICE OF THE CANADIAN AUDITOR GENERAL, EXAMINATION OF
THE CROCUS INVESTMENT FUND 30-31 (2005), http://oag.mb.ca/reports/2004/crocus/OAGcro-
cus.pdf. However, the exact value of the Crocus assets is a key question in the Auditor Gen-
eral's report, as the Fund was place in receivership by the Canadian Securities Commission in
2005, when serious questions arose about overvaluation of its investments.
537 Id. at 6-12.
538 Id. at 10.
539 See Delaney, supra note 501.
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from companies they know very well as investees. 540 The Crocus Fund
lacked the oversight of a sufficient number of hard-nosed business peo-
ple. It may also be that Crocus was operating in too small a universe to
successfully accomplish all its diverse objectives. The pacing rules, re-
quiring fairly quick investment of funds, upon receipt, may have contrib-
uted to Crocus's problems. Additionally, the fund was required to invest
in Manitoba companies within tight time limits, but the provincial popu-
lation was only 1,000,000 with 35,000 businesses. 541 In such a small
universe they likely lacked the diversity and size of deal flow necessary
to choose optimum investments. Operating within the same limitations,
but in the larger Quebec economy, the very large Solidarity FTQ, has
avoided these problems so far.
The LSIF model is not inherently flawed, but if it is to be used as a
model for Fair Exchange community trusts, several important lessons
must be taken from the Crocus experience. A Fair Exchange trust board
must have a more balanced board including a more equal distribution of
labor, business and government members. Additionally, any founding
legislation must provide latitude to invest as slowly as necessary in the
local community to make sound investments. It should also provide gui-
dance similar to the Alaska Permanent Fund legislation regarding spe-
cific types of safer investments permitted or even required for some
portion of the fund.
7. Difficulty in Comparing Performance of LSIFs (Alliance and
Non-Alliance) to Comparable Commercial Funds
It is as difficult to compare Alliance LSIFs with traditional invest-
ment funds, as it is to compare the Alaska Permanent Fund and the Al-
berta Heritage Fund. Just as the Heritage Fund seeks to provide a variety
of non-financial community benefits to Albertans, Alliance LSIFs are
focused on job retention and investing in successful local companies that
are socially and environmentally responsible. These criteria narrow con-
siderably the universe of companies in which Alliance LSIFs can invest.
They are especially restricted for an LSIF such as Crocus in Manitoba.
Whereas the APF's goals are to grow, inflation-proof itself and generate
dividends, regardless of the social impact of the companies in which it
invest; the Heritage Fund and Alliance LSIFs have numerous other social
goals.
Measurement of these alternate goals is difficult because there is not
an alternate reality for comparison. Whatever the socially active funds
did to change employment or environmental circumstances, they
540 Id.
541 See Warren, supra note 534.
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changed the circumstances against which they would otherwise be mea-
sured. This issue presages a discussion in the section below on Commu-
nity Benefit Agreements about developing metrics to measure social and
community benefit. As we do not yet have these metrics, or at least no
consensus on them, it is easy to overlook these benefits and concentrate
on the available hard numbers. The three studies by Regional Data Cor-
poration cited above have attempted to measure community benefit by
creating a model of the economy as it would likely have grown without
the LSIFs, and measuring the additional impact of the LSIFs.542
The hard numbers are provided in Tables 6A-D above. But they do
not present the whole story. Economist Melissa Moye discussed this is-
sue in her comparison of three early studies on the efficacy of the
LSIFs. 54 3 Moye argued that,
The narrow cost-benefit analysis method, used primarily
in evaluating private sector investments, compares only
direct dollar benefits with direct costs in assigning a
value to an investment project. In the public setting,
however, most economists reason that such narrow cost-
benefit analyses should not be the only method used for
valuing a potential public investment. The narrow cost-
benefit study should be used to identify and minimize
costs. However, most analysts agree that indirect effects
(such as increased tax revenue due to increased produc-
tion among supplier firms), induced effects (such as in-
creased tax revenue from higher consumer spending
resulting from more employment) and intangible or
qualitative effects (such as increased networking among
542 Regional Data Corporation, "Analysis of Fiscal Costs and Fiscal and Economic Im-
pact of Ontario Labour-Sponsored Investment Funds", May 2004 at 6-15.
543 Melissa Moye, "Review of Studies Assessing the Impact of Labor-Sponsored Invest-
ment Funds in Canada," Work & Technology Institute, (no date, after 1995) found at http://
www.uswa.org/uswa/program/content/438.php (3/27/05) The three analyses of LSIFs she ex-
amined were: "The Fonds de Solidaritj des Travailleurs du Quibec: A Cost-Benefit Analysis
by Suret, Impact Economique et Fiscal Des Investissements du Fonds de Solidariti des
Travailleurs du Quibec (FTQ), 1984-1993, by Lamond, Martineau and Allen and Economic
and Fiscal Impacts of the Fonds de Solidaritj des Travailleurs du Quibec's Investments,
1984-93 by Jackson and LaMontagne. The Suret study was commissioned by the Fraser Insti-
tute and resulted in a negative evaluation of the net benefit of the FTQ. The Lamond, Marti-
neau and Allen study was commissioned by the FTQ through Quebec's Institut National de la
Recherche Scientifique (INRS) to assess the overall fiscal impacts of the fund's investments
on the Quebec economy. The results of the INRS study, in contrast to those of the Suret study,
showed a positive net impact. The INRS study's methods for computing the costs and benefits
of the FTQ became the basis for a study by the CLMPC research team of Jackson and
LaMontagne. The latter study used essentially the same methodology on an expanded sample
of cases of seven FTQ investee firms and three investee firms of the Working Opportunities
Fund in British Columbia."
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regional businesses) should also be considered when
making public investment decisions."'544
Moye concluded that comprehensive methods, which include collat-
eral effects, but make conservative assumptions to guard against exag-
gerating benefits, are the best methods for evaluating the return on LSIF
investments.5 45
The figures in the Tables 6 B and C above make a comparison on
very narrow financial criteria. Fair Exchange, community benefit agree-
ments, LSIFs, the Alaska and Alberta Funds and all similar ventures
would benefit greatly from a comprehensive, uniform and agreed-upon
system for measuring collateral social benefit, just as financial markets
benefit from the existence of Generally Accepted Accounting Practices
(GAAP).
8. Lessons for Fair Exchange from LSIFs
LSIFs have a 15 to 20 year history of providing a critically impor-
tant community-based source of capital and creating and saving local
jobs. In this era of mobile capital, having a source and mechanism for
generating and growing productive capital is important for maintaining
communities. LSIFs are a new and complex phenomenon. Just as the
Alberta Heritage Fund stumbled before it reorganized itself as an endow-
ment, LSIFs undoubtedly will make mistakes before they stabilize and
become stronger. Fair Exchange community trusts should study the vari-
ous LSIF funds as they develop. They have diverse experiences because
they operate under different provincial laws and economic conditions. It
is important to note that the size and diversity of Solidarity FTQ has
enabled it to reap economies of scale and its stock value to rebound to
reasonably good returns after taking a value hit in 2002-03.546 Fair Ex-
change programs need to learn from the governance and management
problems that undermined Crocus. Furthermore, the sheer number of
LSIFs in Ontario, plus the requirement that a licensed broker must super-
vise union member salespeople, causes those funds to have much higher
expenses than Solidarity. 547
The language in the Airline Stabilization Act, the Chrysler Loan
Guarantee Act or the Alaska Constitution seem like the best models for
Fair Exchange programs to acquire equity or funds. LSIFs provide im-
portant models and lessons to consider in structuring asset management
and distribution mechanism for the Fair Exchange Community Trusts de-
544 Melissa Moye, supra note 543, at 3-8.
545 Id. at 8.
546 Fonds de Solidarit6, FrQ Financial Highlights, Fund Returns, Sept. 9, 2005, http://
www.fondsftq.com/internetfonds.nsffVwebTimpAN/AprSta?opendocument.
547 See Delaney, supra note 501.
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scribed in the Fair Exchange model legislation (section IV below). Those
interested in Fair Exchange should consult with LSIFs' executive staffs
to solicit ideas about how they might change LSIFs if they could start
from scratch.5 48 Perhaps the best asset management and distribution
model would combine the best features of the LSIF and Alaska Perma-
nent Fund models. Such a fund might manage a portion of its fund using
portfolio diversity rules based on the conservative Alaska investment
rules, while investing another fund portion with a well-governed and so-
cially responsible focus on local re-investment. Or perhaps it would pro-
vide that a portion of the Community Trust interest or dividends would
go into individual citizen accounts, as in Alaska, but the actual equity
shares or funds would be controlled by a more diverse version of an
LSIF board. In order to ensure that the individual accounts were used for
economic development, one might limit citizens' use of their individual
account assets to education, business investment, home purchase, retire-
ment and medical emergencies.
The advantage of using an LSIF-type entity for asset management
and distribution is that its investment strategy has a clear focus on the
needs of the local citizens, and strives to maintain a clear business focus
and discipline when making investments. Their success at maintaining
this discipline has been hampered by size and pacing rules, which must
be considered when adapting them to Fair Exchange models. Although
the Alaska Permanent Fund Trustees do not focus their investments in
Alaska or use any social investment criteria, they do use standard endow-
ment management practices and investment discipline successfully. By
contrast, Alberta found its Heritage Fund less focused and too suscepti-
ble to political pressure because it is operated entirely within the govern-
ment. These concerns seem to be balanced by LSIFs such as Solidarity
FTQ, which uses the provincial labor federation as a stand-in for in-
formed citizen interest. The labor federations include financial profes-
sionals on the LSIF boards and hire professional staff to perform
financial due diligence and social audits.
Thus, the LSIF boards serve a function similar to the Alaska Fund
Trustees, with a greater focus on preserving local jobs and economic
vigor, but without the pressure of being elected government officials.
The role of the labor movement in Canada enables labor to serve as a
well-informed citizen-surrogate. In states and countries where a social
contract is understood to exist between labor, management and govern-
ment, this arrangement should be replicable. In countries such as the
U.S., a tri-partite board is a more attainable objective.
548 Id.; Author's telephone interview with Lawrence Euteneier of Industry Canada on 9/
16/05 in which he described an upcoming meeting of LSIF leaders to discuss best practices.
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To make the LSIF model work one must find a strong organization
committed to working people, with checks and balances that help it with-
stand corruption and ensure proper financial and social oversight, to fill
the well-informed citizen-surrogate role. A cooperative federation might
also fill this function, as in Mondragon. 549
It is worth considering the TVA board as an alternative model that
could be used in a large community trust. Its advantage over the well-
informed citizen-surrogate leadership model is that such board members
are usually part-time or volunteer, while TVA board members work full-
time in their roles. Furthermore, TVA board members are appointed by
the President and can be removed by Congress. This is similar to the role
of the Alaska Permanent Fund Trustees. However, unlike the Alaska
Fund trustees, who invest in Wall Street, the TVA invests its resources
entirely for local development.
There have been suggestions of creating something similar to the
TVA to deal with rebuilding Louisiana, Mississippi and Texas after the
enormous damage caused by hurricanes in 2005. For example, Senator
Ted Kennedy (D-MA) proposed establishing a Gulf Coast Redevelop-
ment Authority based on the TVA. 550
F. NEW YORK STATE INVESTMENT FUNDS
The State of New York has several public investment funds that
incorporate aspects of Fair Exchange and aspects of the LSIFs.
The New York State Common Retirement Fund (CRF) has $120
billion in assets, overseen by its sole trustee, State Comptroller Alan
Hevesi. The CRF created an in-state private equity investment program
and committed $364 million to eleven private fund managers throughout
the state. The program supplies capital for local businesses and provides
market-rate returns for the pension fund.551 On July 26, 2005, CRF an-
nounced that through one of its private equity funds it had invested $2.1
549 Mondragon is a cooperative community in Spain that has created and operates over
100 cooperative industrial businesses over the past forty years that now operate an external
corporation. They created a community bank that enabled their phenomenal growth. Mon-
dragon is likely one of the models considered by those who created the LSIFs. See RACE
MArHEWS, JOBS OF OUR OWN: BUILDING A STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY 240-44 (Pluto Press
1999), See generally WILLIAM FOOTE WHYTE & KATHLEEN KING WHYTE, MAKING OF MON-
DRAGON: Tim GROWTH AND DYNAMICS OF THE WORKER'S COOPERATIVE COMPLEX (ILR Press
1988) (analyzes the unexpected success the worker cooperative of Mondragon and its demon-
strated capacity for economic growth and long term survival).
550 WSVN-TV and Associated Press, "Rebuilding Gulf Coast after Katrina most expen-
sive U.S. reconstruction project to date", at http://wwwl.wsvn.com/news/articles/national/
MIA7332.
551 Press Release, Alan G. Hevesi, New York State Comptroller, To Announce Invest-
ment in Binghamton Firm Knovel Corp. to Use Funds to Create 30 Jobs in Binghamton, Nor-
wich and New York City (July 26, 2005), at http://www.osc.state.ny.us/press/releases/ju05/
072605a.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2005).
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million in Knovel Corporation, a provider of online information services
for scientists and engineers. The company plans to create thirty new jobs
between 2005 and 2008.552 The advantage of this arrangement as com-
pared to tax abatements with job promises is that even if all the jobs do
not materialize in New York State, the CRF will benefit from the success
of this company. If Knovel is a smashing success, the CRF will see sig-
nificant upside benefit on its investment, and the State of New York may
obtain more than thirty jobs. In this instance, the public's money is being
invested for a true market type of Fair Exchange. Although $364 million
is a small fraction of the $120 billion fund, it would be imprudent for a
large portion of the pension fund to be invested in such venture capital
schemes.
New York also has a Small Business Technology Investment Fund
(SBTIF).553 SBTIF makes early-stage equity and debt investments in
technology-based companies in New York State. The companies must
have innovative products that materially advance technology. and provide
the state and local communities with an economic benefit. Established in
1981 with federal and state funds, the total capitalization of SBTIF from
1981 to1995 was $15.3 million. It approved over 130 investments, closed
110, and 38 remain active. Using funds acquired from returns on its eq-
uity investments the Fund had $40 million invested in 2005. Since
1981,it has created more than 2,500 jobs, with an average salary of
$60,000. SBTIF achieved evergreen status in 1995, with all expenses
being paid by the Fund since 1990. Therefore, the Fund currently oper-
ates at no expense to taxpayers. Similar funds include Connecticut Inno-
vations, the Ben Franklin Fund of Pennsylvania, and U.S. government-
funded research and development initiatives.554
These New York funds demonstrate pro-active fair exchange invest-
ments, where the government gets an upside reward for taking risks and
reinvests those funds to create additional jobs and economic activity.
These models are likely easier to replicate than the LSIF or Alaska mod-
els. However, the government ownership aspect of the New York funds
may be more politically acceptable in liberal New York than in other
states. For other states, models, such as the Alaska Permanent Fund, that
provide direct payback to citizens may be more politically viable.
552 Id.
553 Presentation by Jack VanWie, retired Executive Director, Small Business Technology
Investment Fund (SBTIF) (taken from a PowerPoint presentation created by Jack VanWie for
a Fair Exchange conference held on Oct. 7, 2005).
554 Id.
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G. COMMUNITY LAND TRUSTS (CLT)
1. What is a CLT?
A community land trust (CLT) is a private non-profit corporation
created to acquire and hold land for the benefit of a community. CLTs
are commonly used by community development organizations to provide
secure affordable access to land and housing for community residents. 555
Environmental groups commonly use CLTs to obtain land and preserve it
in its natural state or to gain significant leverage in negotiations with
governments or developers concerning contiguous developments.
Although different communities use them for different purposes, the
E.F. Schumacher Society, which provides technical assistance in creating
CLTs, defines a CLT as a form of common land ownership with a charter
based on the principles of sustainable and ecologically sound steward-
ship and use. A democratically governed group holds the land in a CLT
in trust, while individuals own the buildings and the improvements cre-
ated by their own labor and investment. Through an inheritable and re-
newable 99-year lease, the trust removes land from the speculative
market and facilitates multiple uses such as affordable housing, agricul-
ture, and open space preservation. 55 6
For example the Institute for Community Economics (ICE) uses
CLTs to:
attempt to meet the needs of residents least served by the
prevailing market. Community land trusts help commu-
nities to: gain control over local land use and reduce ab-
sentee ownership; provide affordable housing for lower
income residents in the community; promote resident
ownership and control of housing; keep housing afforda-
ble for future residents; capture the value of public in-
vestment for long-term community benefit; and build a
strong base for community action. 557
ICE's model CLT provides affordable housing by allowing the
homeowner to purchase a home on land leased from the CLT. The 99-
year renewable lease permits the homeowner and his descendents to live
there for as long as they wish. However, when homeowners want to sell,
the land lease requires them to sell back to the CLT or to another low-
income household at an affordable price. 558
555 Institute for Community Economics web site www.iceclt.org.clt (last visited 3/28/05).
556 E.F. Schumacher Society web site; http://www.schumachersociety.org/framesetland.
html (found 3/28/05).
557 Institute for Community Economics web site www.iceclt.org.clt (last visited 3/28/05).
558 Id.
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The ICE model is a membership organization with two classes of
voting members. One group is composed of people who live in the
homes or use the land in other ways, such as for agriculture. The other
group is made up of other community members or organizations inter-
ested in perpetuating the CLT's goal. Usually a CLT board has three
types of members: representatives of the land users, representatives of
the non-resident members, and representatives of the broader community
interest.5 59
If the founding organization is a community development corpora-
tion, it may fill the role of non-resident members and have a strong voice
in filling the broader community interest seats. For example, the
Cowichan Community Land Trust Society objective is: "In the face of
increasing pressure on land, CCLT is committed to conserving, protect-
ing, and enhancing the quality of the human and natural environment in
and near the Cowichan Valley Regional District, British Columbia, Ca-
nada.' ' 560 To accomplish this objective, CCLT works with other groups
and with government, educates people in the community, provides assis-
tance and guidance to landowners, promotes a cooperative approach to
conservation, protects critical land, and holds conservation covenants. 56'
2. Lessons from CLTs for Fair Exchange
CLTs are private non-profit undertakings. Similar to cooperatives or
charitable non-profits, CLTs are private entities financed by their or-
ganizers, private donors, or foundations. Unlike most of the examples
described above, they generally have no direct connection to a govern-
ment. They benefit Fair Exchange programs as examples of long-term
structures that balance diverse interests in shared property.
CLTs governance structure achieves an important balance between
the needs of individuals and the community. Fair Exchange programs
will need to develop long-term structures that balance the needs of indi-
viduals, business, community, and government.
H. RELATIONSHIP OF PRECEDENTS TO FAIR EXCHANGE MODELS
At least three aspects should be considered when evaluating Fair
Exchange precedents and considering potential models: 1) acquisition, 2)
distribution, and 3) governance. Acquisition is the means used by the
community to obtain ownership interests in the businesses it aids. Distri-
bution is the mechanism used to allocate assets to citizens, either jointly
or severally. Governance describes how a board of directors, represent-
559 Id.
560 Cowichan Community Land Trust Society web site, http://www.island.net/-cclt/what
wedo.htm (last visited 3/28/05).
561 Id.
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ing the citizens, asserts its ownership prerogatives. The historical exam-
ples above were provided as working models of some Fair Exchange
features in the following categories.
Acquisition examples include: TVA, Lockheed, Conrail, Alaska
Permanent Fund, Alberta Heritage Fund, Chrysler and the Airline Stabi-
lization Act. The last four provide the best examples of a fair exchange
acquisition.
Distribution examples include: the Homestead Act Alaska Perma-
nent Fund, Canadian LSIFs, and community land trusts. I favor some
combination of the Alaska Permanent Fund and the LSIF models for
distribution.
Governance in Fair Exchange trusts will likely require use of fea-
tures of the Airline Stabilization Act, the Alaska Permanent Fund, the
Labor Sponsored Investment Funds, community land trusts, and possibly
the TVA.
Negotiation of a Fair Exchange agreement will require a standard
system for quantifying those community benefits that cannot easily be
monetized.
IV. FAIR EXCHANGE MODELS
The following models are not complete pieces of legislation. They
are frameworks developed in response to requests from interested legis-
lators. In a number of places I provide a note suggesting some alterna-
tives that are not detailed, but generally refer back to one of the examples
described in the sections above.
A. INTERNATIONAL TRADE RULES
The following federal legislation would also make sense as a re-
quirement in international agreements, or at least as an exemption from
rules that prevent communities from giving preference to local busi-
nesses. This paper was funded by a source focused solely on the United
States. However, Kenneth Thomas, an expert on international trade
agreements, reviewed the Fair Exchange proposals herein and concluded
that they would not violate the World Trade Organization's Agreement
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. Furthermore, Fair Exchanges
would likely pass the European Union rules for government subsidies to
businesses under the Treaty of Rome because they are structured like
market transactions. 562
562 Kenneth Thomas, Fair Exchange at the National and International Level (October 14,
2005) (post - Fair Exchange Confemce paper) available at http://www.capitalownership.org.
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B. FEDERAL LEGISLATION TO LEVEL THE PLAYING FIELD BETWEEN
STATES AND COMMUNITIES
Federal legislation designed to level the playing field between com-
munities and raise the floor in negotiations with businesses would require
that any community desiring federal transportation fund (or anything else
Congress could agree upon that every local government needs) payments
comply with the following:
Section 1. Enact and enforce legislation requiring that in exchange
for any government investment in a private business, the citizens shall
receive equity in exchange or obtain a community benefit contract
backed by securities (in the form of stock, warrants or property liens)
equivalent to the value of the government investment. A portion of the
interest or dividends from these securities shall be used to supply the
residents of the taxing entity with a stream of income or other direct
benefit(s); a portion of the income shall be used to inflation proof the
fund; and a portion may be used for any public purpose approved by the
community trust which may include contribution to the local govern-
ment. The principal shall be held or reinvested by a community trust to
provide for the "long-term benefit of the community and all its citizens"
as defined in the community trust agreement. (NOTE: This language
should be broad enough to allow experiments with a variety of the posi-
tive examples described in Sections H and III above.)
C. FEDERAL "SAFE HARBOR" MODEL FOR LOCAL LAWS
The following could be a safe harbor model for communities to use
if Section 1 above were enacted:
"Whenever a Government invests in a private Benefited Business
Entity (Company) by providing it with special benefits not given to all
taxpayers in the ordinary course (hereinafter "Government Investment"),
the business shall provide a quid pro quo at fair market value to the
Commonweal.
"Benefited Business Entity" means a for-profit enterprise in
whatever form it is organized (hereinafter referred to as "Company" but
not limited to enterprises organized in the corporate form).
"Government Investment" means any tax deduction, abatement,
grant, government subsidized or guaranteed loan, license (e.g. banking
and broadcasting), lease, concession, or contract, preparing and/or pro-
viding parcels of land, government contracts, and favorable utility rates,
use of non-renewable resources, etc. or any other thing of value for
which less than a market price is paid to the Community;
"Quid pro quo" means an amount equivalent to the Government
Investment in corporate common stock or preferred stock or stock war-
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rants convertible into such common stock if the Company is a stock com-
pany, or its equivalent in cash), or similar ownership rights in any other
business form (hereinafter collectively referred to generally as "Com-
pany Stock") in the Company. Said Company Stock shall have the great-
est voting and dividend rights of any other class of Company Stock
owned by the Company. For liability reasons, a community trust may
prefer to refrain from becoming partners or LLC members with a com-
pany, and instead obtain escrow or bonds.
"Commonweal" means: (NOTE: Defining and structuring the
"Commonweal" or "Community Trust" is the most challenging aspect of
developing a Fair Exchange law.) Here the community must decide upon
a private, public or quasi-public entity that meets specific tests of bona
fide interest in protecting the long-term economic, social, ecological
and/or cultural interests of the local citizens. This might be the govern-
ment giving the tax break. Or the community may wish to use as a model
such statements of principals or objectives as the Canadian Alliance
LSIFs' Statement of Alliance Principles, the language defining the
Alaska Permanent Fund, the Alberta Heritage Fund or the TVA (all de-
scribed previously in this article) or some combination or variation of
these.
This is also the place where the community must designate its
"well-informed-citizen-surrogate" whether that be a set of trustees ap-
pointed by one or more elected leaders as in Alaska; a labor state or
provincial labor federation, as in the Alliance LSIFs; a major coopera-
tive federation, or a multi-party body such as the Conrail USRA struc-
ture or leave that function to the local government as they did in Alberta.
The Commonweal or Community Trust shall provide benefits to the
community generally, and (if the community so chooses) to all citizens
individually as follows. (Note: Here choices must be made regarding
what kinds of individual and community benefits will be provided, for
example:
a) on individual benefits (if they are to be provided): 1)
dividends, savings or equity accounts for individual
citizens with 2) the ability for individuals to withdraw
and use the funds (for limited purposes such as for
home mortgages, tuition, licensed childcare for chil-
dren of working or studying parents, retirement, etc.);
and 3) the ability (or not) to vote for some of the
trust's leadership; and
b) on community benefits whether to follow: 1) the so-
cial investment model of the LSIFs; 2) the endow-
ment fund model of the Alaska fund; 3) a mixed
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model - such as that used in Alberta; or 4) to try
something based on the TVA model.)
Community Benefit Agreement language such as that used in the
State Statutory Model below might be appropriate as a safe harbor as
well.
D. MODEL FOR INVESTMENT OF FEDERAL FUNDS IN BUSINESSES: THE
FAIR EXCHANGE INVESTMENT AND TAXPAYER PROTECTION ACT
(FAIR EXCHANGE ACT) OF 2005 DRAFT, ("FAIR EXCHANGE
ACT")
In summary, the sample Fair Exchange Act language below pro-
vides the following.
1) It creates a government board to negotiate and obtain equity in ex-
change for government subsidies to business, with a 5-member Fed-
eral Equity Exchange Board ("Equity Board") appointed by the
President and approved by the Senate.
2) The Board must include at least one representative from organized
labor, one from a community development financial institution, one
from a majority employee owned company; and one with substantial
experience investing assets for public benefit or a broad based pen-
sion plan.
3) The fund equity is allocated equally between and managed by two
bodies, the Fair Exchange ESOP (Fair Exchange ESOP), and the Fair
Exchange Community Trust (Community Trust).
a) One half of the Fair Exchange ESOP assets are allocated to indi-
vidual accounts for the Company's employees the ability for indi-
viduals to withdraw and use the funds (available to them for
limited purposes such as for home mortgages, tuition, licensed
childcare for children of working or studying parents, retirement,
etc.); and they elect the Fair Exchange ESOP Trustee.
b) The other half of the Fair Exchange ESOP's stock goes to the Fair
Exchange ESOP Joint Trust. The Fair Exchange ESOP Joint Trust
holds its stock in a single account to be used for the benefit of
current and future employees and the community. It is patient cap-
ital that sustains the enterprise and community but does not belong
to any individual. Its trustees are elected 1/3 each by shareholders,
employees and community representatives. The community repre-
sentatives are nominated by shareholders and elected by company
employees.
The Fair Exchange Community Trust (Community Trust) is a non-
profit entity whose board is appointed by the Equity Board. It decides
how to allocate its half of the stock between individual and community
needs and future security within certain parameters. It is the body
FAIR EXCHANGE
charged with being the LSIF- type board or Alaska Permanent Fund-
type trustees.) Figure 6 (below) is a diagram of the trusts created under
the Fair Exchange Act, the trustee appointments and uses of funds.
FIGURE 6. FAIR EXCHANGE TAXPAYER INVESTMENT
PROTECTION ACT OF 2005
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FAIR EXCHANGE ACT ARTICLE I - PREAMBLE
Whereas, this Government has made loans, loan guarantees and pro-
vided other investments to private businesses since early in our history,
including most railroad companies, most airlines, Chrysler, Lockheed,
the savings and loan industry; and others, and
Whereas, there is no reason to believe such investments will not be
sought again and again from Congress; and
Whereas, due to the increase in foreign competition in many sectors
of the U.S. economy, it is reasonable to anticipate that many more busi-
nesses will seek investment from the US government in the form of
grants, loans and loan guarantees, to handle the damages and risks of this
new situation; and
Whereas many of the firms seeking assistance own or operate assets
both within and outside the United States; and
Whereas there has been a trend of U.S. companies outsourcing
much of their work outside the U.S., and
Whereas, many individual taxpayers are also harmed by loss of em-
ployment due to the circumstances that cause companies to seek govern-
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ment grants, loans and/or loan guarantees, tax abatements, favorable
licenses, etc. (hereinafter referred to as "Government Investment"), and
Whereas, corporations, unlike individuals, may be legal persons, but
do not hold citizenship in any country; and
Whereas, the primary purpose of the government is to protect had
defend the rights of its citizens to life, liberty, property and the pursuit of
happiness.
(NOTE: Much of the following language is based on the Air Trans-
portation Safety and Stabilization Act, which was discussed above in the
section on the airline bailout.)
FAIR EXCHANGE ACT ARTICLE II - CREATING THE FEDERAL EQUITY
EXCHANGE BOARD
IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED that the Congress of the United States
shall require in exchange for any grants, loans or loan guarantees made
for or on behalf of any for-profit business entity (hereinafter " the Busi-
ness") by the United States Government or any of its agencies (hereinaf-
ter "the Government"), the Federal Equity Exchange Board (hereinafter
"Equity Board") shall obtain contracts under which the Government, the
Business's employees and all current U.S. taxpayers shall participate in
gain of the participating Business and/or its security holders through use
of common or preferred stock and instruments such as warrants and
stock options or other appropriate equity instruments.
A) The Equity Board's purpose is to utilize the lending capacity of the
federal government to accomplish and balance four goals:
1) Broadly distribute "meaningful ownership" among U.S. citizens
in the same way that the Homestead Act of the 1862 made many
citizens landowners and that ESOPs make employees owners;
2) While lending and making loan guarantees to stabilize US busi-
nesses and the U.S. economy;
3) Create a non-wage stream of income or savings for all U.S. citi-
zens available for individuals to withdraw and use the funds (for
limited purposes such as for home mortgages, tuition, licensed
childcare for children of working or studying parents, retirement,
etc.); and
4) Make investment decisions and exercise any securities voting
rights on behalf of the greatest good of the greatest number of
U.S. citizens considering their need for strong sustainable com-
munities, jobs, income, health, safety, education, a clean environ-
ment, and retirement security.
B) The Equity Board shall include five members appointed by the Presi-
dent with the advice and consent of the Senate. However, there must
be at least one each from a community development financial institu-
FAIR EXCHANGE
tion, one from a national labor federation, one from a majority em-
ployee owned business and one with substantial experience investing
assets for public benefit or a broad based pension plan.
In carrying out the goals stated in Section 1 (above), the Equity
Board may create revolving loan funds to further enable employee or
community ownership programs with repaid loan funds.
C) "Meaningful ownership" shall be interpreted by the Equity Board,
but shall include both voting and property rights.
FAIR EXCHANGE ACT ARTICLE III - POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE
EQUITY BOARD, FESSOP AND FAIR EXCHANGE COMMUNITY TRUST
A) The Equity Board shall obtain contracts under which the Govern-
ment, the Business's employees and all current U.S. taxpayers shall
participate in gain of the participating Business and/or its security
holders through use of common or preferred stock and instruments
such as warrants and stock options or other appropriate equity instru-
ments as follows:
1) In exchange for any direct grant of funds to the Business, the
Business shall provide stock (or its equivalent in a non-stock busi-
ness) meeting all the requirements of IRC Sec.409 (a) (with the
exceptions noted in paragraph 2 below) and shall contribute quali-
fying employer securities, as defined in IRC Sec.4975 (e)(7) and
(8), with fair market value, as defined in ERISA 29 USC Sec.
1108(e) equivalent to the value of the grant made, which shall be
divided equally between:
a) a Fair Exchange ESOP, defined in Section A (2) below (here-
inafter "Fair Exchange Fair Exchange ESOP") and
b) a Fair Exchange Community Trust (hereinafter "Community
Trust"), defined in Section A (4) below.
2) The Business shall create a qualified Fair Exchange ESOP that
shall be:
a) An employee stock ownership plan meeting the all the require-
ments of IRC Sec.409 (a) (with the exceptions noted in para-
graph 2(b) below) and shall contribute qualifying employer
securities, as defined in IRC Sec.4975 (e)(7) and (8), with fair
market value, as defined in ERISA 29 USC Sec. 1108(e)
equivalent to 50% of the value of the grant made.
b) A qualified Fair Exchange ESOP shall include the following
features in addition to the requirements noted in paragraph
2(a) above, and (where these conflict with IRC Sec. 409(a),
the requirements of this paragraph shall take precedence).
These requirements include:
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i. The majority of the Trustees of the Fair Exchange ESOP
shall be elected on a one vote per person basis by the Fair
Exchange ESOP participants, pursuant to procedures and
regulations established by the Equity Board.
ii. Allocations to the individual accounts of individual par-
ticipants in a Fair Exchange ESOP shall be made from one
half of the contributed stock;
iii. The other half of the stock contributed to the Fair Ex-
change ESOP shall be allocated to the "Fair Exchange
ESOP Joint Trust". The Fair Exchange ESOP Joint Trust
shall hold its interest in the Fair Exchange ESOP stock for
the benefit of current and future employees and the local
community. Its Trustees shall be elected as follows: 1/3 by
shareholders; 1/3 by the employees on a one vote per per-
son basis; and 1/3 shall be comprised of representatives of
local governmental, civic or non-profit organizations (lo-
cated in communities where the Business has facilities)
nominated by the shareholders and approved by vote of
the employees on a one vote per person basis.
3) The Equity Board shall create a qualified Fair Exchange Commu-
nity Trust (Community Trust) to which the Business will give the
remaining 50% of the stock or equivalent required in Section a
(1)(b) above.
4) A Community Trust shall be a non-profit agency with a board
appointed by the Equity Board. Its board shall include an equal
number of representatives from labor, community development fi-
nancial institutions and government and at least one member with
substantial experience investing assets for public benefit or a
broad based pension plan.
The Community Trust is empowered to:
a. Create individual accounts to annually allocate the equity or its
income equally to each person who that year qualifies as a citizen
of the U.S.; or
b. Create a community reinvestment plan to use the equity or its
income for projects that serve all the citizens of the U.S.; or
c. Create some combination of the individual accounts and commu-
nity reinvestment plan described above;
d. Use its best efforts to create an inflation-proofing mechanism to
provide a stream of income for future citizens as well as current
citizens.
FAIR EXCHANGE
E. STATE STATUTORY LANGUAGE EXAMPLE
There is not a single model for Fair Exchange; it is a concept in
need of pilot projects. Therefore, this single state model is not intended
to be the primary state or local model, but rather one example of apply-
ing the information garnered from this article to create a model fitting a
particular legislator's purposes.
The following proposal was drafted at the request of a legislative
staff person. She requested a non-mandatory Fair Exchange mechanism
that would enable smaller communities that lack deep financial resources
to negotiate community benefit agreements and manage community
trusts. A large city would probably want to create and control its own
trust. A state law concerning investment of state funds might look more
similar to the proposed Fair Exchange Act model for federal funds.
Creating a system that is socially useful and economically fair from
our current system of government subsidies is a complex process. The
new system will need well-considered legal and administrative struc-
tures. Successful Fair Exchange laws will require a strong and focused
technical assistance capacity. Distressed communities and states are
probably not well suited to a mandatory fair exchange policy because of
the level of risk in their deals and the scarcity of potential investors.
However, even in those locations, a non-mandatory fair exchange policy
might be useful. There may be deals where the private investor would be
willing, or the public entity would have the ability, to make a larger in-
vestment if a fair exchange contract were in place. In those cases, it may
be useful to have legislation providing the format for a community bene-
fit agreement and a state agency able to provide technical assistance or
oversight that is beyond the resources of small communities (discussed
further in Section V(A) below).
In summary, the sample language below: 1) creates a trustee in the
state treasurer's office who can hold stock, warrants, other securities or
escrow funds negotiated in a Community Benefit Agreement, and paid
for our of the trusts it manages; 2) defines a Securitized Community Ben-
efit Agreement as a contract between a community, a business receiving
special government benefits and a community trust organization in which
the business promises to provide very specific benefits to the community
in exchange for its investment in the Company; 3) requires the parties to
agree on metrics to measure performance of these promises and firm
dates by which performance is required; and 4) provides that to the ex-
tent full performance is not timely performed, a corollary percent of the
security becomes permanently vested in the community trust. (See Figure
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FIGURE 7. STATE (TRUST OFFICE) FAIR EXCHANGE MODEL
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EXAMPLE:
Whereas, this State Government and local governments within the
State have made loans, loan guarantees and provided other investments
to private businesses in the past and are likely to in the future, and
Whereas many of the firms seeking assistance own or operate assets
both within and outside the State; and
Whereas there has been a trend of U.S. companies outsourcing
much of their work outside the U.S., and
Whereas, many individual taxpayers are also harmed by loss of em-
ployment due to the circumstances that cause companies to seek govern-
ment grants, loans and/or loan guarantees, tax abatements, favorable
licenses, etc. (hereinafter referred to as "government largesse"), and
Whereas, corporations, unlike individuals, may be legal persons, but
are not citizens; and
Whereas, the primary purpose of the government is to protect and
defend the rights of its citizens to life, liberty, property and the pursuit of
happiness:
NOW THEREFORE, the State of hereby creates a struc-
ture enabling the State and local governments to enter into community
benefit agreements with businesses. It provides a State trustee to hold
collateral or escrow from companies for communities derived from com-
munity benefit agreements. Nothing herein shall prevent a local govern-
ment from creating its own community trust to hold and manage such
assets, nor require that the State trustee hold such assets. The trust struc-
ture is intended to provide cost savings and enhance expertise by pooling
trustee services for interested communities. The trustee services will be
FAIR EXCHANGE
paid on a fee for service basis by the trusts utilizing it. The trustee dis-
perses the funds at the direction of the community government for any of
the permitted purposes.
a. The State of hereby creates a statewide community
trust office in the State Department of Treasury, "
Community Trust Office" ("Trust Office"), which shall adminis-
ter assets obtained as security for Community Benefit Agree-
ments (CBAs).
b. Any "Community," defined in Sec.(c) below, may enter into a
"Securitized Community Benefit Agreement" ("Securitized
CBA"), defined in Sec.(c) below, with a "Business", defined in
Sec.(c) below. Any Securitized CBA which meets the require-
ments of this statute may, upon community request, be adminis-
tered by the Trust Office in cooperation with the local
Community as provided in this statute.
c. When a "Community" (NOTE: as defined in whatever section of
Code defines all boards of directors for governments
in _from the state on down to the township and school
authority - citation to be added) invests in a private business
(hereinafter "Business") by providing it with special benefits not
given to all taxpayers in the ordinary course (hereinafter "Gov-
ernment Investment"), such as a tax abatement, a gift of land or
any other thing of value for which less than a market price is paid
to the Community; the Community may enter into a securitized
Community Benefit Agreement (Securitized CBA) defined as:
"A contract between a Community granting Govern-
ment Investment and the Business ("Company") may
include a "Securitized CBA Security" to insure that
the Community shall receive fair value in exchange
for the 'Government Investment'.
d. The Trust Office shall hold the Securitized CBA Security in trust
for the Community in accordance with the terms of the Securi-
tized CBA.
e. Every Security Agreement shall have one Maturity Date or series
of Maturity Dates. The Securitized CBA may state specific non-
Securitized CBA "Promised Benefits" (Company Promised Ben-
efits) to be provided to the Community by the Company by no
later than the Maturity Date(s) specified in the Securitized CBA;
f. The Securitized CBA shall include metrics (meeting the require-
ments of Trust Office regulations to be promulgated) to quantify
the Government Investments and any Company Promised Bene-
fits enumerated in the Securitized CBA to enable both parties to
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measure partial and complete Company Promised Benefits
performance;
g. Upon the Maturity Date the Securitized CBA Security shall ma-
ture. For any portion of Company Promised Benefits not per-
formed by the Maturity Date, that portion of the Securitized
CBA Security shall become the inalienable property of the Trust
Office for the benefit of the Community
h. Unless another type of Securitized CBA Security (meeting re-
quirements of Trust Office regulations to be promulgated) is mu-
tually agreed upon by the parties, the Securitized CBA Security
shall be corporate common stock (if the Company is a stock
company), or similar ownership rights in any other business form
(hereinafter collectively referred to generally as " Securitized
CBA Stock" in the Company with the greatest voting and divi-
dend rights or preferred stock convertible into such common
stock or its equivalent in cash. For liability reasons, a community
trust may prefer to refrain from becoming partners or LLC mem-
bers with a company, and instead obtain escrow or bonds.
i. The Securitized CBA shall provide that no later than the closing
date of the Government Investment transaction, the Company is-
sue Securitized CBA Security warrants in the name of the Trust
Office for the benefit of the Community. Said warrants shall ma-
ture on the Maturity Date(s) in the total amount of the Govern-
ment Investment less the value of the Company Promised
Benefits (as measured by the agreed upon metric described in
Sec. (f) above) as of the relevant Maturity Date
j. The matured warrants shall then be retained or sold by the Trust
Office as directed by the Community government. A Community
may direct the Trust Office to use the dividends and/or proceeds
from sale of the Securitized CBA Stock for any of the following
within the Community's jurisdiction (as instructed by the Com-
munity governing Board of Directors): utility subsidy to every
Community ratepayer; public parks, public schools, public safety,
fire protection, environmental clean-up, arts & culture or savings
funds for every citizen which may be withdrawn without penalty
for tuition, licensed child care for children of working or studying
parents, home purchase, local business investment (to be further
defined), retirement or health care.
Any voting Securitized CBA Stock retained by Trust Office pursu-
ant to Community instructions shall be voted as instructed by the Com-
munity governing board.
FAIR EXCHANGE
F. FAIR EXCHANGE ADDS SELF-ENFORCEMENT FEATURE TO
COMMUNITY BENEFIT AGREEMENTS
Note that the state model, with the community benefit agreement
(above), unlike the other models, does not require that the business give
up any equity permanently as an upside for risk. This model is designed
for those situations where the community is more interested in getting
other benefits such as jobs with health insurance, than it is in getting an
equity investment. The new feature this state Fair Exchange model adds
to community benefit agreements is self-enforcement. Unlike a typical
contract or a state clawback law, which courts would need to enforce,
the equity collateral or escrow is in the hands of the community trust
when the subsidy deal closes. 563 Non-compliance by the business trig-
gers maturity of the warrants, and the community trust owns stock or
retrieves the escrow. Such escrows are fairly standard in substantial busi-
ness contracts.
V. ISSUES CONFRONTING POTENTIAL FAIR
EXCHANGE LEGISLATION
A. THE BENEFITS OF MANDATORY FEDERAL LEGISLATION
Given the competition for the location of new business facilities
among local governments, mandatory federal legislation is the best op-
tion for fair exchange programs. One of the most difficult obstacles to
implementing a Fair Exchange proposal is the competition between com-
munities when companies are seeking locations for new facilities and
jobs.564 There are many examples of companies asking communities to
make bids for a plant, and significant examples where the community
paid for far more than it received.5 65 Many local leaders and politicians
see the logic of the Fair Exchange idea, but believe it is politically im-
possible to create any such obstacles to potential new jobs in their com-
munities. This way of thinking has led to ever-larger public incentives
and investments in private businesses, without protection.
The fact that the U.S. government required, received and made a
profit on its Chrysler stock warrants is not widely known. 566 Even more
obscure is the fact that every loan and loan guarantee given by the Air-
line Stabilization Board required and received stock warrants. 567 These
563 LERoY, supra note 1, at 43-54.
564 See id.
565 See id. at 4-5.
566 See supra Part I(F) discussing 1979 Chrysler Corporation Loan Guarantee Act.
567 Testimony of Michael Kestenbaum, Executive Director of the Air Transportation Sta-
bilization Board before the Subcommittee on Aviation United States House of Representatives,
June 3, 2004 at 2.
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are clear federal precedents. Furthermore, in a report by the (GAO), 568
one of the key recommendations is for the government to get potential
"upside" benefits should it decide to make such an investment again.
With the change of a few words, the language of the ASTSSA could be
amended to require equity in any situation where the federal government
makes a loan or loan guarantee or other such investment. It need not be
limited to airlines. 569 The FEITPA 2005 model above is based on ex-
isting ASTSSA and ESOP laws.
A solution to the competition problem between states and local gov-
ernment would be federal legislation that required, as a condition of re-
ceiving federal transportation or other development funds, that any
special government benefits to private businesses would have to be sub-
ject to a fair exchange community benefit agreement created under a lo-
cal or state fair exchange law. Such laws would need to permit
enforcement by "affected parties" or a federal agency in order to avoid
evasion of the law through sweetheart deals between local politicians and
businesses. The "Federal legislation to level the playing field between
states and communities" in the above "Fair Exchange Models" section is
designed to address this problem.
B. GETTING INITIAL LEGISLATION PASSED ARGUES FOR OPTIONAL AND
LOCAL
LSIF is private and voluntary. No individual has to put his money
into it. The government makes no direct contributions with tax funds,
except to provide tax exemptions for contributions by individuals.
The state statutory language example above is optional, local legis-
lation. The legislative aide who requested it believes that the easiest way
to get actual Fair Exchange laws enacted is to start small, with optional
laws, and strengthen them over time as they become better known and
accepted.
Communities and states that are most likely to be successful early
adopters of FE, are those fast-growing, attractive communities that have
sufficient demand and thus market leverage to reject subsidy seekers.
Possible examples include the communities to which initially Manhattan-
based businesses have been moving since 9/11, such as Stamford, CT or
Jersey City; or states with increasing populations like California.
568 Comptroller General of the United States, Report to Congress: Guidelines for Rescu-
ing Large Failing Firms and Municipalities, GAO/GGD 84-34, (1984), 17-18.
569 Compare the language in the "Model for investment of federal funds in businesses:
The Fair Exchange Investment and Taxpayer Protection Act of 2005" with ATSSSA 115 Stat.
230, 49 U.S.C. 40101 Sections 102 (b) and (d).
FAIR EXCHANGE
Due to competition between communities for job location, commu-
nities with less market leverage (such as the rust belt states) may seek or
wait for federal legislation to level the playing field.
C. FORM OF FAIR EXCHANGE
Many communities negotiating with businesses over development
funds are more interested in immediate benefits such as jobs, than in
ownership of stock, which may be volatile or not readily marketable. Use
of stock warrants as collateral to ensure performance of other types of
promises enables FE to be incorporated in a broad array of community
benefit agreements. "State Statutory Language Example" above ad-
dresses this problem.
Prof. Lawrence Mitchell noted that the complexity of the FE could
make it quite difficult to get legislation enacted. He suggested that a Fair
Exchange Commission, like the Securities and Exchange Commission,
could be created. The law would provide a set of general principles and
rules and allow the Commission rulemaking authority to deal with the
myriad details. 570
D. TYPES OF GOVERNMENT LARGESSE FOR WHICH TO REQUIRE FE
Certain forms of special government benefits to companies are ob-
vious candidates for FE rules, for example tax abatements, royalties for
use of natural resources, grazing rights, pollution permits, grants of cash
or land and loan guarantees to create jobs. One area where FE require-
ments might generate less of the necessary public good are loan subsidies
to create low-income housing. Here, the government might be trading
needed new housing stock for equity. Yet even in the housing programs
there may be room for more FE. There are housing subsidy programs in
which the developers are only required to make the units available at a
subsidized rate for a specified period. One should consider whether, at
the point the subsidies end, the government or a community land trust
should have a first right of refusal to buy those assets to retain their
subsidized character, and to be credited in the purchase with some of the
financial benefit gained by the developer.
E. COMPOSITION OF THE COMMUNITY TRUST TO ADMINISTER THE
FAIR EXCHANGE ASSETS
As the historical examples above show it is tough to find the right
combination to protect the interests of the government, individual citi-
zens as employees, job seekers, investors and neighbors to the develop-
570 Professor Lawrence Mitchellz oral presentation at the COG Fair Exchange Confer-
ence, George Washington University Law School (Oct. 7, 2005).
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ment. The examples in the above "Fair Exchange Models" section are an
attempt to synthesize some of the best qualities of the Alaska Permanent
Fund, the Alberta Heritage Fund and the Labor Sponsored Investment
Funds. In each instance the government body creating the Fair Exchange
system needs to balance its goals on several parameters: 1) economic
development/ social investment (as in the LSIF Alliance Principles) ver-
sus maximizing return on invested capital (as the Alaska Fund does); 2)
payment of normal government expenses to lower taxes, as in Alberta,
versus investment in highly screened local sustainable productive busi-
ness assets such as the Alliance LSIFs, versus maximizing income for
individual citizens (as in Alaska); 3) considering what effect the new
program may have on increasing or decreasing citizens' responsibility
towards the community compared to their personal interests.
Once those decisions have been made it may be easier to determine
who represents the citizens. These may include government appointees
or well-informed-citizen-surrogate representatives from specific interest
groups (unions, community organizations). The board thus created usu-
ally chooses the investment/business professionals for the trust. Yet the
government body creating the program should maintain both financial
and social oversight to ensure the Trust serves the public/citizens' inter-
ests. Alaska solves that problem by requiring its APF Trustees to report
to and have their budget approved by the legislature. In Alberta, the gov-
ernment serves all these functions. At the TVA, the board is appointed by
the U.S. President, can be removed by Congress, and reports to the gov-
ernment, but is otherwise free to run its business. The LSIFs are formed
by the labor federations and choose the financial sources or experts for
their funds. The only government control for LSIFS is deciding whether
to make tax deductions available or not.
F. WILL FAIR EXCHANGE KEEP PRIVATE BUSINESS FROM DOING
BUSINESS WITH GOVERNMENT? AND IF SO, IS THAT BAD?
It is possible that if there were widespread FE legislation, compa-
nies would be less willing to take money from governments, because
they would not want to provide the equity quid pro quo. This could be a
positive development because it would allow communities to preserve or
use their development funds for projects that provided a more obvious
long-lasting benefit to the community. The behavior of Northwest Air-
lines in initially seeking ATSSSA funds, and then dropping its applica-
tion when they understood the equity kicker, is very instructive. The
purpose of most government development incentive funds is to provide
financing truly needed by a company and generally unavailable from the
private sector.
FAIR EXCHANGE
G. WHAT ABOUT COMPANIES THAT HAVE SECURITIES THE TRUST DOES
NOT WANT TO HOLD?
Does every business entity have securities that the Community
Trust wants to or can hold, such as closely held company stock, or part-
nership or limited liability company interests? If the company is worth
giving subsidies to, it should have valuable stock warrants. Remember,
the Chrysler stock warrants were considered almost worthless when the
U.S. government took them, yet they ended up providing over $350 mil-
lion in profit. For liability reasons, a community trust may prefer to re-
frain from becoming partners or LLC members with a company, and
instead obtain escrow or bonds.
Of course if the stock were marketable securities, the trustees could
sell the stock or warrants and use the proceeds to diversify. If there was
no such public market the trust might still take securities, but only after
serious due diligence conducted on its behalf by knowledgeable advisor.
Alternatively, the trust might ask for an escrow account or bonds instead
of equity to collateralize its loan or to insure performance of promises.
The trust could make disbursements upon completion of specific negoti-
ated contract goals. Escrows are commonly used in business contracts,
and may be more palatable than stock warrants or options, especially to
closely held businesses that do not want to risk sharing ownership. Inves-
tors use various types of bonds in cases where equity seems too risky, but
the target company is strong enough to be considered a good credit risk.
H. DEFINING AND MEASURING "COMMUNITY BENEFIT"
There is substantial literature documenting the problem of competi-
tion between communities to provide subsidies to attract company in-
vestments. 571 The parties to such negotiations are not fairly matched. The
investor, seeking the subsidy, operates in an environment of ever more
mobile capital. He works with location consultants who have more con-
solidated information about the subsidies available from various commu-
nities, which is public information. Communities have no way of
knowing what investors may really be looking for and they have no
knowledge of when the next big deal may arise for their community. 572
Community organizations have taken the lead in pushing back un-
fair subsidies by insisting on greater transparency, or repayment of subsi-
dies if businesses renege on promises ("clawback laws"). 573
Community Benefit Agreements (CBAs) are an innovation created
by the Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy (LAANE). A CBA is a
571 See supra note 1.
572 Thomas, supra note 1, at 1-2.
573 LERoY supra note 1, at 43-54.
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contract among a business or developer, a government body, and a com-
munity organization (often working with labor unions). In a CBA, the
business agrees to provide specific benefits, such as creating a certain
number of jobs paying designated fair wages including health insurance
or other such benefits, building and maintaining specific buildings or in-
frastructure, or requiring tenant businesses in a new development to hire
a certain percentage of its employees from the local community. In ex-
change for these benefits, the community organization agrees to support
the developer's proposal and the government gives the developer the
necessary approval and usually tax subsidies, free land or other financial
incentives. 574
The LAANE book on CBAs points out that a heavy emphasis on
monitoring and enforcement in negotiation of CBAs may make them
more difficult to achieve.5 75 A state FE law, such as the state statutory
language example above, could use stock warrants or cash escrow to
make the CBA self-enforcing. Such escrow arrangements are quite stan-
dard in commercial contracts, and may seem more palatable to develop-
ers. Otherwise, a standard contract generally requires enforcement
through litigation or arbitration. But if the government or community
trust received stock warrants or an escrow that automatically matured
upon default by the developer, enforcement would be easier and the
agreements much stronger:
Coordination of government policies is the only logical
way to blunt the dynamic of competition for investment;
the only truly successful (sic example) of this is the Eu-
ropean Union, where favorable basic law (the Treaty of
Rome) and a centralized monitoring and enforcement ca-
pacity have enabled the E.U. to exert some control over
the investment-attraction activities of Member States,
and local governments within its territory. 576
Federal Fair Exchange laws could serve to blunt this dynamic if
localities were required to implement and enforce FE laws in order to
obtain some federal funds, as in the "Federal legislation to level the play-
ing field between states and communities" section above.
In the above sections on LSIF and the Alberta Heritage Fund, we
encountered the problem of measuring community benefits. Melissa
Moye pointed out the disparate cost-benefit analysis paradigms used by
574 Julian Gross, Greg LeRoy and Madeline Janis-Aparicio, Community Benefit Agree-
ments: Making Development Projects Accountable, Good Jobs First and California Subsidy
Project (2002) at 1-2.
575 Id. at 48.
576 Thomas, supra note 1.
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different sets of researchers, 577 and the methods used by Regional Data
Corporation to determine the economic impact of Ontario LSIFs by com-
parison to an extrapolated "but for" reality.5 78 The Alberta Heritage Fund
has either had difficulty quantifying the benefits that went into its invest-
ments in Crown Corporations, development projects and tax reductions,
it was never pressed to do so, or there was negligible benefit; although
major projects employing a substantial number of people were created.
Alberta converted its Fund to be invested as a more traditional endow-
ment to resolve this vagueness and show more concrete results.
If a community seeks to enter into a CBA, the agreement must have
a way to quantify the results so that both parties will know if and when
any automatic enforcement mechanisms will be triggered. The subsidy
and the contract generally lasts for a set term of years, and calls for the
creation of a certain number of jobs at a certain level of quality. Often
these agreements fail to specify the longevity of the jobs.
To date, I have found no agreed-upon methodology and few exam-
ples using measures common to business transactions, such as calculat-
ing the present value of the income stream from a promised job over a
projected number of years of employment. The technical assistance pro-
ject envisioned by Capital Ownership Group will work on this problem
and develop some objective measures. Many state and local governments
lack the expertise to negotiate appropriate equity agreements, so any FE
legislation must address the expertise gap. Here are some examples of
how the parties might quantify the value of various community benefits
using fairly standard business concepts.
1. The value of each job created would be measured by the real
wages, benefits and taxes paid on behalf of each employee in one
of the newly created jobs for the entire term of the subsidy. This
would include any employees replacing those who terminate em-
ployment on the basis that it is a single job slot. Since the sub-
sidy and the employment costs each usually accrue over time,
there would be no need to calculate the present value of either.
2. If one party provides cash, land or other valuable property at
closing, while the other party makes its contribution over time, it
is proper to discount the contribution over time to the present
value at closing.
3. Infrastructure improvements and proposed environmental mitiga-
tion should be valued by getting an independent bid or valuation
for the work as though the municipality were to build it itself.
577 Moye, supra note 543.
578 See Analysis of Fiscal Costs, supra note 460.
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4. The multiplier effect of job creation is an assumption made by an
economist. The parties can consult economics professors to get
proposals for standard assumptions and negotiate an agreed upon
multiplier, such as the University of Toronto model used in the
Ontario LSIF study.579
5. Similarly, the parties may have to agree upon a discount to make
the transaction more attractive to the investor (especially in early
legislation that is non-mandatory and not required under federal
or state legislation). For example, instead of the community re-
ceiving 100% in fair value in exchange for its contribution, a FE
law might provide that 85% was sufficient.
The community needs to be careful to count in the agreement the
value of everything it invests. Tax abatements or subsidies are fairly easy
to calculate in cash. The contract should also include the value of any
physical improvements or special services provided to the company by
the community, such as worker training, staff time seeking grants from
other government or private bodies and locating other resources.
I. COMMUNITY TRUST NETWORK
1. Fiduciary Issues and Voting Clout
Under a FE law, a community trust would begin to own shares in
local companies. If the community trust sees itself as an endowment,
trustees will have fiduciary concerns about holding too much of certain
securities and not enough of others. Diversification of assets is a typical
fiduciary strategy. For example, the Alaska Permanent Fund is required
to invest in a broad range of investments. However, that same diversifi-
cation dilutes the ability of the trust to exert its interest in corporate gov-
ernance as a substantial shareholder in an investee company.
2. Community Trust Network Mutual Fund with Voting
Agreements is a Solution
If federal FE legislation were enacted, then many local community
trusts would be obtaining equity interests in a diverse array of compa-
nies, even though each community might have only a few local compa-
nies' stock in its portfolio. (See Figures 10A and 10B.)
Portfolio diversification could be achieved, while still preserving
voting clout for the local community trusts, by forming a community
trust network. The network would be like a mutual fund. Communities
would trade shares of FE acquired stock into a pool of such stock held by
the network mutual fund. In return they would receive an equivalent dol-
lar value of network mutual fund shares. The local community trust
579 See id. at 11-13.
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would also enter into a voting agreement with the network mutual fund,
as part of this swap. The voting agreement would enable the community
trust to direct the voting in the shares of local companies it contributes to
the mutual fund.
For example, the hypothetical Detroit Community Trust discussed
in the Introduction, Section I A above, could diversify its portfolio by
trading some or all of its $5 million dollars worth of MMM stock to a
national mutual fund of Community Trusts (Community Trusts) for $5
million worth of shares in the mutual fund made up of stock obtained by
all the other Community Trusts. The mutual fund and the Community
Trusts could have voting agreements allowing the Detroit Community
Trust to continue to vote the proxies on all the MMM shares it traded to
the mutual fund.
Efficiency and high quality management would be other advantages
to creating the network and its mutual fund. The larger pooled funds
could employ high quality professional staff to help communities negoti-
ate FE agreements, administer and invest funds, coordinate proxy voting,
and wield more clout in proxy voting.
If thousands of communities had these community trusts, over time
a significant amount of corporate stock would be held by the trusts. If
this stock is voted in conjunction with public and union pension funds
and other socially responsible investment funds, it could have a signifi-
cant impact on corporate behavior.
FIGURE 8A. COMMUNITY TRUST NETWORK AND
MUTUAL FUND
Federal law Example of thousands of FE Trusts:
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FIGURE 8B. DETROIT COMMUNITY TRUST (EXAMPLE)
Detroit Community Trust
Dividend and capital gains
VI. HOW GOVERNMENTS, INTELLECTUALS, COMMUNITY
AND NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS COULD USE
FAIR EXCHANGE
National, state and local governments and global trade organizations
could use Fair Exchange (FE) to obtain revenue without increasing taxes.
They could also create mutual fund networks of community trusts to cre-
ate diversified investments and even voting blocs that may influence cor-
porate behavior. They could use FE to save money when companies
refuse subsidies rather than give up equity; and obtain resources to im-
plement locally focused economic development.
Local governments and community organizations could negotiate
community benefit agreements that include stock warrants as collateral
for promised jobs or other benefits promised to communities in exchange
for subsidies. Community development financial institutions and micro-
lenders could serve as honest brokers to manage FE funds, especially in
countries where a corruption is a major issue. They could be recipients of
a portion of the FE proceeds to loan out as local micro loans. They could
create and administer individual account plans that allocated funds to all
individual citizens.
Socially responsible investment professionals and funds could pro-
vide the expertise required to create and manage the community trust and
mutual fund mechanisms. Upon reinvestment of fund assets, one method
of ensuring community beneficial investment would be to create invest-
ment screens such as those used by socially responsible investment
funds. The negative screens might explicitly prohibit Community Trusts
from investing in companies: 1) that produce alcohol, gambling or weap-
ons; 2) that are on the EPA's 100 top polluters list; or 3) that are on labor
federation boycott lists. Positive screens might give preference to: 1) en-
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ergy star companies; 2) companies engaged in organic agriculture or pro-
ducing products from organics; 3) companies listed as the 100 best
places to work or similar lists; 4) employee owned companies; 5) union-
ized companies; 6) companies that provide good health care and pension
plans for their employees; 7) producers of renewable energy; or 8) ven-
dors of products that enhance energy efficiency. Based on the LSIF expe-
rience, smaller communities should not utilize so many screens.
However, regional or national funds could successfully use such screens.
President Bush has used the term "ownership society" in his cam-
paign to privatize the social security system, although he's been silent on
it in relationship to employee ownership. 580Sympathetic think tanks and
intellectuals could reorient use of the President's term "Ownership Soci-
ety" from his January 2005 State of the Union address, by demonstrating
that FE is the fairest and most business-like method of organizing trans-
actions between governments and businesses while providing citizens a
useful equity stake.
Fair Exchange provides a powerful argument to counter any call for
private equity accounts as part of social security, while emphasizing the
importance of broad equity ownership including FE. I agree with the
major critiques of plans calling for the privatization of social security
plan, including: 1) that it would require major government debt in-
creases; 2) that it encourages individuals to borrow funds to buy stock,
which is margin buying, a practice frowned on by most financial advisors
for average working people; and 3) that there would be a risk of unaf-
fordable loss in retirement benefits. However, there is good reason to
advocate in favor of providing every citizen with a non-wage additional
stream of equity income. A combination of global wage competition and
technological advance may well be decreasing the number of jobs availa-
ble as the population increases, at least in the U.S. According to the Eco-
nomic Policy Institute (EPI) in its State of Working America 2004 -2005,
"From 2000-2003, long-term unemployment increased 198%. For those
with a Bachelor's degree or more, the increase was 299%".58 1 EPI says
that in the previous seven post-World War II recession recoveries, all lost
jobs were recovered within the first 20 months of the recovery, except in
the 1990s recession it took 30 months to reach this break even-point, and
in the current recovery, "39 months after the peak, we are still 1.2 million
jobs short". 582
580 ESOP Report, November 2005 at 1, "Presidential Tax Reform Panel Report Would
Eliminate ESOPs".
581 Press release, Economic Policy Institute, Jobs Fact Sheet for LAWRENCE MISHEL, JA-
RED BERNSTEIN, & SYLVIA ALLEGRETrO, THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA2004/2005, (Sept.
5, 2004) at http://www.epinet.org/books/swa2004/news/swafacts-jobs.pdf.
582 Id.
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Fair Exchange provides a much better source for a second stream of
income unconnected to wages. The current Social Security system could
remain untouched and intact, while citizens got FE equity accounts, as all
Alaskan citizens now have under the Alaska Permanent Fund. Then most
citizens would have some equity ownership, without the government
debt or the individual retirement risk involved in the privatization of so-
cial security.
The Capital Ownership Group (COG) would like to provide techni-
cal assistance to governments at all levels to craft FE models to fit their
circumstances. This would include working with attorneys, bankers, ac-
countants, other professionals and community representatives to devise
model FE legislation, community benefit agreements, FE collateral stock
warrants, metrics for community benefit agreements, and other necessary
FE technology. COG is expanding the research begun in this article by
creating and collecting information on FE examples. It aims to create a
clearinghouse for materials, research, training and/or technical assistance
for all the parties contemplating, developing and managing FE programs.
COG would also be able to assist in the creation of community benefit
agreements using FE concepts.
A. RANGE OF ISSUES, VENUES, AND JURISDICTIONS IN WHICH FE
MIGHT BE USED
1. Voluntary and Local
Without passing any new laws, FE concepts can be incorporated in
voluntary agreements. Currently, some communities require job quality
standards from companies receiving development subsidies. 583 In other
communities, such standards are attained by means of a community ben-
efit agreement among a company, a government board of directors, and a
community organization. 584
2. FCC Licenses: Taxpayers should get part of the profits
generated when private companies use public airwaves
Free distribution of the airwaves may be the most glaring of current
unfair exchanges. The government has given away or sold licenses at
very low prices to media companies. The companies make enormous
profits, and do not provide free access for election purposes. Our politi-
cal system has become corrupted by money because candidates must
raise huge war chests to pay for advertising on the public's airwaves.
583 Anna Purinton, Nasreen Jilani, Kristen Arant & Kate Davis, The Policy Shift to Good
Jobs: Cities, States and Counties Attaching Job Quality Standards to Development Subsidies
(Good Jobs First, Washington D.C.), Nov. 2003, at 1-5.
584 Gross et. al., supra note 574.
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This need not be so. Federal legislation could require FE in all transac-
tions with the federal government as described in the proposed FEITPA
2005 legislative model above. It could extend beyond loans, loan guaran-
tees and tax abatements to the use of collective resources such as the
airwaves. The Media Access Project estimates that the U.S. radio spec-
trum is worth $771 billion.5 85 FCC licenses should require for-profit
companies to pay royalty fees based on the income derived from the use
of this public asset, just as the oil companies pay royalties to the Alaska
Permanent Fund.5 86 Companies could pay some of these royalties in the
form of broadcasting company stock to the relevant community trust,
which could in turn provide citizens with equity and dividends on a per-
centage of profits made from the licenses, and perhaps eventually some
shareholder clout. This royalty structure could go a long way toward pro-
viding public television and election coverage, as well as improvements
in schools, health care, and infrastructure without increasing taxes on
average citizens.
B. FEDERAL FINANCING OF PILOT FE PROJECTS
In order to find effective, efficient, and practical FE models, the
federal government could fund some local or state pilot projects. The
government could also create a TVA type program for the Gulf Coast
hurricane damage reconstruction and include well-conceived mecha-
nisms used by the New Deal to get funds to people who need them most,
provide decent-wage jobs to displaced people to do reconstruction, and
prevent the corrupt use of funds. The government could require a high
FE requirement when no-bid contracts are granted, in order to discourage
that practice, which would provide greater opportunities for local and
small businesses. 587
585 "The Citizen's Guide to the Airwaves", Media Access Project (MAP), New America
Foundation (2003) and on their web site the MAP states, "The electromagnetic spectrum repre-
sents on of our greatest public resources. Unlike grazing land or old growth forests, however,
use of spectrum can be virtually inexhaustible .... the FCC issues exclusive licenses to use
spectrum. Until recently, the FCC gave away (sic) limited number of licenses for free on
condition that the licensee serve their local community. Since 1993, the FCC has sold the right
to use spectrum at auction." New technology is changing the need for exclusively allocated
spectrum, and new policies are decreasing the public interest obligations of broadcasters. J.H.
Snider, "The Decline of Broadcasters' Public Interest Obligations - a Policy Backgrounder",
New America Foundation (3/26/2004).
586 See http://www.pfd.state.ak.us/ - from original FN 289.
587 See Weisman, Jonathan & Witte, Grief, "Katrina Contracts will be Reopened", Wash-
ington Post, October 7, 2005 at 1, reporting that in the rebuilding after Hurricane Katrina,
there were numerous instances of large out-of-state companies allegedly receiving no-bid con-
tracts, causing small local companies whose owners and employees were direct victims of the
hurricane to miss out on the work.
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C. How FAIR EXCHANGE CAN HELP COMMUNITIES SURVIVE THE
GLOBAL "RACE TO THE BOTTOM" AND IMPROVE GLOBAL
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY
From 2000 to 2004, the EPI shows that Indian software jobs produc-
ing exports to the U.S. increased 120%, while, between 2000 and 2002,
U.S. software occupations decreased by 154%.588 As an increasing num-
ber of higher skilled jobs leave the U.S. for lower-wage and lower-bene-
fit countries, communities in the U.S. and, ultimately in all countries,
will need to adjust their relationships with corporations they aid and sub-
sidize. As the corporations they invest in continue to move jobs out of
the communities for cheaper wages, communities and citizens should be
receiving market-level compensation for their investments in those com-
panies. Otherwise, the communities could be left with the short end of
the stick, suffering economically while the companies' profits
increase.589
One distinct advantage to the FE approach is it does not pit higher-
wage countries against lower-wage countries. FE does not prevent com-
panies from moving to lower-wage countries when competition calls for
it. Rather, FE requires that the community, which invested in the com-
pany making such a move, receive a benefit comparable to that of other
company shareholders. Thus, FE does not penalize developing econo-
mies. Developing countries can also be hurt by capital mobility. The
U.S.'s recent lifting of textile quotas exemplifies this proposition. Facto-
ries in many developing countries were threatened with closure as China
absorbed a huge segment of the textile market.5 90 If FE rules were ap-
plied universally, it could aid poor countries that have invested in busi-
ness infrastructure by returning to their citizens and communities a
portion of the profits they helped generate.
In recent years the quality of life in the U.S. has decreased due to
global competition, with economic growth feeding corporate profits and
lost U.S. manufacturing jobs not being replaced with similarly high-paid,
588 Lawrence Mishel, Jared Bernstein & Sylvia Allegretto, "Facts & Figures - Wages"
p.2, The State of Working America2004/2005, Economic Policy Institute, Cornell University
Press, January 2005 found at http://www.epinet.org/content.cfm/booksswa2004 (4/7/2005).
589 See id. ( showing how from 2000 to 2004 Indian software jobs producing exports to
the United States increased 102%, while from 2000 to 2002 U.S. software occupations de-
creased by 154%).
590 Cecil Yancy Jr. "End of Textile Quotas to Further Hurt Industry" SouthEast Farm
Press, October 6, 2004, "When the World Trade Organization (WTO) lifted quotas on 29
categories of manufactured goods in 2002, China's share of the U.S. market in those products
went from 9 percent to 65 percent ... In an ironic twist, many of the same developing coun-
tries who once clamored for repeal of the quotas have now signed the Istanbul Declaration.
When their voices were loudest in support of repeal of the quotas, the developing countries did
not anticipate Chinese dominance and China was not yet a member of the WTO."
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full-time jobs with benefits.5 9 1 The pay and benefits in the jobs replacing
these lost manufacturing jobs are considerably less than those in the jobs
they replaced. 592A smaller percentage of the U.S. workforce is employed
full-time. 593 Full-time employees are likely to have less comprehensive
health care benefits today than fifteen years ago (if they have any); pay
higher co-pay for benefits they receive, and are less likely to have a de-
fined benefit pension plan. 594 The U.S. economy has grown in the past
decades without significant increases in employment rates or wages. 595
Private sector unions are smaller than they were fifty years ago and are
losing members and benefits every year.596 All of these phenomena are,
largely attributable to pressure from the global marketplace. Simultane-
ously, virtually all state governments are financially strapped and cutting
already meager budgets for education, healthcare, transportation and
other essential services.
At this writing the entire airline industry is going through a transi-
tion, fueled by low-cost carriers providing lower wages and benefits to
their employees than more established airlines. In order to survive finan-
cially, older companies have been reducing their labor and benefit costs
591 News Release from EPI announcing the book, LAWRENCE MISHEL, JARED BERNSTEIN
& SYLVIA ALLEGRETrO, THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 2004/2005, (Economic Policy In-
stitute, Cornell University Press, January 2005) found at http://www.epinet.org/content.cfm/
books-swa2004 (4/7/2005). .... [s]ince the recession began in the first quarter of 2001, 85% of
the growth of corporate income has accrued to profits, and 15% to compensation. In contrast,
compensation comprised 79% of the income growth in the corporate sector in eight prior
business cycles, with profits contributing 21% of the growth."
592 See id. (comparing industries that are adding jobs faster than average (expanding in-
dustries) with those that are losing jobs faster than average (contracting industries), "Con-
tracting industries paid $61,983 in annual compensation, including all wages and benefits,
while expanding industries paid $35,546 in compensation... or 42% less.").
593 See id. "The underemployment rate (including part-time workers who want to work
full-time and discouraged workers who've given up looking for jobs) increased 9.6% as of
June 2004." "The employment gain during the latest recovery was only 0.2%. On average,
employment increased by 9.5% in the previous nine economic recoveries."
594 Facts and Figures: Wages, The State of Working America2004/2005, (Economic Pol-
icy Institute, Cornell University Press, January 2005) found at http://www.epinet.org/content.
cfm/books_swa2004 (4/12005). "Health insurance coverage eroded for all wage groups in the
2000-02 period. Over the longer period, 1979-2002, health insurance coverage declined siza-
bly, and comparably, across the wage spectrum. Less than half the workforce is covered by
employer-provided pensions. Pension coverage fell from 48.3% in 2000 to just 45.5% in
2002."
595 See News Release from EPI, supra note 592, "After almost three years of recovery,
.. unemployment is essentially unchanged, job growth has stalled and real wages have started
to fall behind inflation. Today's picture is a stark contract to the full employment period before
the recession, when the tight labor market ensured that the benefits of growth were broadly
shared ... This is a worse position, in terms of recouping lost jobs, than nay business cycle
since the 1930s."
596 In 2003, 15.8 million U.S. workers belonged to unionsl2.9 percent of the U.S.
workforce (Bureau of Labor Statistics). Fifty years ago, 16.8 million workers belonged to
unions-but they made up 33 percent of the U.S. workforce (Bureau of Labor Statistics) found
at http://www.aflcio.org/aboutaflcio/ourfuture/facts-densityunion.cfm (04/07/2005).
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as best they can. For example, United went to bankruptcy court to unload
their pension liabilities on the public. 597 The extra cost to the public does
not end with the extra pension benefits. Every uninsured person who is
treated in a hospital is paid for through the ever-increasing insurance
premiums paid by the companies and individuals who still have health
insurance. Those increased costs, in turn, make the companies that pro-
vide health insurance and retirement plans, less competitive than those
that do not. For example at General Motors (GM) health care alone ac-
count(s) for $1,400 in the cost of every vehicle built in the United States.
GM's Japanese competition spends less than $400 per vehicle for health
care, leaving General Motors with a penalty of $1,000 a vehicle or $4
billion annually. 598
According to David Cole, Chairman of the Center for Automotive
Research (CAR).
Domestic manufacturers... pay $2,000 to $2,500 per car in current
work health-care and retiree legacy costs - costs that are unsupportable
in a world with capacity of 80 million units and demand of 60 million.599
This is a key reason why they U.S. automakers, such as General
Motors, are losing market share to younger foreign companies. 600 This
vicious cycle is called the "race to the bottom." FE will not stop this race,
but it does provide an effective means for communities to reap some of
the rewards of global economic restructuring for which they are now
paying the bills.
CONCLUSION
In order to create a humane and sustainable global community that
properly balances the needs of communities with the important economic
interests of business, several strategies should be pursued simultane-
ously. These strategies include: 1) creating enforceable agreements on
environmental sustainability and human, civil and labor rights; 2) elevat-
ing the sovereign rights of communities in relationship to businesses; 3)
reorganizing the international financial institutions, internalizing of the
costs of products and services (through corporate accountability mea-
597 BNA Pension & Benefits Reporter Vol.32, No.5, Feb. 1, 2005 at 263 -64.
598 James E. Harbour, "Why GM's profits really hit the wall: While legacy costs are real
all-new cars may pose a real problem" DETROIT NEWS, March 27, 2005 found at http://www.
detnews.com/2005/editorial/0503/27/A15-129850.htm (4/7/05) (Indicating that General Mo-
tors (GM) health care alone account(s) for $1,400 in the cost of every vehicle built in the
United States while Japanese counterparts spend less than $400 per vehicle for health care.)
599 Tom Henderson, "What Drives Detroit" FACSNET BUSINESS & ECONOMIcs April 7,
2005, found at http://www.facsnet.org/tools/biz-econ/detroit-auto.php (4/7/05)
600 C. Loomis, Fortune, "The Tragedy of General Motors" at 5, Feb. 6, 2006, found at
CNNMoney.com.printthis.clickability.com/pt/ctp?action=CP&title:The+Tragedy+of+General
+Motors, 2/8/06.
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sures) now externalized onto the public; and 4) providing a source of
non-wage income through broad ownership to offset the loss of jobs
caused by technology.
A. FAIR EXCHANGE IS ONLY ONE OF THESE STRATEGIES
(FE) is not a solution to all of the problems mentioned in this article
and it does not address all the above-mentioned strategies. It is one of
several important strategies, however, which, when pursued in tandem
with the above-mentioned strategies, can help bring balance back into the
relationship between businesses and communities.
FE provides a businesslike approach in which companies treat com-
munities as investors. FE can be used to retain and rebuild community
assets that have increasingly been privatized, and to provide a second
stream of income for all citizens. It can be utilized to build the asset base
for all citizens to truly be stakeholders in the community. It can be a first
step towards reclaiming the commons for the community.
This article was written during 2004 and 2005 when direct govern-
ment ownership and management of business operations was an ex-
tremely unpopular idea, and elimination or privatization of public
services was the trend. The political climate in the U.S. may change as
the consequences of privatization and tax cuts take their toll on public
well being. The cumulative social cost of tax cuts, the Iraq war, and the
reconstruction following the hurricanes of 2005 may change the political
climate regarding government spending, which could make the New
Deal programs like the TVA more appealing and more politically viable.
A key feature that made the New Deal work was stringent oversight and
controls that prevented corruption and patronage. The model legislation
provided herein provides a system of checks and balances. However, any
FE program would require a strong external oversight mechanism to
monitor the possibility of corruption and patronage.
This article aims to open a new field of study and policy to discus-
sion. Many ideas and proposals herein require further development and
refinement. I intend to pursue this development and invite readers to do
the same.60 1
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2006] FAIR EXCHANGE
APPENDIX A. STOCK WARRANTS ISSUED BY
EACH AIRLINE 60 2
Amount
borrowed in Stock warrants
Carrier Website millions $ issued Comments
America West http://www.america 380 Issued to ATSB In conditional letter
west.com/default.asp warrants for the from ATSB - Gov-
(then go to About purchase of 18.75 ernment needs to
AWA, Investor Rela- million shares of receive warrants that
tions, Press Releases Class B common represent 33% of
and pick desired stock at an exercise AWA's common
year) price of $3.00 per stock on a fully
share. Exercise diluted basis....
period of 10 years. MSN article says
Additional 3.8 mil- 5%
lion warrants with
same terms will be
issued to other par-
ticipants in the loan.
American Trans http://www.ata.com/ 148.5 11% of ATA stock No information
Air sitemap.html - according to MSN available re: war-
report rants on ATA web-
site or ATSB press
release
Aloha Airlines http://www.alohaair 40.5
lines.com/fly/index.
htm (No loan infor-
mation on website)
Frontier Airlines http://fronierairlines. 63 Issued warrants to Already repaid loan
com/ purchase 3,833,946 (02-14-03); not due
shares of common until 2007.
stock at $6.00 per
share to the ATSB
(and two other guar-
antors). The warrants
had an estimated fair
value of $9,282,538
when issued and
expire 7 years after
issuance. Subse-
quently re-priced
from $6.00 to $5.92
per share....
US Airways http://usairways.com/ 900 Warrants represent-
ing 10% of reorga-
nized equity....
World Airways http://worldair.com/ 27 Issued to ATSB
warrants to purchase
an aggregate of
2,378,233 shares of
Common Stock...
(see pg. 34 of Ann
Rep - stock stag-
gered over years and
prices)
602 Appendix A, showing the stock warrants issued by each airline, was compiled from
data taken from the ATSB website and the airlines' websites.

